Rudi Te Velde

This article discusses Thomas Aquinas's view on the ‘utility’ of prayer in the light of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. ‘Creatio ex nihilo’ means, among other things, that nothing can exist that is not caused by the universal power of God. The universal causality of creation implies that God cannot receive from the world or react to any activity on our part. This claim of divine immutability throws into question the intelligibility of prayer: does it make sense to pray to God when his providence is certain and immutable? I argue that the God Thomas conceives is not the God of the ancient régime, the sovereign deity of absolute power who is in charge of everything; on the contrary, it is a God who grants the secondary causes within the world their own power and operation. The human activity of prayer belongs to this sphere of ‘second causes’, through which God realizes his providential plan. God's providence provides good things to us, one of which is the fulfillment of our prayers

In this article the claim of the Dutch ‘Utrechtse School’ of philosophy of religion that its method of practising philosophical theology is a reprise of the Anselmian ‘faith in search of understanding’ is critically examined. Philosophical theology is conceived of by the adherents of this school as an analytical and argumentative clarification of the basic concepts of theistic belief from an insiders point of view. In contrast with the classical project of natural theology their aim is not to provide a rational foundation of the truth of theism. The philosophical analysis of the main concepts of the theistic view of God departs from an methodological affirmation of their truth, that is, their reference to reality, as being an assumption made by faith. It is argued that this approach differs significantly from Anselm’s project of ‘faith in search of understanding’. Anselm aims at a rational understanding of the truth of what he believes. This means that the reference of faith to the reality of God does not remain an assumption of faith. Starting from faith and its inner desire to see the truth of God Anselm strives to reach after the reality of God by means of intellectual insight. In contrast with Anselm the ‘Utrechtse School’ views the truth claim of the statements of belief as a constitutive presupposition of a religious form of life. In my opinion this comes to saying that the believer must believe in the truth of what he believes as an implication of his religious behaviour and attitude. But this leaves no place any more for a seeking to understand the truth of what he believes

According to Thomas Aquinas, both logic and metaphysics are characterized by the same universal scope. The consideration of metaphysics extends to everthing which is, as its subject is being insofar as it is being. And the science of logic too considers everything which is, not as it exists in reality but insofar as the whole of being falls under the consideration of reason. Because of the equivalence between the logical sphere of reason and the real sphere of being metaphysics has an affinity with logic. This similarity is mentioned by Aquinas in order to explain the legitimate use of a logical mode of reasoning within metaphysics. Metaphysics is not identical with logic, but the modus logicus, the logical mode of reasoning, is to a certain extent useful for the philosopher in his inquiry into metaphysical matters. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Thomas refers frequently to this ‘modus logicus' by which Aristotle is said to proceed in his investigation into substance. However, it is not altogether clear what this method consists in and how the similarity between logic and metaphysics, on which the modus logicus is based, should be understood. In this article I want to clarify the meaning of the modus logicusin Aquinas and its revelance for metaphysics. This might help us to understand better how according to Thomas logic and metaphysics are related to one another and in what sense they are different