Jörg Löschke

We need a concept for the neglected practice of overcoming gratitude in ambiguous situations where it has bad effects, despite being appropriate. This concept can be found in the philosophy and psychology of forgiveness. Several cases illustrate how gratitude may be bad, mixed with a feeling of dependence, and how overcoming it may be important. There are also reasons for thinking that gratitude can be excessive without being inappropriate. If this is accurate, the question arises as to whether anything can be done about it without abandoning appropriate gratitude; whether there is some practice that allows us to overcome troubled gratitude while remaining grateful as we should be, but without the bad effects. We refer to this as ‘forgiving’ benefits, drawing attention to the analogy with another technique of indirect action on oneself and others, and distinguishing it from renouncing gratitude. We apply a process account tailored to the forgiveness of wrongs to the ‘forgiveness’ of benefits, answer possible objections and take a normative stance on the significance of that nameless practice.

Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the following three features: the same work content or domain of activity; the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one’s work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them.

Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘colleague.’ Based on the empirical evidence that we present in this paper, we argue that ‘colleague’ is a dual character concept that has both a descriptive and a normative basis for categorization. Its descriptive dimension is characterized by three features, according to which two people are colleagues if they work for the same institution and know each other, or if they work for the same institution and work in the same field. An independent normative dimension is revealed, which shows that, as colleagues, we are expected to fulfill substantial normative expectations. Understanding the expectations that are encoded in the very structure of this concept is crucial to lay the groundwork for an ethics of collegiality.

Die Unterscheidung zwischen akteur-relativen Gründen und akteur-neutralen Gründen ist eine zentrale Unterscheidung im Bereich der normativen Ethik. Akteur-relative Gründe sind solche Gründe, die einen Rückbezug zum Akteur enthalten, dessen Gründe sie sind, und es gilt als Problem für eine Theorie, wenn sie keine akteur-relativen Gründe in ihren theoretischen Rahmen integrieren kann, so auch für den Utilitarismus, der eine akteur-neutrale Theorie par excellence ist. Der Beitrag präsentiert drei mögliche Strategien, wie Utilitaristen auf die Herausforderungen akteur-relativer Gründe reagieren können: sie können den maximierenden Charakter der Theorie aufgeben, eine indirekte Strategie wählen oder eine akteur-relative Theorie des Guten entwickeln. Alle Strategien stehen vor weiteren Herausforderungen, aber eine indirekte Strategie scheint am meisten Erfolg zu versprechen.

Die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung für unsere Handlungen ist ein zentraler Bestandteil unserer moralischen Praxis. Aber sie wirft schwierige philosophische Fragen auf. Müssen wir beispielsweise über einen freien Willen verfügen, um für unsere Handlungen verantwortlich zu sein? Ist Verantwortung ein einheitliches Phänomen oder gibt es verschiedene Arten von Verantwortung? Und können wir nur für unsere Taten verantwortlich sein oder beispielsweise auch für unsere Überzeugungen? Der Band versammelt – zum Teil erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung – die zentralen Texte der philosophischen Debatte über Verantwortung, u. a. von Harry G. Frankfurt, Thomas Nagel, Peter Strawson und Susan Wolf. Inhaltsverzeichnis: Philipp Schwind: Moralische Verantwortung in der analytischen Philosophie I. Moralischer Zufall und Skeptizismus Galen Strawson: Die Unmöglichkeit moralischer Verantwortung Thomas Nagel: Moralischer Zufall II. Moralische Verantwortung und freier Wille Alfred J. Ayer: Freiheit und Notwendigkeit Roderick M. Chisholm: Die menschliche Freiheit und das Selbst Harry G. Frankfurt: Alternative Möglichkeiten und moralische Verantwortung III. Verantwortung und rationale Selbstkontrolle Harry G. Frankfurt: Willensfreiheit und der Begriff der Person Susan Wolf: Mentale Gesundheit und die Metaphysik der Verantwortung John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza: Moralische Verantwortung für Handlungen. Schwache Empfänglichkeit für Gründe IV. Reaktive Einstellungen und Verantwortung Peter F. Strawson: Freiheit und Übelnehmen R. Jay Wallace: Emotionen, Erwartungen und Verantwortung Michael McKenna: Eine dialogorientierte Theorie moralischer Verantwortung V. Die Wissensbedingung Holly Smith: Schuldhafte Unwissenheit Gideon Rosen: Skeptizismus bezüglich moralischer Verantwortung Elizabeth Harman: Entschuldigt moralische Unwissenheit? VI. Verschiedene Formen der Verantwortung Gary Watson: Zwei Seiten von Verantwortung Angela M. Smith: Verantwortung für Einstellungen: Aktivität und Passivität im mentalen Leben

