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17Technological KnowledgeIn Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis, Stig Andur Pedersen & Vincent F. Hendricks (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.This chapter contains sections titled: Types of Knowledge in Technology A Neglected Topic Empirical Studies Philosophical Explorations References and Further Reading.
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162The Empirical turn in the philosophy of technology (edited book)JAI. 2001.THERE'S NO TURN LIKE THE EMPIRICAL TURN Arie Rip Philosophers of technology now turn to the phenomena in order to learn from them - always, and unavoidably, ...
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Pascal Engel is professor of philosophy at the Universite de Paris IV-Sorbonne (Paris). He is a member of the Institut Universitaire de France, and former Presi-dent of the Societe de Philosophic Analytique, the French branch of ESAP. He teaches philosophy of logic, of language, and of mind and has written a number of articles and books in these areas, including The Norm of Truth (1991), David (review)In Belief, Cognition, and the Will, Tilburg University Press. pp. 6--113. 1999.
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Gustav Gerber und Friedrich Nietzsche. Zum historischen Hintergrund der sprachphilosophischen Auffassungen des frühen NietzscheNietzsche Studien 17 (n/a): 369-390. 1988.
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80The ontology of artefacts: the hard problemStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1): 118-131. 2006.We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ and ‘Realizability C…Read more
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48Why Accept Collective Beliefs?ProtoSociology 18 377-388. 2003.Margaret Gilbert has recently argued in ProtoSociology against what she called my rejectionist’s view according to which (i) we have to make a distinction between the intentional states of believing and accepting and (ii) genuine group beliefs, i.e. group beliefs that cannot be reduced to the beliefs of the individual members of a group, should be understood in terms of the acceptance of a view rather than of beliefs proper. In this reply I discuss Gilbert’s objections.
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180Mental Causation and Searle’s Impossible Conception of Unconscious IntentionalityInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2): 155-170. 2000.In my article I evaluate Searle's account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle's philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional s…Read more
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1Believing and accepting as a groupIn Anthonie Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will, Tilburg University Press. 1999.
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45Physical and mental? Reply to John SearleInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2). 2000.In my reply I focus on three topics: the usefulness of Searle's physical analogies for understanding the relationship between higher-level mental properties and lower-level physical properties, the question of overdetermination and the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that Searle's reply does not refute my arguments against his analogies, while concerns about overdetermination are only taken away because his reply shows that there is no genuine unconscious mental causat…Read more
Eindhoven, North Brabant, Netherlands
Areas of Interest
1 more
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
General Philosophy of Science |