Francisco Gonzalez

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular practice, from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF.

This study explores the relationship between criminal thinking and other variables related to criminal cognition. Prosocial behavior, emotional intelligence, and cultural dimensions were chosen to check their predictive capacity for criminal thinking. The research sample comprised 695 young university students and adults, chosen by a non-probabilistic sampling method. The instruments used were the Criminal Sentiments Scales (CSS-M), the Prosociality Scale, the Emotional Intelligence Scale (EQI-C), and the Scale of Cultural Dimensions in its Spanish adaptation. A MANOVA, correlations, and lineal regressions were conducted using SPSS 26 and a SEM was proposed with the results obtained. Criminal thinking’s scores showed differences depending on the age of the participants. The SEM indicated that uncertainty avoidance is a good predictor of criminal thinking. Also, prosocial behavior and emotional intelligence are good predictors of uncertainty avoidance. Although future studies are needed, these results could be used to help future research, rehabilitation, or prevention programs.

The present paper has a negative aim and a positive aim, both limited in the present context to a sketch or outline. The negative aim, today less controversial, is to show that Aristotle’s theory of final causality has little or nothing to do with the teleology rejected by modern science and that, therefore, far from having been rendered obsolete, it has yet to be fully understood. This aim will be met through the identification and brief discussion of some key points on which Aristotle’s theory differs from teleology as still commonly understood. The positive aim is more controversial as it proposes that we take an ontology of life as the proper context for understanding the significance and nature of final causation in Aristotle. The argument for final causation, in other words, is that, without it, we would lose the phenomenon of life and, indeed, of nature altogether, reducing nature to the inanimate and mechanical.

Koselleck en su escrito Futuro Pasado, considera que la historia conceptual permite la comprensión del pensamiento socio-político ya que los conceptos son las herramientas con las que los actores de un momento histórico articularon sus estructuras socio-políticas, y proyectaron diversas expectativas sobre su futuro. Por otra parte, la implementación de la historia conceptual en el estudio del pensamiento socio-político latinoamericano, ofrece a la historia social y a la filosofía política una nueva mirada sobre la consolidación, el cambio o desaparición de las sociedades, sus instituciones y sus conceptos políticos fundamentales. Ahora bien, en este escrito presento una aproximación sobre la libertad y su importancia como concepto fundamental del pensamiento socio-político, en el periodo de la Regeneración, en tres momentos. Primero, describo los lineamientos generales de la historia conceptual. Segundo, expongo la influencia de la historia conceptual en el estudio del pensamiento socio-político latinoamericano. Finalmente, establezco las posibilidades del análisis del concepto libertad durante el periodo de la Regeneración.

En el presente escrito plantearé cómo la posibilidad de un escenario de posconflicto en Colombia se puede construir a través de una redefinición de lo político desde un planteamiento de lo común como un modo de política inclusiva que permita construir la relación nosotros/ellos en torno a intereses o valores de los individuos que conforman un grupo con afinidades, intereses disímiles y pasiones antagónicas que pueden ser resueltas en un campo agonístico. Dicho planteamiento lo abordaré en cuatro momentos. El primero, expone el concepto de comunidad de Schmitt. El segundo, deconstruye el concepto schmittiano de lo político. El tercer momento presenta la concepción de lo común como el resultado de las relaciones de multiversos políticos. Finalmente, se reflexiona sobre la construcción de un escenario de posconflicto en Colombia, concebido como la relación de multiversos políticos. Palabras clave: político, conficto, agonístico, multicultural, común.

La evidencia de un desenlace para el discipulado de Pedro en Jn 21, coherente con el cuerpo del relato, denota la unidad tanto literaria como teoló-gica del cuarto evangelio : la promesa de un futuro seguimiento que había quedado pendiente en Jn 13,36 llega a su cumplimiento en Jn 21,19; pero también, el enigmático sobrenombre que impone Jesús a Simón, hijo de Juan, al inicio del relato solo halla dilucida-ción en Jn 21,15-17. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, dicha evidencia des-tacará una novedad importante res-pecto al desarrollo literario anterior: el discípulo amado comunica ahora su ciencia, su conocimiento intui-tivo del Señor a Simón Pedro. Tal modo de actuar carece de paralelo a lo largo del cuerpo del relato evangélico, indicando, desde el plano diacrónico, un nuevo esta-dio en el camino de reflexión teoló-gica de la comunidad joánica

