Luc Bovens

There are two seemingly unrelated paradoxes of democracy. The older one is the doctrinal paradox or the discursive dilemma. or a comprehensive bibliography, see List 1995. The younger one is the mixed motivation problem introduced by Jonathan Wolff (1994) in this journal. In the mixed motivation problem, we have voters with mixed Benthamite and Rousseauian motivations who reach a majority on an issue that is neither in the self-interest of a majority of the voters, nor considered to be conducive to the common good by a majority of the voters. What has gone unnoticed so far is that both of these paradoxes share a common structure.

Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her views on the relevant sub-questions. The two procedures are not equivalent: There may be a majority of voters supporting each of the premises, but if these majorities do not significantly overlap, there will be a majority against the conclusion. Pettit (2001) connects the choice between the two procedures with the discussion of deliberative democracy. The problem we want to examine instead concerns the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two procedures from the epistemic point of view. Which of them is better when it comes to tracking truth? As it turns out, the answer is not univocal. On the basis of Condorcet’s jury theorem, the premise-based procedure can be shown to be superior if the objective is reach truth for the right reasons, without making any mistakes on the way. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which using the conclusion-based procedure turns out to be more reliable, even though, for the most part, the premise-based procedure will retain its superiority.

Suppose a committee has to take a stand on a complex issue, where the decision presupposes answering a number of sub-questions. There is an agreement within the committee which sub-questions should be posed. All questions are of the ”yes or no?”-type and the main question is to be given the yes-answer if and only if each sub-question is answered with “yes”. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one procedure, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results then determine the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure (or pbp, for short) can be contrasted with the conclusion-based procedure (cbp), on which the members directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her views on the relevant sub-questions. The problem we want to examine concerns the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two procedures from the epistemic point of view. In some cases one can assume that the question before the committee has a right answer, which the committee is trying to reach. Is one of the two procedures better when it comes to tracking the truth? As it turns out, the answer to this query is not univocal: On the basis of Condorcet’s jury theorem we shall show that the premise-based procedure is clearly superior if we want to reach truth for the right reasons, i.e. without making any mistakes on the road to the conclusion. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be special cases in which using the conclusion-based procedure turns out to be more reliable. But for the most part, the premise-based procedure will still retain its superiority. In this respect, our results disconfirm the tentative conjectures that have been put forward in Pettit and Rabinowicz (2001).

Blackburn argues that moral supervenience in conjunction with the lack of entailments from naturalistic to moral judgments poses a challenge to moral realism. Klagge and McFetridge try to avert the challenge by appealing to synthetically necessary connections between natural and moral properties. Blackburn rejoins that, even if there are such connections, the challenge still remains. We remain agnostic on the question whether there are such connections, but argue against Blackburn that, if there are indeed such connections, then the challenge to moral realism, properly phrased, does not hold up

Does the position of the Roman Catholic Church on contraception also imply that the usage of condoms by HIV-discordant couples is illicit? A standard argument is to appeal to the doctrine of double effect to condone such usage, but this meets with the objection that there exists an alternative action that brings about the good effect—namely, abstinence. I argue against this objection, because an HIV-discordant couple does not bring about any bad outcome through condom usage—there is no disrespect displayed for the generative function of sex. One might retort that the badness of condom usage consists in thwarting the unitive function of sex. I argue that also this objection cannot be upheld. In conclusion, if there are no in-principle objections against condom usage for HIV-discordant couples, then policies that deny access to condoms to such couples are indefensible. HIV-discordant couples have a right to continue consummating their marriage in a manner that is minimally risky and this right cannot be trumped by utilitarian concerns that the distribution of condoms might increase promiscuity and along with it the HIV infection rate.

The Government uses various policy tools to reduce alcohol consumption. There are restrictions on promotions, information campaigns, and pricing policies. These policies do not stand unchallenged. Restrictions on promotions irk business, information campaigns fail to reach the less educated, and pricing policies hurt responsible but poor consumers. So what about Thaler and Sunstein’s Nudge? Nudges keep choices open but change the “choice architecture” so as to help those who would like to drink less, and they do so in ways that constructively engage business. Let us focus on one choice environment here, namely beer consumption in British pubs

The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and betting rates diverge. Second, there is an analogy between ways of dealing with situations of this kind and different policies for sequential choice. Third, there is an analogy with strategic voting, showing that the common interest is not always served by expressing how things seem to you in social decision-making.

I give a voice to the sort of qualms we might have about photojournalism. But this is not to say that in each instance the scales will tip to the side of these qualms. To speak with Larry Burrows, sometimes penetrating the hearts of those at home vindicates our capitalizing on other men’s grief. Photojournalism’s role as a catalyst for social change does indeed give it a certain license. But in learning about what kind of values there are on the other side of the scale, we come to understand that there are certain restraints to this license. Understanding those restraints makes for a more respectful and a more powerful photojournalism.

