Mark Bernstein

ABSTRACT I argue for a broader understanding of the morally considerable. I propose a neo‐Aristotelian account of individuals wherein some entities, often precluded from those deserving of moral consideration, are deemed proper subjects of such treatment. The criterion suggested is, roughly, that of self‐regulatory development, a teleological notion, that I argue should not be viewed as archaic and useless. Not only do many non‐human animals then become legitimate subjects of moral concern, but objects outside the animal kingdom, such as plants and trees, also are to be included in our ethical arena.

In "Size Matters" in this issue, Joel MacClellan argues for three claims: according to utilitarianism, faced with a choice of eating large or small animals, we should eat the large; utilitarianism may ground obligations to eat meat; and we justifiably attract greater moral responsibility for the "direct" killing of our food animals than we do for "indirect" killing. MacClellan tends to underestimate the resources available even to hedonistic utilitarianism and oversimplifies the conditions in the food industry. His second claim has merit but is merely an instance of utilitarianism’s problem with providing a satisfying account of justice.

It is undeniable that many human practices are detrimental to the well-being of non-human animals. Among other things, we trap and hunt them, experiment upon them, and kill them to use their flesh for food. We cause pain and suffering, and so a moral justification for these activities is required. Traditionally such a justification has taken the form of claiming that humans have some property–intelligence, ability to morally deliberate, etc.–which is both morally significant and missing in non-humans. However, once we recall the existence of marginal or deficient humans, those who suffer from senility, retardation, Alzheimer disease, etc., this appeal loses much of its force. I investigate whether loyalty appeals can be used to support our treatment of non-humans as resources. That is, can we legitimately appeal to the fact that an individual is a fellow human to ground inferior moral behaviors toward non-human animals. I conclude that, concerning any of the major uses of animals, including the experimenting upon them in the hopes of finding cures and treatments of human diseases, loyalty appeals have no efficacy.

Virtually all persons—philosophers and laypersons alike—agree that, special circumstances aside, killing humans is more morally objectionable than killing animals. I argue for a radical inversion of this dogma: all else being equal, killing nonhuman animals is more morally objectionable than killing humans. We will discover that the dominant reason for the pervasive belief that killing humans is worse than killing animals—that the human kind of animal uniquely has the capacities for self-consciousness and self-reflection—can be implemented to demonstrate the very opposite conclusion.

Received opinion attributes greater value to the lives of humans than to the lives of animals. Arguably, this conviction allows the continuation of the institutions of factory farming, hunting, and animal experimentation. After all, if we believe that the value of animal lives is at least equal to the value of human lives, we would presumably be quick to renounce and abolish these activities. My aim is to show that we have no good reason to sustain our common belief in the hierarchy of value concerning animal lives.

Background As a number of commentators have noted, SARS exposed the vulnerabilities of our health care systems and governance structures. Health care professionals and hospital systems that bore the brunt of the SARS outbreak continue to struggle with the aftermath of the crisis. Indeed, HCPs – both in clinical care and in public health – were severely tested by SARS. Unprecedented demands were placed on their skills and expertise, and their personal commitment to their profession was severely tried. Many were exposed to serious risk of morbidity and mortality, as evidenced by the World Health Organization figures showing that approximately 30% of reported cases were among HCPs, some of whom died from the infection. Despite this challenge, professional codes of ethics are silent on the issue of duty to care during communicable disease outbreaks, thus providing no guidance on what is expected of HCPs or how they ought to approach their duty to care in the face of risk. Discussion In the aftermath of SARS and with the spectre of a pandemic avian influenza, it is imperative that we consider the obligations of HCPs for patients with severe infectious diseases, particularly diseases that pose risks to those providing care. It is of pressing importance that organizations representing HCPs give clear indication of what standard of care is expected of their members in the event of a pandemic. In this paper, we address the issue of special obligations of HCPs during an infectious disease outbreak. We argue that there is a pressing need to clarify the rights and responsibilities of HCPs in the current context of pandemic flu preparedness, and that these rights and responsibilities ought to be codified in professional codes of ethics. Finally, we present a brief historical accounting of the treatment of the duty to care in professional health care codes of ethics. Summary An honest and critical examination of the role of HCPs during communicable disease outbreaks is needed in order to provide guidelines regarding professional rights and responsibilities, as well as ethical duties and obligations. With this paper, we hope to open the social dialogue and advance the public debate on this increasingly urgent issue.

This thesis discusses the traditional problem of Free Will. I refer to this problem as, equivalently, the Deterministic challenge or the Deterministic dilemma. It can be phrased, roughly, as follows: Determinism is either true or false. If Determinism is true, then all of our actions are determined by events which ultimately, are beyond our control. If Determinism is false, then all of our actions are mere random happenings. Thus, our actions can never be legitimately said to be our own. ;Attempts at answering this dilemma have come historically from two sources. Compatibilists accept the truth of Determinism, yet try to show how freedom of action can be reconciled with such a view. In chapter I, I discuss a purported Compatibilist solution offered by a Neo-Humean, Wilfrid Sellars. I try to show that his attempt fails, and for fundamental, rather than technical reasons. ;In chapter II, I discuss contemporary Libertarianism. This camp believes that people are free, but that this can be so only if Determinism is false. Thus their onus is to show that our actions are not mere accidents. The Libertarian apologist dicussed is Daniel Dennett, a worthier advocate of the position, it seems to me, than the more well-known Libertarians, Campbell and Popper. ;Chapter III discusses a unique answer to the Deterministic dilemma. Here I sympathetically review Wittgenstein's 'dissolutionism'. Since, to the best of my knowledge, this is virgin ground in the discussion of Free Will, my aim is not so much to assess Wittgenstein's success, but rather to plausibly interpret his position, pointing out the novel twists which his position includes. ;The significance of the Free Will problem has traditionally been applied to its ethical ramifications. It has been taken as an obvious, perhaps even a conceptual truth, that freedom, or being able to do otherwise, is a necessary condition for the justified ascription of moral responsibility. Chapter IV questions the truth of this assumption. The conclusion is that this assumption is unwarranted. ;Chapter V further attacks, heretofore almost universally accepted maxims. I attempt to show that the identity of freedom with being able to do otherwise is too simplistic, and ignores the normative aspect which we deem freedom to have. . . . UMI