Después de haber tratado el tema del desenlace del discipulado de Simón Pedro a la luz de Jn 21,15-19 en anterior artículo, quedaba pendiente realizar lo propio con respecto al personaje del discípulo amado. La primera sección del epílogo del evangelio, asocia, en efecto, estas dos figuras que interactúan en sinergia para reconocer al Resucitado en su tercera manifestación. Y la finalidad de dicha manifestación consiste en proveer a las necesidades de la comunidad de discípulos en medio de los desafíos inéditos del tiempo post-pascual. El presente artículo desarrolla la especificidad del seguimiento del discípulo amado que, junto con el de Pedro, constituirá parte fundamental de esa provisión necesaria para la vida y misión de la naciente Iglesia

The question addressed here is how Aristotle can characterize the ‘unmoved mover’ that is the ‘first ousia’ and first principle of his metaphysics not only as being alive, but as a model for the best kind of human life. The first step towards understanding this characterization is the distinction between ‘motion’ and ‘activity’ that Aristotle develops in 6th chapter of Metaphysics. Only on the basis of this distinction can we understand how the unmoved mover can be active without being in motion. The second is the argument in De Anima that the soul as principle of life is not any kind of motion, being unmoved even by itself. The soul indeed ‘moves’ in the sense of causing motion, but while remaining itself unmoved. On this basis we see that the meaning of ‘life’ in us is not fundamentally different from its meaning in the divine, and that therefore we can indeed find in the ultimate object of metaphysics a model for how we ourselves are to live.

Pendant l’ete de 1928 Heidegger a offert un seminaire sur le troisieme livre de la Physique d’Aristote et donc sur l’explication aristotelicienne de la nature du mouvement. La derniere seance de ce cours, qui eut lieu le 25 juillet, est d’une grande importance parce que c’est a cette occasion que Heidegger va au livre neuf de la Metaphysique pour essayer de comprendre la notion ontologique qui est a la base de l’interpretation aristotelicienne du mouvement : l’energeia. Mais dans les protocoles de ce seminaire qui se trouvent parmi les papiers de Heidegger et qui ont ete publies recemment dans le volume 83 de la Gesamtausgabe, la seance du 25 juillet se trouve absente. Ce fait a conduit l’editeur a conclure que le seminaire avait pris fin le 23 juillet, sans s’apercevoir donc que la conclusion du seminaire manquait. Il existe heureusement une transcription preservee parmi les papiers de l’etudiante de Heidegger, Helene Weiss, et accessible aujourd’hui dans les archives de l’universite de Stanford. Cette transcription montre que la derniere session eut bien lieu le 25 juillet et nous offre la lecture heideggerienne de Metaphysique IX qui ne se trouve pas dans la version de la Gesamtausgabe. C’est dans le contexte de cette lecture que Heidegger fait la declaration etonnante qui nous concerne ici : ≪Dans la derniere instance, la Metaphysique Θ revient a Platon ; la priorite de l’energeia est fondamentalement la meme chose que l’epekeina des Idees. ≫La première tâche que je me propose ici sera d’expliquer cette déclaration qui suggère une relation tres etroite, ou meme une identite, entre la notion aristotelicienne de l’energeia comme ayant une priorite vis‑a‑vis de la dunamis et la notion platonicienne de l’Idee du Bien comme etant epekeina de l’ousia. Pour cette explication je ferai appel non seulement au contexte du seminaire de 1928, mais aussi aux textes plus tardifs comme les Beitrage et les cours sur Nietzsche dans lesquels Heidegger semble presupposer et développer sa déclaration de 1928. Ma seconde tâche sera de comparer cette thèse heideggerienne a la tentative de Gadamer de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre les ontologies de Platon et d’Aristote en faisant appel a l’idee du bien chez les deux. Cette tentative se trouve dans le texte Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles. La comparaison que j’entreprends ici va montrer certaines affinites entre les interpretations de l’Idee du Bien chez Heidegger et Gadamer, mais aussi de profondes differences qui vont determiner leurs differents projets philosophiques.