We construct a new measure of voting power that yields reasonable measurements even if the individual votes are not cast independently. Our measure hinges on probabilities of counterfactuals, such as the probability that the outcome of a collective decision would have been yes, had a voter voted yes rather than no as she did in the real world. The probabilities of such counterfactuals are calculated on the basis of causal information, following the approach by Balke and Pearl. Opinion leaders whose votes have causal influence on other voters' votes can have significantly more voting power under our measure. But the new measure of voting power is also sensitive to the voting rule. We show that our measure can be regarded as an average treatment effect, we provide examples in which it yields intuitively plausible results and we prove that it reduces to Banzhaf voting power in the limiting case of independent and equiprobable votes

The papers in this collection were presented at a workshop on Bayesian Epistemology at the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria (August 4–7, 2003), at a workshop on Philosophy and Probability at the conference GAP5 in Bielefeld, Germany (September 20–22, 2003), at a workshop on Bayesian Epistemology at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science in London, UK (June 28, 2004), or at the seminar of the research group Philosophy, Probability and Modeling, Center for Junior Research Fellows, University of Konstanz, Germany. We acknowledge the generous support for these events by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, the Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie e.V., the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Program for the Investment in the Future (ZIP) of the German Government through a Sofja Kovalevskaja Award. We thank the organizers of the conferences in Kirchberg and Bielefeld for their support, the authors and referees of the papers for their work, and John Symons for his interest in dedicating a special issue of this journal to Bayesian Epistemology.

The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and betting rates diverge. Second, there is an analogy between ways of dealing with situations of this kind and different policies for sequential choice. Third, there is an analogy with strategic voting, showing that the common interest is not always served by expressing how things seem to you in social decision-making. And fourth, our analysis of the Puzzle of the Hats casts light on a recent controversy about the Dutch book argument for the Sleeping Beauty.

Selinger and Whyte argue that Thaler and Sunstein are insufficiently sensitive to cultural variance in _Nudge_. I construct a taxonomy of the various roles that cultural variance may play in _nudges_. First, biases that are exploited in _nudging_ may interact with features that are culturally specific. Second, cultures may be more or less susceptible to certain biases. Third, cultures may resolve conflicting biases in different ways. And finally, _nudge_ may be enlisted for different aims in different cultures.

The variety of evidence thesis in confirmation theory states that more varied supporting evidence confirms a hypothesis to a greater degree than less varied evidence. Under a very plausible interpretation of this thesis, positive test results from multiple independent instruments confirm a hypothesis to a greater degree than positive test results from a single instrument. We invoke Bayesian Networks to model confirmation on grounds of evidence that is obtained from less than fully reliable instruments and show that the variety of evidence thesis is not sacrosanct when testing is conducted with less than fully reliable instruments: under certain conditions, a hypothesis receives more confirmation from evidence that is obtained from one rather than from more independent instruments. In the appendix, we prove certain convergence results for large numbers of positive test results from single versus multiple less than fully reliable instruments.

We develop a utilitarian framework to assess different decision rules for the European Council of Ministers. The proposals to be decided on are conceptualized as utility vectors and a probability distribution is assumed over the utilities. We first show what decision rules yield the highest expected utilities for different means of the probability distri- bution. For proposals with high mean utility, simple bench- mark rules (such as majority voting with proportional weights) tend to outperform rules that have been proposed in the political arena. For proposals with low mean utility, it is the other way round. We then compare the expected utilities for smaller and larger countries and look for Pareto- dominance relations. Finally, we provide an extension of the model, discuss its restrictions, and compare our approach with assessments of decision rules that are based on the Penrose measure of voting power.

If you believe more things you thereby run a greater risk of being in error than if you believe fewer things. From the point of view of avoiding error, it is best not to believe anything at all, or to have very uncommitted beliefs. But considering the fact that we all in fact do entertain many specific beliefs, this recommendation is obviously in flagrant dissonance with our actual epistemic practice. Let us call the problem raised by this apparent conflict the Addition Problem. In this paper we will find reasons to reject a particular premise used in the formulation of the Addition Problem, namely, the fundamental premise according to which believing more things increases the risk of error. As we will see, acquiring more beliefs need not decrease the probability of the whole, and hence need not increase the risk of error. In fact, more beliefs can mean an increase in the probability of the whole and a corresponding decrease in the risk of error. We will consider the Addition Problem as it arises in the context of the coherence theory of epistemic justification, while keeping firmly in mind that the point we wish to make is of epistemological importance also outside the specific coherentist dispute. The problem of determining exactly how the probability of the whole system depends on such factors as coherence, reliability and independence will be seen to open up an interesting area of research in which the theory of conditional independence structures is a helpful tool.

