Richard Lippke

The starting frame with which jurors begin trials and the approach which they should take toward the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and defense are distinguished. A robust interpretation of the starting frame, according to which jurors should begin trials by presuming the material innocence of defendants, is defended. Alternative starting frames which are less defendant-friendly are shown to cohere less well with the notion that criminal trials should constitute stern tests of the government's case against those it has charged with crimes. The intuitive case for the robust presumption of innocence is supplemented with empirical evidence concerning the psychology of belief formation and preservation. Various objections to the proposed starting frame are addressed

Those found liable for negligently injuring others are required to compensate them, but current practices permit most tort feasors to spread the costs of their liability burdens through the purchase of insurance. Those found guilty of criminal offences, however, are not allowed to shift the burdens of their sentences onto others. Yet the reasons for not allowing criminal offenders to shift such burdens – harm reduction, retribution, and moral education – also appear to retain some force in relation to negligent tort feasors. Arguments for and against limiting the abilities of negligent tort feasors to spread such costs, thus imposing a penalty on them, are discussed. The conclusion reached is that further consideration of such a penalty is warranted.

Given the desert-centric character of retributive penal theory, it seems odd that its supporters rarely discuss the undeserved losses and suffering of crime victims and the state’s role in responding to them. This asymmetry in the desert-focus of retributive penal theory is examined and the likely arguments in support of it are found wanting. Particular attention is paid to the claim that offenders, rather than the state, should supply compensation to victims. Also, standard retributive accounts of why the deserving should be punished are shown to support state-supplied victim compensation.

The question addressed here is whether evidence concerning defendants' past criminal records should be introduced at their trials because such evidence reveals their character and thus reveals whether they are the kinds of persons likely to have committed the crimes with which they are currently charged. I strongly caution against the introduction of such evidence for a number of reasons. First, the link between defendants' past criminal records and claims about their standing dispositions to think and act is tenuous, at best. Second, noncharacter, or trace, evidence should have primacy in determining the guilt or innocence of defendants. Third, character evidence will vary in its freshness and specificity. Other things being equal, only relatively fresh and specific character evidence has probative value. Moreover, such evidence will have greater probative value in criminal cases where the issue before the court is whether a crime has been committed than in cases where the issue is whether it was the defendant who committed the crime. Finally, we might be more sanguine about the introduction of fresh and specific character evidence under conditions likely to work against its misuse or misinterpretation. However, the relevant conditions may not often be satisfied in the real world of criminal trials and defendants.

Numerous retributivists hold that deserved punishment has intrinsic value. A number of puzzles regarding that claim are identified and discussed. An alternative, more Kantian account of intrinsic value is then identified and the ways in which legal punishment might be understood to cohere with it are explored. That account focuses on the various ways in which legal punishment might be persons-respecting. It is then argued that this Kantian account enables us to solve or evade the puzzles generated by the other intrinsic value account.

The criminal law requires citizens to demonstrate ‘reasonable firmness’ in the face of temptations to violate its provisions. But what if individuals repeatedly face powerful temptations to offend, are not responsible for being in such predicaments, cannot escape them, and cannot alter or expunge their desires because they count as urgent on any plausible account of a decent human life? Should the criminal law make some sort of allowance for the chronically tempted? I argue that it should, because individuals in such predicaments will have to exhibit exemplary if not extraordinary self-control. Intuitively, such self-control is more than the criminal law can reasonably demand of individuals. Also, there is empirical evidence that repeated acts of self-control wear down individuals. Numerous objections to the position I defend are addressed and its implications for the criminal law are briefly explored

After surveying the many practical difficulties sentencing judges must confront in determining whether the offenders who appear before them are genuinely remorseful, recent dialogical accounts of remorse-based sentence reductions are examined. These accounts depend on a morally communicative approach to legal punishment’s justification and seem to confine such communication to offenders. They contend that, in order to respect remorseful offenders, sentencing judges must reduce their sentences. Why they should do so, by how much they should do so, and whether they should do so when the individuals being sentenced are recidivists, are among the questions discussed. Also examined is whether remorse should be a prominent mitigating factor in sentencing or only one among many aggravating or mitigating factors. In conclusion, it is suggested that existing sentencing practices might make more sense if we suppose judges to be looking for things other than genuine remorse in the individuals who appear before them.

