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123Methodological Naturalism, Part 2Origins and Design 18 (2): 22-34. 1997.So why must a scientist proceed in accordance with methodological naturalism? Michael Ruse suggests that methodological naturalism or at any rate part of it is true by definition: Furthermore, even if Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific explanation of origins. The Creationists believe that the world started miraculous…Read more
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160Evolution, epiphenomenalism, reductionismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3): 602-619. 2004.A common contemporary claim is the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism—the idea, roughly, that there is no such person as God or anything at all like God—with the view that our cognitive faculties have come to be by way of the processes to which contemporary evolutionary theory direct our attention. Call this view ‘N&E’. I’ve argued elsewhere that this view is incoherent or self-defeating in that anyone who accepts it has a defeater for R, the proposition that her cognitive faculties are reli…Read more
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171Two concepts of modality: Modal realism and modal reductionismJournal of Philosophy 83 (11): 693. 1986.
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13Against NaturalismIn Alvin Plantinga & Michael Tooley (eds.), Knowledge of God, Blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains sections titled: Theism Alternatives to Theism Naturalism and Its Woes Conclusion.
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51What’s The Question?Journal of Philosophical Research 20 19-43. 1995.Two kinds of critical questions have been asked about the propriety or rightness of Christian beliefs. The first is the de facto question: is Christian belief true? The second is the de jure question: is it rational, or reasonable, or intellectually acceptable, or rationally justifiable? This second question is much harder to locate than you’d guess from looking at the literature. In “Perceiving God” William AIston suggests that the (or a) right question here is the question of “the practical ra…Read more
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197Does God Have a Nature?Marquette University Press. 1980.Sets of contingent objects, perhaps, are as contingent as their members; but properties, propositions, numbers and states of affairs, it seems, are objects whose non-existence is quite impossible. If so, however, how are they related to God? Suppose God has a nature: a property he has essentially that includes each property essential to him. Does God have a nature? And if he does, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? How is God related to such abstract objects a…Read more
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9Supralapsarianism, or 'O Felix Culpa'In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, Eerdmanns. pp. 1-25. 2004.The problem of evil has challenged religious minds and hearts throughout the ages. Just how can the presence of suffering, tragedy, and wrongdoing be squared with the all-powerful, all-loving God of faith? This book gathers some of the best, most meaningful recent reflections on the problem of evil, with contributions by shrewd thinkers in the areas of philosophy, theology, literature, linguistics, and sociology. In addition to bringing new insights to the old problem of evil, Christian Faith an…Read more
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189Intellectual Sophistication and Basic Belief in GodFaith and Philosophy 3 306-312. 1986.are properly basic for at least some believers in God; there are widely realized sets of conditions, I suggested, in which such propositions are indeed properly basic. And when I said that these beliefs are properly basic, I had in mind what Quinn calls the narrow conception of the basing relation.[1] I was taking it that a person S accepts a belief A on the basis of a belief B only if (roughly) S believes both A and B and could correctly claim (on reflection) that B is part of his evidence for …Read more
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2A Contemporary Defence of Ontological ArgumentsIn Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2000.
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22``Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism"In Kevin Meeker & Philip Quinn (eds.), The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, Oxford University Press. pp. 172-192. 1995.
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12Can Robots think : reply to Tooley's second statementIn Knowledge of God, Blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains sections titled: Can a Material Thing Think? Tooley's Reply to the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism.
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2Religious belief without evidenceIn J. Runzo & Craig Ihara (eds.), Religious Experience, Religious Belief, University Press of America. 1986.
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35Games Scientists PlayIn Michael Murray & Jeffrey Schloss (eds.), The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 139. 2009.Accession Number: ATLA0001788484; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 139-167.; Language(s): English; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay
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21 On Being Evidentially Challenged 'Alvin Plantinga'In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, Blackwell. pp. 6--176. 1999.
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11The ontological argument from St. Anselm to contemporary philosophers (edited book)Macmillan. 1965.
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2The Evolutionary Anti-Naturalism ArgumentIn Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, Blackwell. pp. 6--125. 1999.
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162Materialism and Christian beliefIn Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine, Oxford University Press. pp. 99--141. 2007.
Notre Dame, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |