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4Chapter Seventeen. Circularity?In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 131-134. 2011.
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4Chapter Nineteen. Concernment and RepentanceIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 139-149. 2011.
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11Chapter Nine. Consciousness Is Not MemoryIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 72-76. 2011.
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3Chapter Four. ConcernmentIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 22-29. 2011.
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4Chapter Eighteen. The Distinction between [P] and [S]In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 135-138. 2011.
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6Chapter Fourteen. “And therefore... ”: [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfersIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 110-118. 2011.
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4Chapter Fifteen. “A fatal error of theirs”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 119-124. 2011.
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12Real Materialism: And Other EssaysOxford University Press. 2008.Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.
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192Real Materialism: And Other EssaysOxford University Press. 2008.Real Materialism is a collection of highly original essays on a set of related topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics: consciousness and the mind-body problem; our knowledge of the world; the nature of the self or subject; free will and moral responsibility; the nature of thought and intentionality; causation and David Hume.
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9Chapter Two. “Person”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 5-16. 2011.
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8Chapter Sixteen. A Fatal Error of Locke’s?In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 125-130. 2011.
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9Chapter Thirteen. “ But next... ”: Personal Identity without Substantial ContinuityIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 97-109. 2011.
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9Chapter Five. ConsciousnessIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 30-41. 2011.
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9Chapter Ten. Personal IdentityIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 77-87. 2011.
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9Chapter Six. “Consciousness... is inseparable from thinking”In Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 42-49. 2011.
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8Chapter Eight. “Person”—Locke’s DefinitionIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 58-71. 2011.
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8Chapter Eleven. Psychological ConnectednessIn Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, Princeton University Press. pp. 88-92. 2011.
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Nietzsche's metaphysics?In Manuel Dries & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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45Identity MetaphysicsThe Monist 104 (1): 30-60. 2021.Identity metaphysics finds identity or unity where other metaphysical theories find difference or diversity. It denies the fundamentality of ontological distinctions that other theories treat as fundamental. It’s opposed to separatism, which mistakes natural conceptual distinctions for ground-floor ontological differences. It proposes that the distinctions between the concepts SUBSTANCE, OBJECT, QUALITY, PROPERTY, PROCESS, STATE, and EVENT are metaphysically superficial; so too the distinctions …Read more
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2David Hume: Objects and PowerIn Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry, Oxford University Press. 2001.
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74A hundred years of consciousness: “a long training in absurdity”Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 59. 2019.There occurred in the twentieth century the most remarkable episode in the history of human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious experience. Others held back from the Denial, as we may call it, but claimed that it might be true --a claim no less remarkable than the Denial. This paper documents some aspects of this episode, with particular reference to two things. First, the development of two views which are for…Read more
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4I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fa…Read more
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19The impossibility of ultimate moral responsibility?In D. Pereboom (ed.), Free will. Hackett readings in philosophy, . 2009.
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22Language without communication intentionJournal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 12 (24): 15-54. 2018.This paper argues that a language can exist and flourish in a community even if none of of the members of the community has any communication intentions; and that reference to the notion of communication intention can therefore be dispensed with in the core account of the nature oflinguistic meaning. Certainly one cannot elucidate the notion of linguistic meaning without reference to psychological notions; the communication-intention theorists are right about this. They are, however, wrong about…Read more
Bobolino, Toscana, Italy