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36Recent developments in the scientific realism debate have resulted in a form of ‘exemplar driven’ realism that eschews general ‘recipes’ and instead focuses on the specific, ‘local’ reasons for adopting a realist stance in particular theoretical contexts. Here I suggest that such a move highlights even more sharply the need for the realist to incorporate a health dose of metaphysics in her position, particularly when it comes to the theories associated with modern physics. Turning to another set…Read more
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75Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddington's structuralist conception of objectsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (2): 227-259. 2003.Although Eddington's philosophy of physics has been subjected to critical re-evaluation in recent years, neither the exact nature of his structuralist views nor his response to criticism by the likes of Braithwaite have been made clear. In this paper I trace, in particular, the incorporation into Eddington's structuralism of the non-classical indistinguishability of quantum objects. His metaphysical view of such objects as the product of group-theoretical analysis is crucial for understanding hi…Read more
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Review Articles-The Phenomenological Approach to PhysicsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 30 (2): 267-282. 1999.
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158A model‐theoretic account of representation (or, I don't know much about art…but I know it involves isomorphism)Philosophy of Science 70 (5): 1472-1483. 2003.Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such examples need to be handled with care given a) the differences between works of art and scientific theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate…Read more
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432Quantum physics and the identity of indiscerniblesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2): 233-246. 1988.Department of History and Philosophy of Science. University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH This paper is concerned with the question of whether atomic particles of the same species, i. e. with the same intrinsic state-independent properties of mass, spin, electric charge, etc, violate the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, in the sense that, while there is more than one of them, their state-dependent properties may also all be the same. The answer depends …Read more
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234Why the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is not contingently true eitherSynthese 78 (2). 1989.Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz''sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong.
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383In defence of ontic structural realismIn Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, Springer Science+business Media. pp. 25-42. 2011.
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The structure of theoriesIn Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Routledge. pp. 269--280. 2005.
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145Semi-realism, Sociability and StructureErkenntnis 78 (1). 2013.Semi-realism offers a metaphysics of science based on causal properties. Insofar as these are understood in terms of dispositions for specific relations that comprise the concrete structure of the world it can be regarded as a form of structural realism. And insofar as these properties are 'sociable' and cohere into the groupings that comprise the particulars investigated by science, it captures the underlying intuition behind forms of entity realism. However, I shall raise concerns about both t…Read more
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169Structure as a weapon of the realistProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2). 2006.Although much of its history has been neglected or misunderstood, a structuralist 'tendency' has re-emerged within the philosophy of science. Broadly speaking, it consists of two fundamental strands: on the one hand, there is the identification of structural commonalities between theories; on the other, there is the metaphysical decomposition of objects in structural terms. Both have been pressed into service for the realist cause: the former has been identified primarily with Worrall's 'epistem…Read more
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54The current state of the relationship between metaphysics and the philosophy of science might appear to be one best described as ‘hostility on both sides’. In an attempt to bridge this gap, French and McKenzie have suggested a two fold strategy: on the one hand, if metaphysics is to be taken to have something direct to say about reality, the implications of physics need to be properly appreciated; on the other, one does not have to agree with the claim that a prioristic metaphysics should be dis…Read more
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7Review of Martin H. Krieger: Constitutions of Matter: Mathematically Modeling the Most Everyday of Physical Phenomena (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 355-358. 1998.
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186The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Science 57 (2). 1990.An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction of partial structures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both "iconic" and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself.
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |