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217Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper FunctionOxford University Press USA. 1993.Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.
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10The Metaphysics of ModalityOxford University Press USA. 1969.These essays, dating from the late 1960's to the present, chronicle the development of Plantinga's thoughts about some of the most fundamental issues in metaphysics: what is the nature of abstract objects like possible worlds, properties, propositions, and such phenomena? Are there possible but non-actual objects? Can objects that do not exist exemplify properties? Plantinga gives thorough and penetrating answers to these and other questions.
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155Response to William Lane Craig’s Review of Where the Conflict Really LiesPhilosophia Christi 15 (1): 175-179. 2013.I try to clear up a couple of misunderstandings in William Craig’s review. The first has to do with the difference between what I call “Historical Biblical Criticism” and historical scholarship. I claim there is conflict between the first and Christian belief; I don’t for a moment think there is conflict between historical scholarship and Christian belief. The second has to do with Platonism, theism and causality. I point out that theism has the resources to see abstract objects as like divine t…Read more
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22Proper FunctionalismWarrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper FunctionNoûs 27 (1): 34. 1993.
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70Precis of Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper FunctionWarrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper FunctionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 393. 1995.
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God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in GodReligious Studies 4 (2): 288-291. 1969.
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375On Ockham’s Way OutFaith and Philosophy 3 (3): 235-269. 1986.In Part I, I present two traditional arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with human freedom; the first of these is clearly fallacious; but the second, the argument from the necessity of the past, is much stronger. In the second section I explain and partly endorse Ockham’s response to the second argument: that only propositions strictly about the past are accidentally necessary, and past propositions about God’s knowledge of the future are not strictly about the past. In th…Read more
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20The Foundations of TheismFaith and Philosophy 3 (3): 298-313. 1986.Philip Quinn’s “On Finding the Foundations of Theism” is both challenging and important. Quinn proposes at least the following four theses: (a) my argument against the criteria of proper basicality proposed by classical foundationalism is unsuccessful, (b) the quasi-inductive method I suggest for arriving at criteria of proper basicality is defective, (c) even if belief in God is properly basic, it could without loss of justification be accepted on the basis of other propositions, and (d) belief…Read more
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20What’s The Question?Journal of Philosophical Research 20 19-43. 1995.Two kinds of critical questions have been asked about the propriety or rightness of Christian beliefs. The first is the de facto question: is Christian belief true? The second is the de jure question: is it rational, or reasonable, or intellectually acceptable, or rationally justifiable? This second question is much harder to locate than you’d guess from looking at the literature. In “Perceiving God” William AIston suggests that the (or a) right question here is the question of “the practical ra…Read more
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28De EssentiaGrazer Philosophische Studien 7 (1): 101-121. 1979.In this paper I propose an amendment to Chisholm's definition of individual essence. I then argue that a thing has more than one individual essence and that there is no reason to believe no one grasps anyone else's essence. The remainder of the paper is devoted to a refutation of existentialism, the view that the essence of an object X (along with propositions and states of affairs directly about x) is ontologically dependent upon x in the sense that it could not have existed if x had not existe…Read more
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108Evolution, Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability: a Reply to Van Till and McMullinChristian Scholar's Review 21 (1): 80-109. 1991.First, I'd like to thank Professors Van Till, Pun, and McMullin for their careful and thoughtful replies. There is a deep level of agreement among all four of us; as is customary with replies and replies to replies, however, I shall concentrate on our areas of disagreement. In the cases of Van Till and McMullin, this may give an impression of deeper disagreement than actually exists. In the case of Pun it leaves me with little to say except Yea and Amen; I find no serious disagreement between us…Read more
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249The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism: An Initial Statement of the ArgumentIn Michael Ruse (ed.), Philosophy After Darwin: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Princeton University Press. pp. 301. 2009.This chapter contains sections titled: * Notes
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67. Die Sünde und ihre kognitiven KonsequenzenIn Gewährleisteter Christlicher Glaube, De Gruyter. pp. 232-282. 2015.
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80The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga ReaderEerdmans. 1998.This collection of essays and excerpts gives a comprehensive overview of Alvin Plantinga 's seminal work as a Christian philosopher of religion
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98Justification and TheismFaith and Philosophy 4 (4): 403-426. 1987.The question is: how should a theist think of justification or positive epistemic status? The answer I suggest is: a belief B has positive epistemic status for S only if S’s faculties are functioning properly (i.e., functioning in the way God intended them to) in producing B, and only if S’s cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which her faculties are designed; and under those conditions the more firmly S is inclined to accept B, the more positive epistemic status it has …Read more
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |