John Forge

The institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour began comparatively earl- though not always under that name - in the Australasian region. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appoint ments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and 1960s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of Wollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia and in New Zealand. "Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science" aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. Papers address general issues, however, rather than local ones; parochial topics are avoided. Further more, though in each volume a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand, contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out. Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encour aged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question.

This paper is about structuralism as a form of reconstructing theories, associated with the work Sneed, Balzar and Moulines among others, and not about "structuralism" is any of its other manifold senses. The paper is a reflection in that it looks back on some earlier work of my own on the subject of structuralism and explanation, in which I argued that structuralism and my 'instance view' of explanation go well together, with structuralism providing the means to develop the idea of a theoretical instance. Bartelborth has suggested a view that has some similarity with my early ideas, so I reflect on those as well. I suggest, in opposition to both positions, that a causal account of explanation might also sit well with structuralism. This paper will appear in a special edition of Synthese edited by Moulines and devoted to structuralism themes

Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding ‘interpretation problem’: what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a ‘measurement problem’: how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed.

ConclusionI think it is clear that Bqm and Oqm are quite different theories, even if they have the same empirical consequences. This is, of course, to adopt something like the realist perspective. Oqm is not normally interpreted realistically by physicists (the survey still has not been done!) but it can be, and what it says things are like is by no means the same as what Bqm says. One of the most puzzling features of Oqm is the status of the particle when it is in an eigenstate of momentum: if it has no precise position how can it be anywhere at all, and if it isn’t anywhere how can it be said to exist? The great advantage of Bqm is that it restores definite trajectories.The books under review, on which I have based this exposition, are all to be recommended. I am particularly impressed with Peter Holland’s book and assure the reader that it will repay study. The collection by Cushinget al. is, on the whole, better than most in that it is consistently focused on the advertised theme, but it is mostly technical. Cushing’s book is the most accessible of the three volumes.

'Explanation, Quantity and Law' is a sustained elaboration and defence of a theory of explanation, called the instance view, that is able to deal with the characteristic aspects of physical science, such as the use of mathematics, the fact that errors of measurement are ubiquitous, and so forth. The book begins with a summary of 'new directions' in the theory of explanation and continues with a systematic account of the view that to explain is to show that something is an instance of a law of nature. This embraces topics such as the following - Salmon’s casual-mechanistic account and the ontic conception of explanation; theories of quantity from Ellis to Bigelow-Pargetter to quantum mechanics; Armstrong on numerical laws and laws of nature as relations between quantities; explanation and the quantum state.

Abstract This paper argues that there are good reasons to adopt a non-reductive account of states when it comes to quantum mechanics. That is to say, it is argued that there are advantages to thinking about states as sui generis, as reducible to classes of values of quantities, when it comes to the quantum domain. One reason for holding this view is that it seems to improve the prospects for explanation. In more detail, it is argued that there is an 'explanatory shortfall' in the quantum domain owing to the failure of value definiteness. To remedy this situation, two proposals are put forward about the nature of the quantum state: Proposal A, that the quantum state is the only first-order property of quantum systems, Proposal B, that the quantum state is one first-order property among many. These proposals seem equally good

While there has been much interest in this topic, no generally accepted definition of dual use has been forthcoming. As a contribution to this issue, it is maintained that three related kinds of things comprise the category of dual use: research, technologies and artefacts. In regard to all three kinds, difficulties are identified in making clear distinctions between those that are and are not dual use. It is suggested that our classification should take account of actual capacities and willingness to make use of these objects for ‘bad ends’ and not the mere possibility that this could be done, and here three ‘contextual factors’ are identified. A (provisional) definition is proposed that takes account of threats and risks.