University of California, Berkeley
Mathematics
PhD, 1994
CV
Oxford, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  •  154
    What is the theory without power set?
    with Victoria Gitman and Thomas A. Johnstone
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 62 (4-5): 391-406. 2016.
    We show that the theory, consisting of the usual axioms of but with the power set axiom removed—specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well‐ordered—is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of in which ω1 is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet ω1 exists, in which there a…Read more
  •  73
    Infinite Time Turing Machines With Only One Tape
    with Daniel Evan Seabold
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 47 (2): 271-287. 2001.
    Infinite time Turing machines with only one tape are in many respects fully as powerful as their multi-tape cousins. In particular, the two models of machine give rise to the same class of decidable sets, the same degree structure and, at least for partial functions f : ℝ → ℕ, the same class of computable functions. Nevertheless, there are infinite time computable functions f : ℝ → ℝ that are not one-tape computable, and so the two models of infinitary computation are not equivalent. Surprisingl…Read more
  •  548
    Large cardinals need not be large in HOD
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 166 (11): 1186-1198. 2015.
    We prove that large cardinals need not generally exhibit their large cardinal nature in HOD. For example, a supercompact cardinal κ need not be weakly compact in HOD, and there can be a proper class of supercompact cardinals in V, none of them weakly compact in HOD, with no supercompact cardinals in HOD. Similar results hold for many other types of large cardinals, such as measurable and strong cardinals.
  •  124
    The rigid relation principle, a new weak choice principle
    with Justin Palumbo
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 58 (6): 394-398. 2012.
    The rigid relation principle, introduced in this article, asserts that every set admits a rigid binary relation. This follows from the axiom of choice, because well‐orders are rigid, but we prove that it is neither equivalent to the axiom of choice nor provable in Zermelo‐Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of choice. Thus, it is a new weak choice principle. Nevertheless, the restriction of the principle to sets of reals (among other general instances) is provable without the axiom of choice.
  •  144
    Post's problem for supertasks has both positive and negative solutions
    with Andrew Lewis
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 41 (6): 507-523. 2002.
    The infinite time Turing machine analogue of Post's problem, the question whether there are semi-decidable supertask degrees between 0 and the supertask jump 0∇, has in a sense both positive and negative solutions. Namely, in the context of the reals there are no degrees between 0 and 0∇, but in the context of sets of reals, there are; indeed, there are incomparable semi-decidable supertask degrees. Both arguments employ a kind of transfinite-injury construction which generalizes canonically to …Read more
  •  205
    Indestructible Strong Unfoldability
    with Thomas A. Johnstone
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (3): 291-321. 2010.
    Using the lottery preparation, we prove that any strongly unfoldable cardinal $\kappa$ can be made indestructible by all
  •  173
    Canonical seeds and Prikry trees
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (2): 373-396. 1997.
    Applying the seed concept to Prikry tree forcing P μ , I investigate how well P μ preserves the maximality property of ordinary Prikry forcing and prove that P μ Prikry sequences are maximal exactly when μ admits no non-canonical seeds via a finite iteration. In particular, I conclude that if μ is a strongly normal supercompactness measure, then P μ Prikry sequences are maximal, thereby proving, for a large class of measures, a conjecture of W. Hugh Woodin's
  •  105
    New inconsistencies in infinite utilitarianism: Is every world good, bad or neutral?
    with Donniell Fishkind and Barbara Montero
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2). 2002.
    In the context of worlds with infinitely many bearers of utility, we argue that several collections of natural Utilitarian principles--principles which are certainly true in the classical finite Utilitarian context and which any Utilitarian would find appealing--are inconsistent.
  •  180
    With infinite utility, more needn't be better
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2). 2000.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  301
    Exactly controlling the non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals
    with Arthur W. Apter
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 68 (2): 669-688. 2003.
    We summarize the known methods of producing a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal and describe some new variants. Our Main Theorem shows how to apply these methods to many cardinals simultaneously and exactly control which cardinals are supercompact and which are only strongly compact in a forcing extension. Depending upon the method, the surviving non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals can be strong cardinals, have trivial Mitchell rank or even contain a club disjoint from the set o…Read more
  •  195
    Small forcing makes any cardinal superdestructible
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (1): 51-58. 1998.
    Small forcing always ruins the indestructibility of an indestructible supercompact cardinal. In fact, after small forcing, any cardinal κ becomes superdestructible--any further
  •  137
    Fragile measurability
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (1): 262-282. 1994.
    Laver [L] and others [G-S] have shown how to make the supercompactness or strongness of κ indestructible by a wide class of forcing notions. We show, alternatively, how to make these properties fragile. Specifically, we prove that it is relatively consistent that any forcing which preserves $\kappa^{
  •  99
    Changing the Heights of Automorphism Towers by Forcing with Souslin Trees over L
    with Gunter Fuchs
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 73 (2). 2008.
    We prove that there are groups in the constructible universe whose automorphism towers are highly malleable by forcing. This is a consequence of the fact that, under a suitable diamond hypothesis, there are sufficiently many highly rigid non-isomorphic Souslin trees whose isomorphism relation can be precisely controlled by forcing
  •  107
    The least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and nearly $${\theta}$$ θ -supercompact
    with Brent Cody, Moti Gitik, and Jason A. Schanker
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 54 (5-6): 491-510. 2015.
    We prove from suitable large cardinal hypotheses that the least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and even nearly θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}-supercompact, for any desired θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} …Read more
  •  502
    The set-theoretic multiverse
    Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (3): 416-449. 2012.
    The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous range of set-theoretic …Read more