Richard Lippke

Negative retributivism is the view that though the primary justifying aim of legal punishment is the reduction of crime, the state's efforts to do so are subject to side-constraints that forbid punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty. I contend that insufficient attention has been paid to what the side-constraints commit us to in constructing a theory of legal punishment, even one primarily oriented toward reducing crime. Specifically, I argue that the side-constraints limit the kinds of actions that are appropriately criminalised, the kinds of beings who are appropriately liable to legal punishment, and the absolute and comparative severity of sanctions. I also argue that a third retributive constraint is needed, one which I term a ‘non-degradation constraint’. According to this third constraint, in our efforts to reduce crime, we must avoid treating offenders as non-moral beings and ensure that punishment does not atrophy or erode the complex capacity for moral responsibility. When this third constraint is combined with the persuasive instrumental case for promoting the moral responsiveness of offenders, the result is an approach to crime reduction that is quite different from ones which emphasise general deterrence and incapacitation. In the closing section, I broach the question whether negative retributivism has been appropriately characterised in the literature on legal punishment

Two recent discussions concerning punishment of the socially deprived reach conflicting conclusions. Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth argue that we should sympathize with the predicament of the poor and therefore mitigate their sentences. Peter Chau disputes von Hirsch and Ashworth’s conclusion, contending that having to face strong temptations is not an appropriate ground for reducing anyone’s punishment for their crimes. I argue that neither von Hirsch and Ashworth’s account nor Chau’s critique of it is persuasive. I then take up the challenge of showing why social deprivation renders punishment problematic. I contend that it establishes a perverse incentive structure that is persistent and powerful, requiring the disadvantaged to exercise self-control on an ongoing basis. Repeated acts of self-control are difficult, especially for youths whose skills at it are not yet fully developed. Also, in a variety of more and less subtle ways, social deprivation reduces the incentives for self-control and may work to stunt its development. In closing, I briefly consider the options for responding to the crimes of the chronically disadvantaged.

Retributive approaches to the justification of legal punishment are often thought to place exacting and unattractive demands on state officials, requiring them to expend scarce public resources on apprehending and punishing all offenders strictly in accordance with their criminal ill deserts. Against this caricature of the theory, I argue that retributivists can urge parsimony in the use of punishment. After clarifying what parsimony consists in, I show how retributivists can urge reductions in the use of punishment in order to conserve scarce resources for other valuable social purposes, minimize the foreseeable and adverse effects of legal punishment on the innocent, and accommodate the fact that existing societies fail in numerous ways to satisfy the conditions that make retributive punishment fully justified.

After surveying the many practical difficulties sentencing judges must confront in determining whether the offenders who appear before them are genuinely remorseful, recent dialogical accounts of remorse-based sentence reductions are examined. These accounts depend on a morally communicative approach to legal punishment’s justification and seem to confine such communication to offenders. They contend that, in order to respect remorseful offenders, sentencing judges must reduce their sentences. Why they should do so, by how much they should do so, and whether they should do so when the individuals being sentenced are recidivists, are among the questions discussed. Also examined is whether remorse should be a prominent mitigating factor in sentencing or only one among many aggravating or mitigating factors. In conclusion, it is suggested that existing sentencing practices might make more sense if we suppose judges to be looking for things other than genuine remorse in the individuals who appear before them.

The pre-trial detention of individuals charged with crimes is viewed by many legal scholars as problematic. Standard arguments against it are that it constitutes legal punishment of individuals not yet convicted of crimes, violates the presumption of innocence, and rests on dubious predictions of future crime. I defend modified and restrained forms of pre-trial detention. I argue that pre-trial detention could be made very different than imprisonment, should be governed by strict criteria, and is warranted, when the evidence of danger is convincing. I contend that the presumption of innocence does not preclude us from doing many other things to criminal suspects and defendants that imply their guilt. Finally, I dispute arguments designed to show that pre-trial detention can be justified to prevent absconding or interferences with the course of justice, but not to prevent other, and sometimes much more serious, offenses

Those found liable for negligently injuring others are required to compensate them, but current practices permit most tort feasors to spread the costs of their liability burdens through the purchase of insurance. Those found guilty of criminal offences, however, are not allowed to shift the burdens of their sentences onto others. Yet the reasons for not allowing criminal offenders to shift such burdens – harm reduction, retribution, and moral education – also appear to retain some force in relation to negligent tort feasors. Arguments for and against limiting the abilities of negligent tort feasors to spread such costs, thus imposing a penalty on them, are discussed. The conclusion reached is that further consideration of such a penalty is warranted.

The criminal law requires citizens to demonstrate ‘reasonable firmness’ in the face of temptations to violate its provisions. But what if individuals repeatedly face powerful temptations to offend, are not responsible for being in such predicaments, cannot escape them, and cannot alter or expunge their desires because they count as urgent on any plausible account of a decent human life? Should the criminal law make some sort of allowance for the chronically tempted? I argue that it should, because individuals in such predicaments will have to exhibit exemplary if not extraordinary self-control. Intuitively, such self-control is more than the criminal law can reasonably demand of individuals. Also, there is empirical evidence that repeated acts of self-control wear down individuals. Numerous objections to the position I defend are addressed and its implications for the criminal law are briefly explored

The dominant approach to the analysis of issues in business ethics consists in the articulation and use of a set of mid-level moral principles. This approach is geared to business practitioners who are not interested in the difficult problems of moral and political theory. I argue that this "practitioner model" is philosophically suspect. I show how the theoretical frameworks prominent business ethicists employ are insufficiently developed. I also show how many of their analyses presuppose substantive views about issues of social justice which they rarely defend or acknowledge. Since no neutral position on these issues is available, I argue that the only alternative is to address the problems such issue's raise for the analysis of institutions and the conduct of persons acting under those institutions. I offer suggestions about how we can develop a more philosophically defensible approach to business ethics.

