Jonathan Bain

Radical Ontic Structural Realism (ROSR) claims that structure exists independently of objects that may instantiate it. Critics of ROSR contend that this claim is conceptually incoherent, insofar as, (i) it entails there can be relations without relata, and (ii) there is a conceptual dependence between relations and relata. In this essay I suggest that (ii) is motivated by a set-theoretic formulation of structure, and that adopting a category-theoretic formulation may provide ROSR with more support. In particular, I consider how a category-theoretic formulation of structure can be developed that denies (ii), and can be made to do work in the context of formulating theories in physics. Keywords: structural realism, category theory, general relativity..

Einstein algebras have been suggested (Earman 1989) and rejected (Rynasiewicz 1992) as a way to avoid the hole argument against spacetime substantivalism. In this article, I debate their merits and faults. In particular, I suggest that a gauge‐invariant interpretation of Einstein algebras that avoids the hole argument can be associated with one approach to quantizing gravity, and, for this reason, is at least as well motivated as sophisticated substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of the standard tensor formalism

In this essay, I consider what condensed matter physics has to say about the nature of spacetime. In particular, I consider the extent to which spacetime can be modeled as a quantum liquid, with matter and force fields described by effective field theories of the low-energy excitations of the liquid. After a brief review of effective field theories in 2-dim highly-correlated condensed matter systems, I evaluate analogies in the recent physics literature between spacetime and superfluid Helium, and proposals that suggest spacetime is an emergent phenomenon arising from the edge states of a 4-dim Quantum Hall liquid. KeyworCh: spacetime, effective field theory, condensed matter, quantum gravity..

Algebraic substantivalism, as an interpretation of general relativity formulated in the Einstein algebra formalism, avoids the hole argument against manifold substantivalism. In this essay, I argue that this claim is well-founded. I first identify the hole argument as an argument against a specific form of semantic realism with respect to spacetime. I then consider algebraic substantivalism as an alternative form of semantic realism. In between, I justify this alternative form by reviewing the Einstein algebra formalism and indicating the extent to which it is expressively equivalent to the standard formalism of tensor analysis on differential manifolds.

This book seeks to answer the question "What explains CPT invariance and the spin-statistics connection?" These properties play foundational roles in relativistic quantum field theories, are supported by high-precision experiments, and figure into explanations of a wide range of phenomena, from antimatter, to the periodic table of the elements, to superconductors and superfluids. They can be derived in RQFTs by means of the famous CPT and Spin-Statistics theorems; but, the author argues, these theorems cannot be said to explain these properties, at least under standard philosophical accounts of scientific explanation. This is because there are multiple, in some cases incompatible, ways of deriving these theorems, and, secondly, because the theorems fail for the types of theories that underwrite the empirical evidence: non-relativistic quantum theories, and realistic interacting RQFTs. The goal of this book is to work towards an understanding of CPT invariance and the spin-statistics connection by first providing an analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for these properties, and second by advocating a particular account of explanation appropriate for this context.

CPT invariance and the spin-statistics connection are typically taken to be essential properties in relativistic quantum field theories (RQFTs), insofar as the CPT and Spin-Statistics theorems entail that any state of a physical system characterized by an RQFT must possess these properties. Moreover, in the physics literature, they are typically taken to be properties of particles. But there is a Received View among philosophers that RQFTs cannot fundamentally be about particles. This essay considers what proofs of the CPT and Spin-Statistics theorems suggest about the ontology of RQFTs, and the extent to which this is compatible with the Received View. I will argue that such proofs suggest the Received View’s approach to ontology is flawed