Reasons, values and structures. This article argues that, despite Julian Nida-Rümelin’s powerful critique of consequentialism, there are interesting similarities between Nida-Rümelin’s theory of structural rationality and consequentialist approaches. The theory of structural rationality can be interpreted in such a way that structures generate reasons. Consequentialism represents a value-based theory of practical reasons, according towhich practical reasons can be traced back to value. If one combines the consequentialist idea with the attractive view that structures of complex unity are the metaphysical basis of intrinsic value, then there is a profound similarity between Nida-Rümelin’s view and consequentialist theories: both share the assumption that practical reasons can be explained by structures.

Personal relationships can change the deontic status of acts. Such change usually takes the form from optional to required. However, it also seems possible that relationships can change the deontic status from impermissible to optional or even required. In other words, agents can be required to do things for a friend that would be impermissible when done for a stranger. In this paper, I examine these controversial forms of deontic change. I argue that friendships can, in fact, make otherwise impermissible acts permissible or even required, but only in certain cases. The question, then, is why friendships can play such a role, and why they can only do so in certain situations. I argue that the idea of deontological thresholds provides a unified explanation for both questions. This idea posits that otherwise impermissible actions become permissible or even required only in very specific situations, namely to avoid a moral catastrophe. I then argue that such deontological thresholds can be agent-relative and that friendships influence whether an agent-relative deontological threshold is reached. This explains why only friends, not strangers, can be permitted or required to perform certain otherwise impermissible actions. I contend that friendships play this role because of the fundamental knowledge by acquaintance that friends have of each other’s overall virtuous characters.

The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons concerns the normative force that these reasons can have for agents.

Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-leveltheory of moral explanationJo ̈rg Lo ̈schke1ÓSpringer Nature B.V. 2020AbstractDeontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in termsof reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussedhow to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly.Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms ofboth reasons and reasons to require: A is required touiff (1) A has most reason tou, and (2) there is most reason to require A tou. This promising proposal faces twoopen questions: the question of why there can only be most reason to require A touif A has most reason tou, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons playin generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue thatthe key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moralexplanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriateresponses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained interms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require.

Two intuitions are important to commonsense morality: the claim that all persons have equal moral worth and the claim that persons have associative duties. These intuitions seem to contradict each other, and there has been extensive discussion concerning their reconciliation. The most widely held view claims that associative duties arise because relationships generate moral reasons to benefit our loved ones. However, such a view cannot account for the phenomenon that some acts are supererogatory when performed on behalf of a stranger but obligatory when performed on behalf of a loved one. This paper offers a novel view of associative duties, according to which such duties arise because relationships serve as indirect intensifiers of moral reasons: they decrease the cost to the agent that certain acts imply, and this increases the relative weight of the reasons that speak in favour of the act in an all‐things‐considered judgement. This reconciles moral egalitarianism and associative duties in a promising way: the moral worth of a person always generates the same moral reasons, but due to differences in the cost to the agent, these reasons sometimes amount to obligations and sometimes do not.

