•  3868
    The ethics of algorithms: mapping the debate
    Big Data and Society 3 (2): 2053951716679679. 2016.
    In information societies, operations, decisions and choices previously left to humans are increasingly delegated to algorithms, which may advise, if not decide, about how data should be interpreted and what actions should be taken as a result. More and more often, algorithms mediate social processes, business transactions, governmental decisions, and how we perceive, understand, and interact among ourselves and with the environment. Gaps between the design and operation of algorithms and our und…Read more
  •  199
    Cognitive states as well as cognitive commodities play central though distinct roles in our epistemological theories. By being attentive to how a difference in their roles affects our way of referring to them, we can undoubtedly accrue our understanding of the structure and functioning of our main epistemological theories. In this paper we propose an analysis of the dichotomy between states and commodities in terms of the method of abstraction, and more specifically by means of infomorphisms bet…Read more
  •  115
    Hard and Soft Logical Information
    Journal of Logic and Computation 1-20. 2017.
    In this paper I use the distinction between hard and soft information from the dynamic epistemic logic tradition to extend prior work on informational conceptions of logic to include non-monotonic consequence-relations. In particular, I defend the claim that at least some non-monotonic logics can be understood on the basis of soft or “belief-like” logical information, and thereby question the orthodox view that all logical information is hard, “knowledge-like”, information.
  •  251
    The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection: An Interactive Perspective
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1): 91-124. 2013.
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.