There is a long philosophical tradition of addressing questions in philosophy of science and epistemology by means of the tools of Bayesian probability theory (see Earman (1992) and Howson and Urbach (1993)). In the late '70s, an axiomatic approach to conditional independence was developed within a Bayesian framework. This approach in conjunction with developments in graph theory are the two pillars of the theory of Bayesian Networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. The theory has been very successful over the last two decades and has found a wide array of applications ranging from medical diagnosis to safety systems for hazardous industries.

Much of the contemporary philosophical literature on authenticity is secondary work on figures like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus. I would like to find a different voice by searching for inspiration in the artistic expression that the theme of authenticity has found in the oeuvre of the Japanese film-maker Akira Kurosawa. To be authentic is to be true to ourselves. But what is it to be true to ourselves? The locution suggests that authenticity has something to do with the self and has something to do with being truthful or sincere. Kurosawa’s *Ikiru* illustrates that authenticity requires the creation of a coherent self-image. *Rashomon* illustrates that authenticity requires an attitude of sincerity. There is a tension between both components, which accounts for the precarious nature of the project of authenticity. Much of Kurosawa’s oeuvre can be seen as an exploration of this theme.

It has received little attention that the truth values of sequential counterfactuals (i.e. counterfactuals in which the antecedent event precedes the consequent event) can shift over time. In the footsteps of Goodman, I develop a theory of sequential counterfactuals that can account for this feature. The theory (i) defends a semifactual test of cotenability, (ii) spells out the truth conditions for semifactuals in probabilistic terms and (iii) accounts for truth-value shifts by appealing to a dynamic view of time.

Gender-neutral bathrooms are usually framed as an accommodation for trans and other gender-nonconforming individuals. In this paper, we show that the benefits of gender-neutral bathrooms are much broader. First, our simulations show that gender-neutral bathrooms reduce average waiting times: while waiting times for women go down invariably, waiting times for men either go down or slightly increase depending on usage intensity, occupancy-time differentials and the presence of urinals. Second, our result can be turned on its head: firms have an opportunity to reduce the number of facilities and cut costs by making them all gender-neutral without increasing waiting times. These observations can be used to reframe the gender-neutral bathrooms debate so that they appeal to a larger constituency, cutting across the usual dividing lines in the ‘bathroom wars’. Finally, there are improved designs and behavioural strategies that can help overcome resistance. We explore what strategies can be invoked to mitigate the objections that gender-neutral bathrooms (1) are unsafe, (2) elicit discomfort and (3) are unhygienic.

We consider a decision board with representatives who vote on proposals on behalf of their constituencies. We look for decision rules that realize utilitarian and (welfarist) egalitarian ideals. We set up a simple model and obtain roughly the following results. If the interests of people from the same constituency are uncorrelated, then a weighted rule with square root weights does best in terms of both ideals. If there are perfect correlations, then the utilitarian ideal requires proportional weights, whereas the egalitarian ideal requires equal weights. We investigate correlations that are in between these extremes and provide analytic arguments to connect our results to Barberà and Jackson (J Polit Econ 114(2):317–339, 2006) and to Banzhaf voting power.

Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her views on the relevant sub-questions. The two procedures are not equivalent: There may be a majority of voters supporting each of the premises, but if these majorities do not significantly overlap, there will be a majority against the conclusion. Pettit (2001) connects the choice between the two procedures with the discussion of deliberative democracy. The problem we want to examine instead concerns the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two procedures from the epistemic point of view. Which of them is better when it comes to tracking truth? As it turns out, the answer is not univocal. On the basis of Condorcet’s jury theorem, the premise-based procedure can be shown to be superior if the objective is reach truth for the right reasons, without making any mistakes on the way. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which using the conclusion-based procedure turns out to be more reliable, even though, for the most part, the premise-based procedure will retain its superiority.

Let a miracle-like event be an event that is seemingly indicative of the existence of an all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful being, and yet might occur in a naturalistic world, though this would be very improbable. Suppose that a third-person report is equally as reliable as a first-person experience of such a miracle-like event — which avoids Hume’s objection to the evidential value of reports of miracles. The question addressed in this chapter is: Is it the case that, under the assumption of equal reliability, a first-person experience still has greater evidential weight than a third-person report of a miracle-like event? William James (1902) answers this question affirmatively, whereas William Alston (1991) argues that they should have equal evidential weight. An appeal to Shafer’s protocols (1985) provides qualified support to James’ position in this controversy.