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432Quantum physics and the identity of indiscerniblesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2): 233-246. 1988.Department of History and Philosophy of Science. University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH This paper is concerned with the question of whether atomic particles of the same species, i. e. with the same intrinsic state-independent properties of mass, spin, electric charge, etc, violate the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, in the sense that, while there is more than one of them, their state-dependent properties may also all be the same. The answer depends …Read more
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The structure of theoriesIn Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Routledge. pp. 269--280. 2005.
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383In defence of ontic structural realismIn Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, Springer Science+business Media. pp. 25-42. 2011.
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147Semi-realism, Sociability and StructureErkenntnis 78 (1). 2013.Semi-realism offers a metaphysics of science based on causal properties. Insofar as these are understood in terms of dispositions for specific relations that comprise the concrete structure of the world it can be regarded as a form of structural realism. And insofar as these properties are 'sociable' and cohere into the groupings that comprise the particulars investigated by science, it captures the underlying intuition behind forms of entity realism. However, I shall raise concerns about both t…Read more
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54The current state of the relationship between metaphysics and the philosophy of science might appear to be one best described as ‘hostility on both sides’. In an attempt to bridge this gap, French and McKenzie have suggested a two fold strategy: on the one hand, if metaphysics is to be taken to have something direct to say about reality, the implications of physics need to be properly appreciated; on the other, one does not have to agree with the claim that a prioristic metaphysics should be dis…Read more
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169Structure as a weapon of the realistProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2). 2006.Although much of its history has been neglected or misunderstood, a structuralist 'tendency' has re-emerged within the philosophy of science. Broadly speaking, it consists of two fundamental strands: on the one hand, there is the identification of structural commonalities between theories; on the other, there is the metaphysical decomposition of objects in structural terms. Both have been pressed into service for the realist cause: the former has been identified primarily with Worrall's 'epistem…Read more
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7Review of Martin H. Krieger: Constitutions of Matter: Mathematically Modeling the Most Everyday of Physical Phenomena (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 355-358. 1998.
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186The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of SciencePhilosophy of Science 57 (2). 1990.An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction of partial structures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both "iconic" and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself.
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1Understanding permutation symmetryIn Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, Cambridge University Press. pp. 212--38. 2002.
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59Dispositionalist accounts of scientific laws are currently at the forefront of discussions in the metaphysics of science. However, Mumford has presented such accounts with the following dilemma: if laws are to have a governing role, then they cannot be grounded in the relevant dispositions; if on the other hand, they are so grounded, then they cannot perform such a role. Mumford’s solution is drastic: to do away with laws as metaphysically substantive entities altogether. Dispositionalist accoun…Read more
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Putting a new spin on particle identityIn R. Hilborn & G. Tino (eds.), Spin Statistics Connection and Commutation Relations, . pp. 305-318. 2000.
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41The esperable uberty of quantum chromodynamicsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26 (1): 87-105. 1995.Within the philosophy of science there has been a great deal of rather vague talk about the 'heuristic fruitfulness' (or what Peirce called the 'esperable uberty') of theories. It is my aim in the present paper to add some precision to these discussions by linking this 'fruitfulness' to the satisfaction of certain heuristic criteria. In this manner the demarcation between 'discovery' and 'pursuit' becomes blurred. As a case study, I present the competition between the paraparticle and colour mod…Read more
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118Hacking away at the identity of indiscernibles: Possible worlds and Einstein's principle of equivalenceJournal of Philosophy 92 (9): 455-466. 1995.
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |