Annette Claire Baier

(1929 - 2012)

_Postures of the Mind _was first published in 1985. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Annette Baier develops, in these essays, a posture in philosophy of mind and in ethics that grows out of her reading of Hume and the later Wittgenstein, and that challenges several Kantian or analytic articles of faith. She questions the assumption that intellect has authority over all human feelings and traditions; that to recognize order we must recognize universal laws—descriptive or prescriptive; that the essential mental activity is representing; and that mental acts can be analyzed into discrete basic elements, combined according to statable rules of synthesis. In the first group of essays—"Varieties of Mental Postures"—Baier evaluates the positions taken by philosophers ranging from Descartes to Dennett and Davidson. Among her topics are remembering, intending, realizing, caring, representing, changing one's mind, justifying one's actions and feelings, and having conflicting reasons for them. The second group of essays—"Varieties of Moral Postures" - explores the sort of morality we get when all of these capacities become reflective and self-corrective. Some deal with particular moral issues—our treatment of animals, our policies regarding risk to human life, our contractual obligations; others, with more general questions on the role of moral philosophers and the place of moral theory. These essays respond to the theories of Hobbes, Kant, Rawls, and MacIntyre, but Baier's most positive reaction is to David Hume; _Postures of the Mind _ affirms and cultivates his version of a moral reflection that employs feeling and tradition as well as reason.

Both a morality, like Kant's, which relies on wrongdoers' guilt feelings and expectation of punishment, as enforcement for its requirements, and one which, like Hume's, relies on the feelings of shame and expectation of their fellows' contempt which will be felt by those showing lack of the moral virtues, seem to merit the charge that morality is an intrinsically cruel institution. The prospects for a gentle non-punitive morality are explored, and Hume's views found more promising, for this purpose, than Kant's.

In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:133. HUME ON RESENTMENT In his Enquiry version of the conditions of justice, Hume adds a third modified Hobbesian condition to the two, moderate scarcity and moderate selfishness, which he had listed in the Treatise. The new condition is a certain measure of equality, or limit ±o inequality—justice is owed, he says, only if there is a society of more-or-less equals; and only to those who are members of it. The equality in question concerns the ability of candidate societymembers to make us feel the effects of their resentment (E190). If such ability is lacking, then, Hume says, the relationships between "us" and "them" will be those of absolute command on the one side and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions : Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will (Ibid. ). This passage is interesting because Hume describes the position of such powerless creatures intermingled with men in terms which appear to be social —command, obedience, possession, tenure, the act of "resigning" coveted goods. But he says that our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality (Ibid. ). True society is, then, restricted to those who are roughly equal, whose interests help to determine the conventions which give rise to duties of justice. But intermingled with the members of such a real society there might be, were or are, a species of creatures, who, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment (Ibid. ). They are "rational", so can obey, can resign possessions, and can resent their inferior status. They have quasi-social relations with their masters, but not fully social ones, since they are neither parties to nor bene- 134. ficiaries of the social conventions which create rights and duties. Hume seems to assume that because they are not parties to the artifice-creating conventions, those conventions will not cover relations with them, so that the conveners' "laws" are limited, and allow them a sphere of "lawless will" in their dealings with the inferior creatures. But children, for example, while not legislators, may be both right holders and beneficiaries of the laws which adults agree on. Hume is most charitably read here to mean that the conventions which serve the interests of the superior creatures might not, cannot be depended on, to regulate in any way the dealings of the superiors with the inferiors. They are left at the mercy of their superiors, resent that fact, and yet may be powerless to alter the situation. It is very clear from what follows that Hume has in mind in this passage the relations of males to females, and that it is his thoughts about male-female relationships which led to his emendation of his Treatise account of the conditions of justice. The Treatise had not mentioned equality of power as a condition for justice, but had devoted a chapter to the extra obligations, of chastity and modesty, which social conventions imposed on the female sex. It was therefore a natural question to arise for Hume whether women really could be parties to conventions which imposed these obligations on them. Were their interests served, or did these obligations arise from "the voluntary conventions of men, " (T510, emphasis added) who asked themselves What restraint, therefore, shall we impose upon women, in order to counter-balance so strong a temptation as they have to infidelity? (T571). Hume had argued that female fidelity was needed for male paternal obligations to be properly assigned, so that it was in the interests of children, of fathers, and of society in general, that fatherhood be determinable, and so that wives be chaste. Now, in the Enquiry, he considers the possibility of a class of slaves whose interests, like those of animals, need not be considered 135, in the conventions which generate duties of justice. The great superiority of civilized Europeans above barbarous Indians, tempted us to imagine ourselves on...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier Annette C. Baier Gauthier's splendidly dialectical paper1 first sets out Hume's official Treatise account ofhow each personhas a self-interested motive to curb her natural but socially troublesome self-interest, by agreeing to the adoption ofthe artifices ofprivate property rights, transfer by consent, and promise (provided others are also agreeing to adopt them), andhow the sympathy-dependent moral sentiment approves of such a redirection of"the interested passion." Enlightened self-interest gives us the natural obligation tojustice; the fact that it is morally approved turns it into a moral obligation. Self-hatred for any breaches of the moral obligation may come in to bolster the self-interested motivation, and this will be helped along by the extra artifices employed by educators and politicians. So far so good. But now enters the sensible knave, who queries the initial assumption that each will in fact gain more by strict conformity to the rules of the Humean social artifices than by occasional carefully calculated and undetected breaches of them. If the knave is right, then the Treatise story ofhow reasonable self-interested people can get themselves to conscientiously respect property rights (including rights ofbarter), and to keep promises, is in trouble. Only by an erroneous calculation of their interest could they end with the motivation which Hume attributes to them, and finds to be morally approvable.Gauthier argues that there are indications even in the Treatise that Hume is aware ofthe flawed nature ofhis official account, since he attributes "sophistry" to some attempted justifications of honest behaviour, and attributes "feigned acts" of impossible willing to some conscientious promise-keepers. Gauthier finds Hume to have, in the Treatise, a second, less official story ofwhat it takes to be motivated to be just—that it takes error, and letting oneself be taken in by feignings and sophistry. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals this submerged account surfaces in the sensible knave's challenge and Hume's admission that his own answer will not be satisfactory to the knave. The charms of official Humeanjustice, Gauthierconcludes, are spurious, sincethe "anatomy" of the account of the rational motivation to be just is known to be unsound. "The sensible knave's message is thathuman society... lacks any moral foundation." Volume XVIII Number 2 429 ANNETTE C. BAIER This is a sombre tale. One of its unwelcome implications is that Hume himself, really believing that the knave is right, but unwilling tobe seen tohave the bad grace to "dehver a theory, however true which... leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious," is simply trying to "sink" the knave's truth in oblivion by creating a smoke-screen of insincere rhetoric about the greater delights of consciousness of integrity over the knave's satisfaction in his ill-gotten gains. So there really are two sombre tales—one, attributed to Hume, about justice, and one about Hume's dupUcity (or is it mere cynical frivolity?): Gauthier crafts both stories beautifully, directing our attention to bits ofHume's text injust the right order for his dramatic purposes. But is he giving us truth or fiction? I completely agree with Gauthier's version of Hume's official Treatise story, that the moral obligation to justice supervenes on the "natural obligation" for which Hume believes the natural motivation to be collectively redirected self- (or family) interest.2 1 agree that there are one or two passages, especially in the Treatise section, "Of the obUgation of promises," that seem to jar with this account, and which much somehow be explained. I agree that Hume believes that his reply to the knave is, from the knave's point ofview, unsatisfactory. Now for some disagreements. First, about Hume's reply to the knave.3From the viewpointofthevirtuous dues-payingmemberof"the party of humankind," Hume's is a perfectly satisfactory reply. It will be plain truth, for a person with the other Humean virtues (including equity, which is listed as a natural virtue),4 that justice will bring as great or greater good than would judicious injustice. Even if it would be "simply preposterous" to believe that the social order is dangerously threatened by any...

