Christian Lotz

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this topic to the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind.

In this paper, I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the nonintentional relation that painting opens up is itself part of andemerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude toward the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation.

To be sure, Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophy has received increased attention in recent philosophical debates. For although older confrontations, such as Gadamer's debate with Habermas, have receded in the background, scholars such as John McDowell, Cristina Lafont, Ruth Sonderegger, Albrecht Wellmer, and Günther Figal have revitalized some of Gadamer's main philosophical insights and demonstrated the importance of hermeneutics for contemporary philosophy. In addition, the newly-founded Society for Philosophical Hermeneutics has helped to give this recent attention a new academic forum for fresh and vibrant work on Gadamer.Kristin Gjesdal's book fits neatly into this newly-discovered interest in Gadamer's philosophy, especially since it focuses on important, but less frequently discussed, historical sources of Gadamer's philosophy and their systematic impact on both hermeneutics in general and a theory of interpretation in particular. Gjesdal's book is lucidly written, paying much attention to the underlying arguments that are implied in Gadamer's critical and often reductive accounts of philosophers who belong to the tradition of "German Idealism." However, having said this, the title of her book is misleading: though the reader might expect an extensive discussion of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the author focuses mainly on the sources of