JeeLoo Liu

The philosophy of time and change in Chinese Buddhism originated in a short treatise written by an early Chinese monk, Sengzhao (c. 384-414 CE). In this treatise, “On the Immutability of Things (wubuqianlun),” Sengzhao proposed a revolutionary theory of time and change that opposed the traditional Chinese notion of change established by Confucianism and Daoism. His thesis of the immutability of things also seemingly defies a fundamental Buddhist teaching about the impermanence of things. More than a thousand years after Sengzhao, a monk in the Ming dynasty, Kongyin Zhencheng (1546–1617) published the “Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things (Wubuqian zhengliang lun) to refute Sengzhao's theory of the immutability of things. Because of Sengzhao's esteemed status as one of the early founders of Chinese Buddhism, Zhencheng's critique of Sengzhao caused an uproar among his contemporaries. The ensuing exchange constituted one of the major debates in the history of Chinese Buddhism (Lin 2018; Liu et al., 2020; Fang 1998; Zhu 2012) and was considered a significant event in the “rise of Buddhist scholasticism” (Liu et al., 2020: 7). This entry will carefully analyze Sengzhao's treatise on time and the immutability of things, highlighting the philosophical disagreements between him and Zhencheng. It will also place Sengzhao in his philosophical lineage to examine how he derived insights from Kumarajiva and Nāgārjuna, and how he might have influenced Chan Buddhism's conception of time. This entry will present the uniqueness of Sengzhao's conception of time that marks his departure from the Chinese tradition.

This paper provides a defense of the description theory of proper names by constructing a ‘two-component’ theory of names. Using Kripke’s puzzle about belief as the stepping stone, this paper first points out problems with Kripke’s direct reference theory of names. It then presents the two-component theory of names and defends it against Kripke’s general criticisms of the description theory. It also compares the two-component theory of names against other leading description theories and shows how the two-component theory provides a better analysis of names. The paper offers a comprehensive summary of the debate between the description theory and the direct reference theory of names. At the end, it shows how the two-component theory of names can deal with Kripke’s puzzle and more.

In Why Be Moral: Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers, Yong Huang presents a comparative study on the moral philosophy of the Cheng brothers as how comparative philosophy should be done: to engage in contemporary philosophical problems and to propose solutions that could be gleaned from the ideas of ancient Chinese philosophers. His analysis provides a paradigm for comparative philosophy. I think this is the right way to do comparative philosophy—to focus on problem solving rather than textual comparison. I am very impressed both with the breadth of his knowledge of Western moral philosophy and with the depth of his analysis of the moral philosophy of the Cheng brothers. Since I share his view on how to...

A variety of crucial and still most relevant ideas about nothingness or emptiness have gained profound philosophical prominence in the history and development of a number of South and East Asian traditions—including in Buddhism, Daoism, Neo-Confucianism, Hinduism, Korean philosophy, and the Japanese Kyoto School. These traditions share the insight that in order to explain both the great mysteries and mundane facts about our experience, ideas of "nothingness" must play a primary role. This collection of essays brings together the work of twenty of the world’s prominent scholars of Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, Neo-Confucian, Japanese and Korean thought to illuminate fascinating philosophical conceptualizations of "nothingness" in both classical and modern Asian traditions. The unique collection offers new work from accomplished scholars and provides a coherent, panoramic view of the most significant ways that "nothingness" plays crucial roles in Asian philosophy. It includes both traditional and contemporary formulations, sometimes putting Asian traditions into dialogue with one another and sometimes with classical and modern Western thought. The result is a book of immense value for students and researchers in Asian and comparative philosophy

In this paper I examine the foundations of physical externalism and social externalism and argue that these foundations are incompatible. Physical externalism is based on a direct reference theory of natural-kind terms, while social externalism is based on a description theory of natural-kind terms. Thus, physical externalism and social externalism are incompatible just in the same way that the direct reference theory of proper names is incompatible with the description theory of proper names. My argument will proceed as follows. In Section One, I shall explain what the two theses say and spell out my suspicion. In Section Two, I shall take a look at the initial setups for physical externalism and social externalism by examining Putnam’s and Burge’s original arguments. Finally in Section Three, I shall explain that the real incompatibility comes to lie in the different assumptions on which the two theories are based. I will present some thought experiments to highlight this incompatibility.

This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that the Mind is the Principle—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.

A variety of crucial and still most relevant ideas about nothingness or emptiness have gained profound philosophical prominence in the history and development of a number of South and East Asian traditions--including in Buddhism, Daoism, Neo-Confucianism, Hinduism, Korean philosophy, and the Japanese Kyoto School. These traditions share the insight that in order to explain both the great mysteries and mundane facts about our experience, ideas of "nothingness" must play a primary role. This collection of essays brings together the work of twenty of the world's prominent scholars of Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, Neo-Confucian, Japanese and Korean thought to illuminate fascinating philosophical conceptualizations of "nothingness" in both classical and modern Asian traditions. The unique collection offers new work from accomplished scholars and provides a coherent, panoramic view of the most significant ways that "nothingness" plays crucial roles in Asian philosophy. It includes both traditional and contemporary formulations, sometimes putting Asian traditions into dialogue with one another and sometimes with classical and modern Western thought. The result is a book of immense value for students and researchers in Asian and comparative philosophy.

The present dissertation deals with the issue of the individuation of beliefs. This is an issue that falls into philosophy of psychology as well as philosophy of language. There are two major schools of thought that are involved in the debate. Individualism claims that the individuation does not need to take intentional, semantic properties of beliefs into account, while Anti-Individualism claims that it does. The former is represented by Jerry Fodor and the latter is represented by Tyler Burge. ;This dissertation is divided into three parts. In Part I, I review Tyler Burge's several attempts to refute Individualism. My conclusion is that Burge does not give us a viable alternative theory of content. In Part II, I examine Jerry Fodor's arguments for a new form of Individualism, one that proposes to individuate beliefs with respect to their causal powers. My conclusion is that Fodor runs into a problem in arguing that the individuation of mental states should be based on causal powers alone, since he would have to sacrifice the causal relevance of intentional mental properties. Finally in Part III, I formulate my arguments against Fodor's Individualism. I first present a holistic view of beliefs according to which, beliefs cannot be considered in isolation from the individual's system of beliefs. My view is that the individuation of beliefs not only needs to consider the semantic properties of the belief in question, it also needs to consider the semantic properties of relevant beliefs. I then argue for the causal relevance of intentional mental properties. My conclusion is that since the individuation of beliefs has to be based on groupings of their intentional, semantic properties, Individualism cannot be accepted