-
80The ontology of artefacts: the hard problemStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1): 118-131. 2006.We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ and ‘Realizability C…Read more
-
48Why Accept Collective Beliefs?ProtoSociology 18 377-388. 2003.Margaret Gilbert has recently argued in ProtoSociology against what she called my rejectionist’s view according to which (i) we have to make a distinction between the intentional states of believing and accepting and (ii) genuine group beliefs, i.e. group beliefs that cannot be reduced to the beliefs of the individual members of a group, should be understood in terms of the acceptance of a view rather than of beliefs proper. In this reply I discuss Gilbert’s objections.
-
180Mental Causation and Searle’s Impossible Conception of Unconscious IntentionalityInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2): 155-170. 2000.In my article I evaluate Searle's account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle's philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional s…Read more
-
1Believing and accepting as a groupIn Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will, Tilburg University Press. 1999.
-
45Physical and mental? Reply to John SearleInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2). 2000.In my reply I focus on three topics: the usefulness of Searle's physical analogies for understanding the relationship between higher-level mental properties and lower-level physical properties, the question of overdetermination and the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that Searle's reply does not refute my arguments against his analogies, while concerns about overdetermination are only taken away because his reply shows that there is no genuine unconscious mental causat…Read more
-
47Collective Agents and Cognitive AttitudesProtoSociology 16 70-85. 2002.Propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, can be attributed to collective agents. In my paper I focus on cognitive attitudes, and I explore the various types of collective beliefs. I argue that there is a whole spectrum of collective beliefs, and I distinguish between two extremes: the weak opinion poll conception and the strong agreement-based conception. Strong collective beliefs should be understood in terms of the acceptance of a proposition rather than of belief pro…Read more
-
265The dual nature of technical artefactsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1): 1-4. 2006.
-
32Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics (edited book)Stanford: CSLI Publications. 2001.The philosophy of mind has long been dominated by the view that mental states are identical with, constituted by, or grounded in brain states. Lynne Rudder Baker has been a persistent critic of this view, developing instead a theory grounded in a larger metaphysical outlook called Practical Realism. This volume is the first critical book-length evaluation of her views and criticism; leading philosophers answer her challenges and explore the consequences of Practical Realism, and Baker herself pr…Read more
Eindhoven, North Brabant, Netherlands
Areas of Interest
1 more
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
General Philosophy of Science |