John Gunnell

Despite the extensive commentary on the work of Peter Winch, there has been inadequate recognition of how his Idea of a Social Science discerned the implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for confronting issues regarding the nature and interpretation of social phenomena. Winch’s subsequent confrontation with anthropology can be further illuminated by examining one of the most contentious contemporary debates in this field. This case illustrates the paradoxes involved in meta-practices such as philosophy and social science seeking to make descriptive and normative claims about conceptually preconstituted forms of life, and it indicates the limitations of philosophical realism as a social scientific meta-theory

It has been notoriously difficult to link Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work to the agendas of academic political theory. While this is in part due to his style of writing and the absence of an explicit discussion of politics, his commitment to the irreducibility of conventions is difficult to reconcile with the search of many political theorists for both criteria of political essentiality and a basis of cognitive privilege that would underwrite a vision of critical and normative inquiry. Although political theory is characteristically drawn toward the literature of philosophy in search of identity and images of epistemic authority, Wittgenstein’s work subverts the search for the universality of both politics and political inquiry. It is, however, possible to perceive in his work a positive valence for both a vision of political inquiry and criteria of democracy