Filiale Pflichten sind Pflichten, die Kinder ihren Eltern aufgrund der Eltern-Kind-Beziehung schulden. Es handelt sich also um eine besondere Form von speziellen Pflichten – Pflichten, die ein Akteur gegenüber einem anderen Akteur nicht aufgrund ihres gemeinsamen Menschseins hat, sondern aufgrund einer besonderen Beziehung, in der sie zu einander stehen. Spezielle Pflichten werden bisweilen argwöhnisch betrachtet, weil Unparteilichkeit ein wichtiges Element der Moral darstellt und spezielle Pflichten eine gewisse Art von Parteilichkeit ausdrücken: Sie fordern in vielen Fällen, die Interessen bestimmter Personen höher zu gewichten als die Interessen unbeteiligter Dritter.

This paper discusses under which circumstances grateful responses can become intrinsically bad. It is argued that gratitude should be understood as an appropriate response to value and that it is subject to the so-called recursive account of intrinsic value, according to which appropriate responses to value are intrinsically good, and inappropriate responses to value are intrinsically bad. As a result, gratitude can become intrinsically bad in two cases: i) when gratitude has the wrong object, i.e., is a pro-response to an intrinsically bad act, ii) when the grateful response is grossly disproportionate, i.e., the intensity of the response does not match the goodness of the act that it is a response to.

The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons concerns the normative force that these reasons can have for agents.

In the philosophy of love there is discussion about the reasons for love and how to understand them. According to the property-approach, reasons for love are grounded in features of the beloved; according to the relationship-approach, they are grounded in facts about the relationship. The property-approach seems to be intuitively the more plausible view, but it faces the problems of fungibility and continuity. The talk defends the property-approach by applying Dancy’s holistic conception of reasons to this question. This can solve the fungibility problem, since it only arises when reasons of love are understood atomistically. Furthermore, the continuity problem can be solved by applying the distinction of favorers and enablers. If the beloved is understood as a general enabler, it is conceivable that the reasons for love change with the propertis of the beloved, making a continuity of love possible when the properties of the beloved change.

Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism.

Deontic buck-passing aims to analyse deontic properties of acts in terms of reasons. Many authors accept deontic buck-passing, but only few have discussed how to understand the relation between reasons and deontic properties exactly. Justin Snedegar has suggested understanding deontic properties of acts in terms of both reasons and reasons to require: A is required to φ iff A has most reason to φ, and there is most reason to require A to φ. This promising proposal faces two open questions: the question of why there can only be most reason to require A to φ if A has most reason to φ, and the question of what role agent-relative reasons play in generating requirements. In this paper, I address these questions and argue that the key to answering them is to reject evaluative buck-passing and accept a value-based theory of practical reasons instead. The result is a two-level theory of moral explanation: on the first level, practical reasons are explained in terms of appropriate responses to value; on the second level, deontic properties of acts are explained in terms of reasons: reasons to act as well as reasons to require.

A promising strategy to make progress in the debate between consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories is to unravel the background assumptions of the respective views and discuss their plausibility. This paper discusses a background assumption of consequentialism that has not been noticed so far. Consequentialists claim that morality is about maximizing the impersonal good, and the background assumption is that an appropriate response to the impersonal good is necessarily a response to the impersonal good as a whole. In this paper, I argue that we should understand the impersonal good as a complex good, and that an appropriate responses to a complex good need not be a response to that good as whole. This constitutes a novel objection against consequentialism.

The paper discusses the second-personal account of moral obligation as put forward by Stephen Darwall. It argues that on such an account, an important part of our moral practice cannot be explained, namely special obligations that are grounded in special relationships between persons. After highlighting the problem, the paper discusses several strategies to accommodate such special obligations that are implicit in some of Darwall’s texts, most importantly a disentanglement strategy and a reductionist strategy. It argues that neither one of these strategies is entirely convincing. The last part of the papers sketches a novel account of how to accommodate special obligations in a second-personal framework: According to this suggestion, special obligations might be due to the fact that relationships change the normative authority that persons have over each other.