James Kreines

My focus here is on what Hegel has to say about nature and natural kinds, in ‘Observing Reason’ from the Phenomenology, and also in similar material from the Logic and Encyclopedia. I intend to argue that this material suggests a surprising way of stepping beyond the fundamental debate. There can of course be no question of elaborating and defending here a complete interpretation of Hegel’s entire theoretical philosophy. I will have to restrict myself to arguing for the unlikely conclusion that there is an approach that can combine and integrate the strongest points made by both sides in the most basic debate shaping recent Hegel interpretation. What needs explaining is how there could be any single coherent position that in any philosophical sense both cancels and preserves metaphysics

Hegel seeks to overturn Kant's conclusion that our knowledge is restricted, or that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. Understanding this Hegelian ambition requires distinguishing two Kantian characterizations of our epistemic limits: First, we can have knowledge only within the "bounds of experience". Second, we cannot have knowledge of objects that would be accessible only to a divine intellectual intuition, even though the faculty of reason requires us to conceive of such objects. Hegel aims to drive a wedge between these two characterizations, showing that we can have knowledge beyond Kant's bounds of experience, yet without need of divine intuition. And attention to such knowledge is supposed to show that we have no legitimate need to even conceive of divine intuition and its objects - and no need to conclude that our own knowledge is restricted by comparison, or that we cannot know things as they are in themselves. I focus here on the initial case Hegel uses to introduce this extended argument strategy: we can have more knowledge of natural kinds and laws than would be allowed by Kant's bounds of experience.

This dissertation develops an interpretation of Hegel's answer to the question of who or what we ourselves are, or his theory of Geist . The theory of Geist is perhaps most familiar when read as an appeal to a romantic metaphysical or theological view on which we are all part of "cosmic spirit", a self-creating collective agent identical to reality itself. I argue that the theory of Geist cannot be understood apart from Hegel's core concerns, but that these are not the concerns of romantic metaphysics or theology. Instead, Hegel's theory is rooted in his engagement with philosophical problems concerning explanation---problems largely drawn from his engagement with Kant's Critique of Judgment. Hegel's central concern is to make sense of the explanatory status of teleological accounts of our own actions in terms of our ends, and of relations between this and other "levels" of explanation. I am particularly interested in two of Hegel's main conclusions. First, he claims that we are fundamentally social beings, arguing that our subjective states explain what we do only in virtue of our participation in historically developing forms of social life. This first thesis accounts for Hegel's dual use of his central term: Geist refers to the historically developing forms of social life in virtue of which---Hegel argues---we posses the mental or geistig life which distinguishes us from other living beings. Second, Hegel claims that Geist is prior to or "the truth" of nature, arguing that the basic empirical concepts of forces and species employed in the natural sciences owe their explanatory status to their place in our ongoing social endeavor of systematizing our overall knowledge and understanding of nature