Las teorías más difundidas sobre el nacionalismo suelen pasar muy rápidamente por la experiencia latinoamericana. Tampoco en el entorno académico iberoamericano ha existido gran interés por estudiar el desarrollo del Estado nacional de forma paralela a ambos lados del Atlántico. Este artículo reconstruye las perspectivas historiográficas que impidieron ese encuentro de miradas y parte del supuesto de que la creación de un orden político liberal no fue una tarea tan disimilar en la península y en América como a menudo se piensa. Para ello analiza el efecto fragmentador del constitucionalismo gaditano de 1812 sobre las estructuras políticas del Imperio español, revisa los lenguajes políticos empleados para legitimar la emancipación hispanoamericana e intenta identificar el legado político-cultural de los liberalismos hispánicos.

a central thesis of martin heidegger's first reading of a Platonic dialogue, the 1924/25 course on the Sophist, was that, "for the Greeks, being means precisely to be present, to be in the present [Anwesend-sein, Gegenwärtig-sein]."1 Heidegger saw this Greek interpretation of being as leading to Plato's specific interpretation of being as eidos or idea. Heidegger makes this clear in the following passage from another Plato course, the 1931–32 course On the Essence of Truth: "'Idea' is the look [der Anblick] of what something offers itself as being. These looks [Anblicke] are that in which the individual thing presents itself as this or that, that in which it is present and presencing [präsent und anwesend]....

ABSTRACTThe important role played by Aristotle in Martin Heidegger’s path towards Being and Time during the 1920's is now well documented. Yet an important chapter of this story remains mostly unexplored: Heidegger's early attempt to develop an ontology of life in dialogue with Aristotle. This is because the early seminars in which Heidegger developed his important and highly original interpretation of Aristotle's De Anima remain unpublished : one seminar from the summer of 1921 and one spanning the winter semester of 1922/23 and the summer semester of 1923. In the present paper, I reconstruct Heidegger's key interpretative moves in the latter seminar on the basis of a detailed handwritten transcript preserved among the papers of his student Helene Weiss held at Stanford University. What emerges is a dialogue between Aristotle and Heidegger that enables us better to understand and to question the thought of both philosophers on the phenomenon of life.

This paper defends a ‘perspectivist’ reading of Plato’s dialogues. According to this reading, each dialogue presents a particular and limited perspective on the truth, conditioned by the specific context, aim and characters, where this perspective, not claiming to represent the whole truth on a topic, is not incompatible with the possibly very different perspectives found in other dialogues nor, on the other hand, can be subordinated or assimilated to one of these other perspectives. This model is contrasted to the other models that have been proposed, i.e., Unitarianism, Developmentalism, and ‘Prolepticism’, and is shown to address and overcome the limitations of each. One major advantage of ‘perspectivism’ against the other interpretative models is that, unlike them, it can do full justice to the literary and dramatic character of the dialogues without falling into the opposite extreme of turning them into literary games with no positive philosophical content. To say that Plato’s dialogues are ‘perspectivist’ is not to say that they contain no ‘doctrines’ on the soul, for example, but, on the contrary, to stress the plurality of doctrines, with the observation that each is true within the limits of the argumentative function it is introduced to serve and of the specific dialogical context.

The “destructive” appropriation of the Aristotelian concepts of δύναµις and ἐνέργεια played a central role in Martin Heidegger’s own reflection on the meaning of being. While this has been generally known for some time, it is only now that we can understand the full scope, complexity and evolving character of this appropriation. One reason is the fairly recent publication of notes and protocols for seminars Heidegger led on Aristotle as late as the 1940s and 1950s. Another is the existence of student transcripts in the Special Collections Department of Stanford University for a number of unpublished seminars on Aristotle that Heidegger led during the 1920s. Considering all of this material enables us to see both the significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the δύναµις/ἐνέργιεα pair as well as how this interpretation evolved along with his own “Kehre”: from a “pandynamic” conception of being to being as “Ereignis.”

Faced with the impossibility of saying Being directly given that all language is language of beings, Heidegger proposes an overcoming of logic in favor of what he calls Sigetik: a way of addressing Being in and through silence, i.e., without asserting anything of Being. After considering what such a Sigetik actually involves and how it is possible, this paper asks why Heidegger rejects the alternative of that indirect saying of Being that he identifies with dialectic. It is then argued both that Heidegger's arguments against dialectic are not compelling and that the Beiträge itself, in mostly failing to achieve and sustain the Sigetik it prescribes, cannot fully escape some form of dialectic. Sigetik may prove a lure more threatening to philosophical questioning than the dialectic it seeks, unsuccessfully, to overcome.

The study of Plato's dialogues has traditionally oscillated between two paradigms: one that portrays the dialogues as treatises expounding doctrines and one that sees them as purely skeptical, rhetorical, or literary. This collection of new essays by twelve noted Plato scholars illustrates the fruitfulness of breaking away from those paradigms, which have divided Platonic scholarship and led it to a number of dead ends. While the essays are diverse in their approaches, each seeks to find a 'third way' to understand Plato, reading him as neither a dogmatist nor a skeptic but as a philosopher capable of reconciling the content and form of his writings