Joel Marks

This dissertation considers some normative and meta-ethical implications of a theory of emotion. In Chapter 2 emotion is argued to be belief plus strong desire. The 'strong desire' qualifier is defended against the more exclusively cognitive theories of William Lyons and Robert Solomon. Chapter 3 provides an explication of the 'dispassion thesis', which is the main thesis to be defended in this dissertation. The dispassion thesis states that dispassion, or the absence of emotion, is good; put differently, that emotion has no place in the ethical life. Various similar-sounding theses are shown to have significantly different content in light of the theory of emotion presented in Chapter 2; for example, the dispassion thesis is not the thesis that it is good to be unfeeling. Chapter 4 then gives the defense of the dispassion thesis. Dispassion is argued to be good on such grounds as that emotion inhibits desire-satisfaction, autonomy, adaptability, and rationality--in short, that emotion inhibits prudential and moral effectualness; thus, note, this defense of dispassion is largely non-quietist. A special section takes as a case in point the life of the Buddha Gautama Siddhartha, showing how it is possible to understand the compassion of a bodhisattva as an outgrowth of his dispassion. Chapter 5 asks whether dispassion, if desirable, is yet a practicable attainment for human beings. An affirmative response is supported by consideration of a possible cognitive method for inducing desire-transformation. Chapter 6 then carries on the discussion of desire-transformation by cognitive means in order to elaborate and defend a theory of the good recently put forward by Richard Brandt. This theory, while significant in its own right, also serves three important functions in this dissertation: it makes possible a more precise formulation of the dispassion thesis; it provides an acid test of the thesis that emotion has no place in ethical theory ; and it serves as a bridge between the dispassion thesis and the conclusion that dispassion is appropriate to the very nature of good and evil

Animal research is a challenging issue for the animal advocate because of what, besides animal well-being, is considered to be at stake, namely, human health. This article seeks to vindicate the antivivisectionist position. The standard defense of animal research as promoting the overwhelming good of human health is refuted on both factual and logical, or normative-theoretical, grounds. The author then attempts to clinch the case by arguing that animal research violates a deontic principle. However, this principle falls to counterexample. The author concludes, nevertheless, that the principle retains force as a presumption that the current state of affairs fails to overthrow. This does suggest, though, that the antivivisection movement would be well advised to keep ahead of the curve. The author proposes it do so by emulating the vegan movement against animal agriculture with the active promotion of alternatives to animal research.

It is common to argue that animal experimentation is justified by its essential contribution to the advancement of medical science. But note that this argument actually contains two premises: an empirical claim that animal experimentation is essential to the advancement of medical science and an ethical claim that if research is essential to the advancement of medical science, then it is justified. Both claims are open to challenge, but in the logic of the case, only one of them needs to be shown false or moot in order to refute the argument. I argue that the ethical claim does not withstand scrutiny. In addition, the main so-called “alternatives” to animal research do not merit that label since they still involve the use of nonhuman animals.

In On Their Own Terms (Darien, CT: Nectar Bat Press, 2010), Lee Hall articulates a theory that wild animals, due to their autonomous nature, are endowed with rights, but domesticated animals lack rights because they are not autonomous. Hall then argues that the rights of wild animals require that humans let them alone, and that, despite the fact that domestic animals lack rights, humans are required to take care of them because it is humans who brought them into existence. While sympathetic to Hall's aims, this review concludes that Hall’s theory denies rights to domestic animals only by employing theoretical means that are uncomfortably analogous to how others have denied rights to all nonhuman animals.

This book challenges the widespread assumption that the ethical life and society must be moral in any objective sense. In his previous works, Marks has rejected both the existence of such a morality and the need to maintain verbal, attitudinal, practical, and institutional remnants of belief in it. This book develops these ideas further, with emphasis on constructing a positive alternative. Calling it “desirism”, Marks illustrates what life and the world would be like if we lived in accordance with our rational desires rather than the dictates of any actual or pretend morality, neither overlaying our desires with moral sanction nor attempting to override them with moral strictures. Hard Atheism and the Ethics of Desire also argues that atheism thereby becomes more plausible than the so-called New Atheism that attempts to give up God and yet retain morality.