While many countries are following the lead of the United States in making insider trading illegal, its moral status is still controversial. I summarise the scholarly debate over the fairness of insider trading and lay bare the assumptions about fairness implicit in that debate. I focus on the question whether those assumptions can be defended independently of a more comprehensive theory of social justice. Current analyses presuppose that we can intelligently discuss what the social rules regarding insider trading should be while ignoring questions about the broader principles of justice that should be adopted and the extent to which existing institutions realise those principles. I argue that such questions must be addressed. I then employ an egalitarian conception of social justice to analyse insider trading. I thereby illustrate how a more systematic approach, grounded in a comprehensive theory of justice, transforms the debate about the fairness of insider trading.

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices

What are termed the ‘collateral legal consequences’ (or CLCs) of criminal conviction have been defended in a variety of ways. The focus in this article is on efforts to justify the burdens and restrictions they involve as nonpenal measures designed to secure public safety. Zachary Hoskins' careful defense of such public‐safety CLCs is utilized as a point of departure. Although it is granted that such measures might be defensible, the many complications and problems of ensuring that they do not amount to further legal punishment and are kept within reasonable bounds are explored. I argue that the state is unlikely to deploy such public safety measures wisely and with sufficient restraint.

Given the desert-centric character of retributive penal theory, it seems odd that its supporters rarely discuss the undeserved losses and suffering of crime victims and the state’s role in responding to them. This asymmetry in the desert-focus of retributive penal theory is examined and the likely arguments in support of it are found wanting. Particular attention is paid to the claim that offenders, rather than the state, should supply compensation to victims. Also, standard retributive accounts of why the deserving should be punished are shown to support state-supplied victim compensation.

Numerous retributivists hold that deserved punishment has intrinsic value. A number of puzzles regarding that claim are identified and discussed. An alternative, more Kantian account of intrinsic value is then identified and the ways in which legal punishment might be understood to cohere with it are explored. That account focuses on the various ways in which legal punishment might be persons-respecting. It is then argued that this Kantian account enables us to solve or evade the puzzles generated by the other intrinsic value account.

In the United States, the identities of criminal offenders are matters of public record, accessible to prospective employers, the press, and ordinary citizens. In European countries, the identities of offenders are routinely kept hidden, with some exceptions. The question addressed in this discussion concerns whether the public disclosure of the identities of offenders is part and parcel of their legal punishment. My contentions are that public disclosure is not conceptually part of legal punishment, necessary to serve substantive penal aims, or likely to enhance penal aims. At times, it will conflict with defensible aims of legal punishment. Other values might support or require the public identification of criminal offenders, but the aims of legal punishment do not appear to do so.

The enterprise of state punishment requires the use of limited resources for which there are other competitors, such as national defense, market regulation, and social welfare. How resource-demanding retributive justice will turn out to be depends on how retributivists answer a series of questions concerning the theory’s structure. After elaborating these questions and the varieties of retributive justice that answers to them might generate, I consider the resource demands of retributive justice in the context of competing theories of distributive justice. Various tensions and outright conflicts between the pursuit of retributive and distributive justice are then explored.

Discussion in this paper focuses on how strongly we should prefer non-punishment of persons guilty of serious crimes to punishment of persons innocent of them. William Blackstone's version of that preference, expressed as a ten to one ratio, is first shown to be untenable on standard accounts of legal punishment's justifying aims. Somewhat weaker versions of that ratio also appear suspect. More to the point, Blackstone's adage obscures the crucial way in which there are risks to be assessed in setting up a criminal justice system - the risk that it will not be eff ective enough at apprehending and punishing serious off enders, as well as the risk that it will expose innocent persons to harsh punishment. I urge a balancing of such risks, and argue that the salient features of many contemporary criminal justice systems can be plausibly interpreted as attempting to achieve and maintain such a balance. We do not grant criminal defendants a presumption of innocence that the state must overcome with proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to institutionally express a strong degree of preference for non-punishment of the guilty to punishment of the innocent. Instead, we do so in order to ensure that institutions of legal punishment have suffi cient scope while preserving their ability to accurately sort the guilty from the innocent

Imprisonment imposes very substantial losses and deprivations on people convicted of crimes. The question for which crimes imprisonment is an appropriate sanction is addressed employing both retributive and crime reduction approaches to the justification of legal punishment. Although there is not complete convergence between what the two approaches imply about its use, it is argued that both would reserve imprisonment for serious offenses, ones that inflict or threaten significant harms with moderate to high levels of culpability. Thus, neither approach supports the current use of imprisonment to sanction a range of lesser offenses. Key Words: crime reduction • imprisonment • retribution.

After discussing the interests that ground theright to democratic political participation,arguments for the disenfranchisement of thosewho commit serious criminal offenses areexamined. The arguments are divided into twogroups. The first group consists of argumentsthat are relatively independent of thejustifying aims of punishment. It is concededthat two of these arguments establish thatsome, though by no means all, serious offendersshould lose the vote for a period of time thatdoes not necessarily overlap with the durationof the other sanctions visited upon them. Thesearguments also imply that the state isjustified in attempting to exclude theoffenders in question from all forms ofpolitical participation, a position thatarguably runs afoul of moral limits onpunishment. The second group of arguments makesexplicit reference to the justifying aims ofpunishment. None supports the blanketdisenfranchisement of felons, though some mayjustify it in relation to some seriousoffenders for certain periods of time. All ofthe arguments supporting the disenfranchisementof serious offenders are most persuasive on theassumption that they live in reasonably justsocieties that are genuinely democratic. Ifthat assumption is false or questionable, thenit is argued that the force of such argumentsmay be weakened considerably.