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907The Retributive Emotions: Passions and Pains of PunishmentPhilosophical Papers 39 (3): 343-371. 2010.It is not usually morally permissible to desire the suffering of another person, or to act so as to satisfy this desire; that is, to act with the aim of bringing about suffering. If the retributive emotions, and the retributive responses of which they are a part, are morally permitted or even required, we will need to see what is distinctive about them. One line of argument in this paper is for the conclusion that a retributive desire for the suffering of the wrong-doer, and the aim to bring thi…Read more
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8The Social Network directed by David Fincher, starring Jesse Eisenberg, Andrew Garfield and Justin TimberlakeThe Philosophers' Magazine 53 112-113. 2011.
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39Under-represented groups in philosophy (26th-27th November 2010)Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 243-249. 2012.
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73Alasdair Maclean, autonomy, informed consent and medical law, a relational challengeJournal of Value Inquiry 44 (2): 255-262. 2010.
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236Relational autonomy and paternalistic interventionsRes Publica 15 (4): 321-336. 2009.Relational conceptions of autonomy attempt to take into account the social aspects of autonomous agency. Those views that incorporate not merely causally, but constitutively necessary relational conditions, incorporate a condition that has the form: A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the agent stands in social relations S. I argue that any account that incorporates such a condition cannot play one of autonomy’s key normative roles: identifying those agents who ought to be protec…Read more
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61Mark D. White : Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy: Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, 272 pp (review)Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1): 177-188. 2015.It is customary to remark, in writings on retributivism, that the meaning of the term is so diffuse and variably applied that there is no one concept or justificatory principle picked out by the term. Cottingham identified 9 different ideas captured by the term retributivism, and a similar paper could today no doubt identify as many again. This edited volume of essays on retributivism does justice to that customary remark, by bringing together a range of writings on retributivism many of which p…Read more
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876Punishment and JusticeSocial Theory and Practice 36 (1): 78-111. 2010.Should the state punish its disadvantaged citizens who have committed crimes? Duff has recently argued that where disadvantage persists the state loses its authority to hold individuals to account and to punish for criminal wrongdoings. I here scrutinize Duff’s argument for the claim that social justice is a precondition for the legitimacy of state punishment. I sharpen an objection to Duff’s argument: with his framework, we seem unable to block the implausible conclusion that where disadvantage…Read more
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89Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility by Nelkin (review)Analysis 73 (1): 198-202. 2013.What must the world be like, and what must we agents be like, in order to be morally responsible for our actions? In Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, Dana Nelkin develops and defends what she dubs the ‘rational abilities’ view (RA) of moral responsibility. On this compatibilist view, an agent is morally responsible for an action, in a sense which makes it appropriate to hold her accountable for that action, if she has ‘the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons, or a good…Read more
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30On Regretting Things I Didn't Do and Couldn't Have DoneJournal of Applied Philosophy 34 (3): 403-413. 2016.One of the lines of investigation opened up by Wallace in The View from Here concerns the notion of regret: what it is, what it is rationally constrained by, and what are the proper objects of regret. A distinctive feature of Wallace's view is that regret is an intention-like state, which, whilst backward-looking, is bound up with our future directed practices of value. In this commentary, I set out Wallace's claims on regret, its rational constraints, and its objects, and raise some worries abo…Read more
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76Substantively Constrained Choice and DeferenceJournal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2): 180-199. 2010.Substantive accounts of autonomy place value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. According to such views, not all sober and competent choices can be autonomous: some things simply cannot be autonomously chosen. Such an account is developed and appealed to, by Thomas Hill Jr, in order to explain the intuitively troubling nature of choices for deferential roles. Such choices are not consistent with the value of self-respect, it is claimed. In this paper I argue that Hill's attempt to …Read more
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19Clarifying capacity: value and reasonsIn Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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University of SheffieldRegular Faculty
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Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Other Academic Areas |
Philosophy, Misc |