Joel Marks

This dissertation considers some normative and meta-ethical implications of a theory of emotion. In Chapter 2 emotion is argued to be belief plus strong desire. The 'strong desire' qualifier is defended against the more exclusively cognitive theories of William Lyons and Robert Solomon. Chapter 3 provides an explication of the 'dispassion thesis', which is the main thesis to be defended in this dissertation. The dispassion thesis states that dispassion, or the absence of emotion, is good; put differently, that emotion has no place in the ethical life. Various similar-sounding theses are shown to have significantly different content in light of the theory of emotion presented in Chapter 2; for example, the dispassion thesis is not the thesis that it is good to be unfeeling. Chapter 4 then gives the defense of the dispassion thesis. Dispassion is argued to be good on such grounds as that emotion inhibits desire-satisfaction, autonomy, adaptability, and rationality--in short, that emotion inhibits prudential and moral effectualness; thus, note, this defense of dispassion is largely non-quietist. A special section takes as a case in point the life of the Buddha Gautama Siddhartha, showing how it is possible to understand the compassion of a bodhisattva as an outgrowth of his dispassion. Chapter 5 asks whether dispassion, if desirable, is yet a practicable attainment for human beings. An affirmative response is supported by consideration of a possible cognitive method for inducing desire-transformation. Chapter 6 then carries on the discussion of desire-transformation by cognitive means in order to elaborate and defend a theory of the good recently put forward by Richard Brandt. This theory, while significant in its own right, also serves three important functions in this dissertation: it makes possible a more precise formulation of the dispassion thesis; it provides an acid test of the thesis that emotion has no place in ethical theory ; and it serves as a bridge between the dispassion thesis and the conclusion that dispassion is appropriate to the very nature of good and evil

A defense of amorality as both philosophically justified and practicably livable. While in synch with their underlying aim of grounding human existence in a naturalistic metaphysics, this book takes both the new atheism and the mainstream of modern ethical philosophy to task for maintaining a complacent embrace of morality. It advocates instead replacing the language of morality with a language of desire. The book begins with an analysis of what morality is and then argues that the concept is not instantiated in reality. Following this, the question of belief in morality is addressed: How would human life be affected if we accepted that morality does not exist? The book argues that at the very least, a moralist would have little to complain about in an amoral world, and at best we might hope for a world that was more to our liking overall. An extended look at the human encounter with nonhuman animals serves as an illustration of amorality’s potential to make both theoretical and practical headway in resolving heretofore intractable ethical problems.