-
15Religion as an Evolutionary Byproduct: A Critique of the Standard ModelBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 457-486. 2012.The dominant view in the cognitive science of religion (the ‘Standard Model’) is that religious belief and behaviour are not adaptive traits but rather incidental byproducts of the cognitive architecture of mind. Because evidence for the Standard Model is inconclusive, the case for it depends crucially on its alleged methodological superiority to selectionist alternatives. However, we show that the Standard Model has both methodological and evidential disadvantages when compared with selectionis…Read more
-
8The lies remain the same: A reply to ChalmersAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1). 1995.In her 1983 work How the Laws of Phyiscs Lie [1] Nancy Cartwright argued for antirealism about fundamental laws alongside realism about phenomenological laws. Her position was considerably altered by 1989 when, in Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement [2], she argued for a realist construal of capacities (close relations of Powers, natures, tendencies, propensities and disptısitions), which she took fundamental laws to be about. Most realists about capaeities, and their ilk, are realist abou…Read more
-
3Justifying deception in social science researchJournal of Applied Philosophy 16 (2). 1999.The use of deceptive techniques is common in social science research. It is argued that the use of such techniques is incompatible with the standard of informed consent, which is widely employed in the ethical evaluation of research involving human subjects. A number of proposals to justify the use of deceptions in social science research are examined, in the face of its apparent incompatibility with the standard of informed consent, and found to be inadequate. An alternative method of justifica…Read more
-
2Coercion, consequence and salvationIn Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Scientific Approaches to the Philosophy of Religion, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 205. 2012.
-
9When to Believe in MiraclesAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1). 1997.Brierley et al argue that in cases where it is medically futile to continue providing life-sustaining therapies to children in intensive care, medical professionals should be allowed to withdraw such therapies, even when the parents of these children believe that there is a chance of a miracle cure taking place. In reasoning this way, Brierley et al appear to implicitly assume that miracle cures will never take place, but they do not justify this assumption and it would be very difficult for the…Read more
-
30Review of The Disunity of Science: Boundaries Contexts, and Power by Peter Galison and David J. Stump (review)Philosophy of Science 66 (3): 506-507. 1999.
-
8Informed Consent in Medicine in Comparison with Consent in Other Areas of Human ActivitySouthern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2): 169-187. 2001.
-
231Conscientious Objection to VaccinationBioethics 31 (3): 155-161. 2016.Vaccine refusal occurs for a variety of reasons. In this article we examine vaccine refusals that are made on conscientious grounds; that is, for religious, moral, or philosophical reasons. We focus on two questions: first, whether people should be entitled to conscientiously object to vaccination against contagious diseases ; second, if so, to what constraints or requirements should conscientious objection to vaccination be subject. To address these questions, we consider an analogy between CO …Read more
-
190Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and RepugnanceMonash Bioethics Review 28 (1). 2009.We consider the current debate between bioconservatives and their opponents—whom we dub bioliberals—about the moral acceptability of human enhancement and the policy implications of moral debates about enhancement. We argue that this debate has reached an impasse, largely because bioconservatives hold that we should honour intuitions about the special value of being human, even if we cannot identify reasons to ground those intuitions. We argue that although intuitions are often a reliable guide …Read more
-
7The Neuroscience of Decision Making and Our Standards for Assessing Competence to ConsentNeuroethics 6 (1): 189-196. 2011.Rapid advances in neuroscience may enable us to identify the neural correlates of ordinary decision making. Such knowledge opens up the possibility of acquiring highly accurate information about people’s competence to consent to medical procedures and to participate in medical research. Currently we are unable to determine competence to consent with accuracy and we make a number of unrealistic practical assumptions to deal with our ignorance. Here I argue that if we are able to detect competence…Read more
-
4Luck and miraclesReligious Studies 39 (4): 471-474. 2003.In another paper published here, I criticized Stephen Mumford 's causation-based analysis of miracles on the grounds of its failure to produce results that are consistent with ordinary intuitions. In a response to me, intended as a defence of Mumford 's position, Morgan Luck finds fault with my rival approach to miracles on three grounds. In this response to Luck I argue that all three of his criticisms miss their mark. My response to Luck's final line of criticism helps shed light on the differ…Read more
-
12Future technologies, dystopic futures and the precautionary principleEthics and Information Technology 7 (3): 121-126. 2005.It is sometimes suggested that new research in such areas as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and genetic engineering should be halted or otherwise restricted because of concerns about possible catastrophic scenarios. Proponents of such restrictions typically invoke the precautionary principle, understood as a tool of policy formulation, as part of their case. Here I examine the application of the precautionary principle to possible catastrophic scenarios. I argue, along with Sunstein (Ri…Read more
-
9Disclosing Clinical Trial Results: Publicity, Significance and IndependenceAmerican Journal of Bioethics 9 (8): 3-5. 2009.Participants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in considerations …Read more
-
277Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense (edited book)Springer. 2010.Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of thematically-connected essays edited by scholars based in Australia or New Zealand with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Ze…Read more
-
-
University of OxfordWellcome Centre for Ethics and Humanities, St Cross College
Faculty of PhilosophyResearcher
Oxford, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
General Philosophy of Science |
Biomedical Ethics |
Applied Ethics |
Technology Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Philosophy of Social Science |
Medical Ethics |
Biomedical Ethics |