Frankena sees moral point of view theories as steering a middle course between scepticism or relativism in ethics and absolutism or dogmatism. The constraints of a distinctive point of view limit the range of moral judgments, provide some basis to expect agreement between different moral judges, and generate standards if not of moral truth at least of moral acceptability. Since however these constraints arise only from the moral point of view, they are avoidable if the point of view is avoidable, and do not impose absolute inescapable demands on every person. Frankena sees the judgments made from the moral point of view to include categorical ones, but since he does not characterize the point of view itself as either the final court of practical reason or as an inevitable point of view, the categorical judgments made from that point of view are themselves externally conditional on taking that view-point. The most that can be said is that when and if one takes that viewpoint, certain demands are inescapable and unconditional. The whole illocutionary act of making the categorical moral judgment is as it were limited by the condition that one’s hearers, including oneself as hearer, share the point of view. Made fully explicit, what I am calling the external conditional would take this form: “Provided that one takes the moral point of view, one must acknowledge the unconditional obligation to …”. This is quite different from claims like “If one is a parent one has obligations to one’s child,” which is itself presumably a claim which may have an implicit initial qualifier of the form “From the moral point of view …” or “From the legal point of view …”. It might of course also be saying “From the point of view of practical rationality as such, a point of view which one cannot refuse to take, and beyond which lies no more comprehensive or corrected point of view …”. Frankena distinguishes this ultimately authoritative practical judgment from a moral judgment, while nevertheless suggesting that practical reason will normally endorse what morality has decreed. It is not, however, part of the very meaning of “moral point of view” that that point be final or inescapable for human persons.

Maclntyre’s contrast between contemporary individualist versions of morality, expressive of arbitrary selfwill, and some less willful or less arbitrary moral guidance, is queried. All social practices, both those Maclntyre disapproves of and those he prefers, are claimed to contain elements of arbitrariness, and some scope for the expression of some individual human wills. Maclntyre’s neglect of the question of what allocation of power a particular practice or set of practices involves is contrasted with Hume’s due but not undue attention to this matter. Maclntyre’s treatment of Hume’s place in the history of the Aristotelian conception of the moral life as cultivation of virtues is criticized and tentatively explained as really due not to Hume’s anti-rationalism, but to his acceptance of the political and commercial practices which Maclntyre distrusts, and to his rejection of the non-Aristotelian religious concepts of other-worldly goods, sin and redemption from it, which Maclntyre wants added on to Aristotle’s moral theory.