Joel David Hamkins

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, Σn-reflecting cardinals, Σn-correct cardinals and Σn-extendible cardinals are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdestructible: if κ exhibits any of them, with corresponding target θ, then in any forcing extension arising from nontrivial strategically

Infinite time Turing machines with only one tape are in many respects fully as powerful as their multi-tape cousins. In particular, the two models of machine give rise to the same class of decidable sets, the same degree structure and, at least for partial functions f : ℝ → ℕ, the same class of computable functions. Nevertheless, there are infinite time computable functions f : ℝ → ℝ that are not one-tape computable, and so the two models of infinitary computation are not equivalent. Surprisingly, the class of one-tape computable functions is not closed under composition; but closing it under composition yields the full class of all infinite time computable functions. Finally, every ordinal that is clockable by an infinite time Turing machine is clockable by a one-tape machine, except certain isolated ordinals that end gaps in the clockable ordinals

The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous range of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for

In this paper, following an idea of Christophe Chalons. I propose a new kind of forcing axiom, the Maximality Principle, which asserts that any sentence varphi holding in some forcing extension $V^P$ and all subsequent extensions $V^{P\ast Q}$ holds already in V. It follows, in fact, that such sentences must also hold in all forcing extensions of V. In modal terms, therefore, the Maximality Principle is expressed by the scheme $(\lozenge \square \varphi) \Rightarrow \square \varphi$ , and is equivalent to the modal theory S5. In this article. I prove that the Maximality Principle is relatively consistent with ZFC. A boldface version of the Maximality Principle, obtained by allowing real parameters to appear in φ, is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $V_\delta \prec V$ for an inaccessible cardinal δ, which in turn is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that ORD is Mahlo. The strongest principle along these lines is $\square MP\!_{\!\!\!\!\!\!_{\!\!_\sim}}$ , which asserts that $MP\!_{\!\!\!\!\!\!_{\!\!_\sim}}$ holds in V and all forcing extensions. From this, it follows that $0^\#$ exists, that $x^\#$ exists for every set x, that projective truth is invariant by forcing, that Woodin cardinals are consistent and much more. Many open questions remain

A pointwise definable model is one in which every object is \loos definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this property strengthens $V=\HOD$, but is not first-order expressible. Nevertheless, if \ZFC\ is consistent, then there are continuum many pointwise definable models of \ZFC. If there is a transitive model of \ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive models of \ZFC. What is more, every countable model of \ZFC\ has a class forcing extension that is pointwise definable. Indeed, for the main contribution of this article, every countable model of Gödel-Bernays set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which every set and class is first-order definable without parameters

We show that the theory, consisting of the usual axioms of but with the power set axiom removed—specifically axiomatized by extensionality, foundation, pairing, union, infinity, separation, replacement and the assertion that every set can be well‐ordered—is weaker than commonly supposed and is inadequate to establish several basic facts often desired in its context. For example, there are models of in which ω1 is singular, in which every set of reals is countable, yet ω1 exists, in which there are sets of reals of every size, but none of size, and therefore, in which the collection axiom fails; there are models of for which the Łoś theorem fails, even when the ultrapower is well‐founded and the measure exists inside the model; there are models of for which the Gaifman theorem fails, in that there is an embedding of models that is Σ1‐elementary and cofinal, but not elementary; there are elementary embeddings of models whose cofinal restriction is not elementary. Moreover, the collection of formulas that are provably equivalent in to a Σ1‐formula or a Π1‐formula is not closed under bounded quantification. Nevertheless, these deficits of are completely repaired by strengthening it to the theory, obtained by using collection rather than replacement in the axiomatization above. These results extend prior work of Zarach.

The Lévy-Solovay Theorem [8] limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small forcing extension. Here I announce a generalization of this theorem to a broad new class of forcing notions. One consequence is that many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal literature create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, and so on

In this paper, following an idea of Christophe Chalons, I propose a new kind of forcing axiom, the Maximality Principle, which asserts that any sentence φ holding in some forcing extension $V\P$ and all subsequent extensions V\P*\Qdot holds already in V. It follows, in fact, that such sentences must also hold in all forcing extensions of V. In modal terms, therefore, the Maximality Principle is expressed by the scheme $\implies\necessaryφ$, and is equivalent to the modal theory S5. In this article, I prove that the Maximality Principle is relatively consistent with \ZFC. A boldface version of the Maximality Principle, obtained by allowing real parameters to appear in φ, is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $Vδ\elesub V$ for an inaccessible cardinal δ, which in turn is equiconsistent with the scheme asserting that $\ORD$ is Mahlo. The strongest principle along these lines is $\necessary\MPtilde$, which asserts that $\MPtilde$ holds in V and all forcing extensions. From this, it follows that 0# exists, that x# exists for every set x, that projective truth is invariant by forcing, that Woodin cardinals are consistent and much more. Many open questions remain.

We summarize the known methods of producing a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal and describe some new variants. Our Main Theorem shows how to apply these methods to many cardinals simultaneously and exactly control which cardinals are supercompact and which are only strongly compact in a forcing extension. Depending upon the method, the surviving non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals can be strong cardinals, have trivial Mitchell rank or even contain a club disjoint from the set of measurable cardinals. These results improve and unify Theorems 1 and 2 of [5], due to the first author

The Gap Forcing Theorem, a key contribution of this paper, implies essentially that after any reverse Easton iteration of closed forcing, such as the Laver preparation, every supercompactness measure on a supercompact cardinal extends a measure from the ground model. Thus, such forcing can create no new supercompact cardinals, and, if the GCH holds, neither can it increase the degree of supercompactness of any cardinal; in particular, it can create no new measurable cardinals. In a crescendo of what I call exact preservation theorems, I use this new technology to perform a kind of partial Laver preparation, and thereby finely control the class of posets which preserve a supercompact cardinal. Eventually, I prove the ‘As You Like It’ Theorem, which asserts that the class of κ -directed closed posets which preserve a supercompact cardinal κ can be made by forcing to conform with any pre-selected local definition which respects the equivalence of forcing. Along the way I separate completely the levels of the superdestructibility hierarchy, and, in an epilogue, prove that the notions of fragility and superdestructibility are orthogonal — all four combinations are possible