John Forge

Weapons are artefacts, which is to say that they are ‘man-made’, crafted by us for some end or reason. Artefacts are of two basic kinds: the aesthetic and the practical. The former are made to be admired, while the later are made because the help us achieve something, either something that we could not do unaided, or do something more cheaply, more easily, more efficiently, etc. Weapons are practical artefacts: they enable people to harm others more easily, more cheaply, more efficiently, in new ways, on a grander scale, and so forth. I am going to begin this chapter by considering weapons as (practical) artefacts, so we can better understand the kind of things they are. Weapons research, as we have seen, is an endeavour that seeks out new kinds of weapons: weapons that are altogether entirely new, like the Atomic bomb and the Catapults; weapons that are new variants on a type, such as the German Mauser rifle; weapons that are improvements on an existing weapon, like an improved version of the Soviet M-34 T-34 (tank); or new or improved ancillary structures, such as the Chariot and the galleon, first used as a weapons platform in the 16th century Anglo-Dutch wars. Weapons research aims to find workable designs for weapons and their ancillary structures.

In order the make the case against weapons research we need to know what weapons research is, and the aim of this chapter is to explain what it is. There is no need to come up with an absolutely precise definition which includes every instance of weapons research and excludes everything else, a kind of ‘demarcation criterion’. We do, however, have a choice as to how we understand “research”, and this will become clear after I have introduced two examples. One of these, the Manhattan project, is familiar to many, at least in outline, and has been the subject of much writing and discussion. The other, the development of the ArtillerytorsionCatapults in the fourth century BCE, is much less familiar. I have chosen these examples for several reasons. The first is that I want to suggest that weapons research is not a new or recent phenomenon, but has a very long pedigree—this suggestion is a consequence of how I think we should understand research. The Manhattan project was the beginning of the nuclear age which led to the nuclear-armed world we live in today, with enough nuclear weapons to extinguish much of sentient life on the planet. No more need be said about its relevance to the present discussion.

The DefenceDeterrence of weapons is to harm: this is what weapons do, this is what they are designed to do, and the more effectively Military efficiency they harm, the better they are as weapons. Weapons are exceptional in this regard, for no other artefacts are intentionally produced to do something that all of us agree is bad. If this is so, then there must be compelling reasons why weapons are made, why people design them and manufacture them. If weapons harm us, why have them? And there is only one plausible answer: we must have weapons to prevent harm.

Weapons research is conducted at particular times and places, under certain circumstances and conditions. I have expressed this by saying that weapons research takes place in some context. There have been instances of individuals conducting weapons research simply out of Interests—Maxim, Hiram the inventor of the first effective Machine gun, fits the mould of someone who just liked inventing things—but in the vast majority of cases it is conducted in response to something external, something outside the research facility. In order to show that weapons research done in one context often has effects in quite different contexts, I give a number of examples in this chapter. The first series of these is intended to provide reasons to accept the evolution view of technology, which implies that weapons research has indirect as well as direct effects, because one innovation can lead to others down the line. I begin with the idea of the context of weapons research and offer a characterisation that is informed by matters that we have discussed in earlier chapters.

If there can be no ahistoricalJustification, ahistorical justification for weapons research, then all attempts at justification must be historicalJustification, historical: they must refer to the situations and circumstances in which weapons are actually used. In view of the general condition for all such justification, in terms of harm prevention, it must be the case that the harms caused by the use of the weapons produced must also prevent harm, and moreover, the harms caused must not be excessive and the harms prevented must at least be comparable to, and preferably much less than, those caused. But the problem here is that weapons designers cannot know what is going to happen in the future when it comes to the ways the weapons they design are used (if indeed they are ever used). If they cannot know what they must know in order for their work to be justified, then justification of weapons research will not in fact be possible. I am going to spend this chapter and the next making good this claim. If I am able to do so, then I will have shown that weapons research is never morally permissibleMorally permissible: that is to say, in no circumstances and under no conditions is it ever morally acceptable to undertake weapons research. The case against weapons research will have been made.

Harm principle order to argue that weapons research is morally wrong and, in addition, that it is morally unjustifiable, it is necessary to appeal to some system of morality. This is because it is necessary, in the first place, to understand just exactly what is at stake. When I claim that weapons research is morally wrong, what am I saying, and what does it mean to say that weapons research is morally wrong? In the second place, it is necessary to appeal to a system of morality for justification. Why is it that weapons research is morally wrong? And finally it is necessary to appeal to a system of morality to show that weapons research is not justifiable. The distinction between the two claims I hope to establish in this book, that weapons research is morally wrong and that it is morally unjustifiable, is to some extent a feature of the particular Moral system that I favour—as we will see, not all Moral system embody such a distinction. This raises the question as to the possibility of alternative Moral system and hence different judgements about the morality of weapons research.

This book addresses the morality of engaging in weapons research, a topic that has been neglected but which is extremely important. It is argued that this activity is both morally wrong and morally unjustifiable, and this implies that moral persons should not engage in it. The argument is not based on any pacifist assumptions: it is not assumed that neither individuals nor states should not defend themselves. What is wrong with weapons research is that it is the first step in the production of weapons, weapons are the means to harm, and harming without justification is always wrong. Those who study science, for instance those who are interested in the responsibilities of the scientist, are given a new perspective, while those who are practicing scientists will realize that they should not consider working to design new or improved weapons systems. This book is of interest to students and researchers working in ethics and technology, philosophy of technology, military ethics, and history of technology.

Some features of physical science relevant for a discussion of physical explanation are mentioned. The D-N account of physical explanation is discussed, and it is seen to restrict the scope of explanation in physical science because it imposes the requirement that the explanandum must be deducible from the explanans. Analysis shows that an alternative view of scientific explanation, called the instance view, allows a wider range of physical explanations. The view is seen to be free from a certain class of counter examples to the D-N theory