In the United States, the identities of criminal offenders are matters of public record, accessible to prospective employers, the press, and ordinary citizens. In European countries, the identities of offenders are routinely kept hidden, with some exceptions. The question addressed in this discussion concerns whether the public disclosure of the identities of offenders is part and parcel of their legal punishment. My contentions are that public disclosure is not conceptually part of legal punishment, necessary to serve substantive penal aims, or likely to enhance penal aims. At times, it will conflict with defensible aims of legal punishment. Other values might support or require the public identification of criminal offenders, but the aims of legal punishment do not appear to do so.

What are termed the ‘collateral legal consequences’ (or CLCs) of criminal conviction have been defended in a variety of ways. The focus in this article is on efforts to justify the burdens and restrictions they involve as nonpenal measures designed to secure public safety. Zachary Hoskins' careful defense of such public‐safety CLCs is utilized as a point of departure. Although it is granted that such measures might be defensible, the many complications and problems of ensuring that they do not amount to further legal punishment and are kept within reasonable bounds are explored. I argue that the state is unlikely to deploy such public safety measures wisely and with sufficient restraint.

Critics charge that retributivists fail to show why the state should concern itself with ensuring that criminal offenders are punished in accordance with their ill deserts. Drawing on the notion that the state should attempt to equalize the realization of the interests designated by rights, it is argued that legal punishment restores the equality of condition, disrupted by criminal conduct, that all citizens are entitled to. While this equality of condition might be restored in various ways, it is argued that the imposition of punitive losses is the most appropriate way to restore it in most cases. An account of the ill deserts of offenders, as a function of the harms their crimes produce and the extent of their culpability for those harms, is briefly elaborated.

After discussing the interests that ground theright to democratic political participation,arguments for the disenfranchisement of thosewho commit serious criminal offenses areexamined. The arguments are divided into twogroups. The first group consists of argumentsthat are relatively independent of thejustifying aims of punishment. It is concededthat two of these arguments establish thatsome, though by no means all, serious offendersshould lose the vote for a period of time thatdoes not necessarily overlap with the durationof the other sanctions visited upon them. Thesearguments also imply that the state isjustified in attempting to exclude theoffenders in question from all forms ofpolitical participation, a position thatarguably runs afoul of moral limits onpunishment. The second group of arguments makesexplicit reference to the justifying aims ofpunishment. None supports the blanketdisenfranchisement of felons, though some mayjustify it in relation to some seriousoffenders for certain periods of time. All ofthe arguments supporting the disenfranchisementof serious offenders are most persuasive on theassumption that they live in reasonably justsocieties that are genuinely democratic. Ifthat assumption is false or questionable, thenit is argued that the force of such argumentsmay be weakened considerably.

abstract Supermax prisons subject inmates to extreme isolation and sensory deprivation for extended periods of time. Crime reduction and retributive arguments in favour of supermax confinement are elaborated. Both types of arguments are shown to falter once the logic of the two approaches to the justification of legal punishment is made clear and evidence about the effects of supermax confinement on inmates is considered. It is also argued that many criminal offenders suffer from defects in their capacities for morally responsible action, lack sufficient opportunities to remain law‐abiding, or are understandably alienated from society and the prison regime. The implications of this more realistic picture of offenders for supermax confinement are then explored briefly.

Arguing against most scholars of business ethics who have articulated a set of moral principles and applied them to problems faced by business people, Richard Lippke steers away from offering moral directives. In Radical Business Ethics, he develops a more comprehensive perspective on business issues that is tied to larger questions of social justice. Analyzing a select group of timely issues such as advertising, employee privacy, and insider trading in the context of debates about the nature of the just society, Lippke argues that the most plausible theory of justice is one whose implications are highly critical of many features of advanced capitalist societies. Radical Business Ethics will be an eye-opening book for students and scholars of ethics, and anyone interested in the role business plays in a just society

Very few scholars discuss the moral basis of the right of persons accused of crimes to be supplied with attorneys if they cannot afford them. More discussion of the topic is needed, in particular because political theorists who prefer a minimal state deny that indigent persons have such a moral right. This article addresses their contentions by developing three arguments for supplying poor persons accused of crimes with defense attorneys. First, doing so will prevent state officials from becoming emboldened in their dealings with the poor, such that they might come to pose a threat to the non-poor. Second, poor persons who believe that the state does not treat them fairly will have reduced incentives to abide by the law, which will, in turn, increase the cost of the minimal state. Third, the better off should show solidarity with the poor in demanding that the minimal state honor all citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property. Crucial to these arguments is the claim that a right of indigent defense is unlike other welfare rights in that securing it protects other basic moral rights that minimal statists acknowledge.