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145Semi-realism, Sociability and StructureErkenntnis 78 (1). 2013.Semi-realism offers a metaphysics of science based on causal properties. Insofar as these are understood in terms of dispositions for specific relations that comprise the concrete structure of the world it can be regarded as a form of structural realism. And insofar as these properties are 'sociable' and cohere into the groupings that comprise the particulars investigated by science, it captures the underlying intuition behind forms of entity realism. However, I shall raise concerns about both t…Read more
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54The current state of the relationship between metaphysics and the philosophy of science might appear to be one best described as ‘hostility on both sides’. In an attempt to bridge this gap, French and McKenzie have suggested a two fold strategy: on the one hand, if metaphysics is to be taken to have something direct to say about reality, the implications of physics need to be properly appreciated; on the other, one does not have to agree with the claim that a prioristic metaphysics should be dis…Read more
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169Structure as a weapon of the realistProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2). 2006.Although much of its history has been neglected or misunderstood, a structuralist 'tendency' has re-emerged within the philosophy of science. Broadly speaking, it consists of two fundamental strands: on the one hand, there is the identification of structural commonalities between theories; on the other, there is the metaphysical decomposition of objects in structural terms. Both have been pressed into service for the realist cause: the former has been identified primarily with Worrall's 'epistem…Read more
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186The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Science 57 (2). 1990.An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction of partial structures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both "iconic" and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself.
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7Review of Martin H. Krieger: Constitutions of Matter: Mathematically Modeling the Most Everyday of Physical Phenomena (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 355-358. 1998.
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Putting a new spin on particle identityIn R. Hilborn & G. Tino (eds.), Spin Statistics Connection and Commutation Relations, . pp. 305-318. 2000.
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1Understanding permutation symmetryIn Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, Cambridge University Press. pp. 212--38. 2002.
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59Dispositionalist accounts of scientific laws are currently at the forefront of discussions in the metaphysics of science. However, Mumford has presented such accounts with the following dilemma: if laws are to have a governing role, then they cannot be grounded in the relevant dispositions; if on the other hand, they are so grounded, then they cannot perform such a role. Mumford’s solution is drastic: to do away with laws as metaphysically substantive entities altogether. Dispositionalist accoun…Read more
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118Hacking away at the identity of indiscernibles: Possible worlds and Einstein's principle of equivalenceJournal of Philosophy 92 (9): 455-466. 1995.
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41The esperable uberty of quantum chromodynamicsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26 (1): 87-105. 1995.Within the philosophy of science there has been a great deal of rather vague talk about the 'heuristic fruitfulness' (or what Peirce called the 'esperable uberty') of theories. It is my aim in the present paper to add some precision to these discussions by linking this 'fruitfulness' to the satisfaction of certain heuristic criteria. In this manner the demarcation between 'discovery' and 'pursuit' becomes blurred. As a case study, I present the competition between the paraparticle and colour mod…Read more
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4Review of BAS VAN FRAASSEN: Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist Approach (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3): 436-439. 1995.
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33Scribbling on the blank sheet: Eddington's structuralist conception of objectsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (2): 227-259. 2003.
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164A Model‐Theoretic Account of RepresentationPhilosophy of Science 70 (5): 1472-1483. 2003.Recent discussions of the nature of representation in science have tended to import pre-established decompositions from analyses of representation in the arts, language, cognition and so forth. Which of these analyses one favours will depend on how one conceives of theories in the first place. If one thinks of them in terms of an axiomatised set of logico-linguistic statements, then one might be naturally drawn to accounts of linguistic representation in which notions of denotation, for example,…Read more
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624Remodelling structural realism: Quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure (review)Synthese 136 (1): 31-56. 2003.We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structuralrealism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned theview of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualisingobjects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in thecontext of modern physics.
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |