Avner de Shalit

ABSTRACT Facing heretofore unknown waves of new immigrants, the Israeli Government and the mayor of Jerusalem issued a comprehensive development programme, including rapid and massive construction. Cities with historical and aesthetic uniqueness, particularly Jerusalem, are likely to lose their special features and beauty. A question is raised: how can an argument in favour of conservation of the special beauties of such cities be advanced in light of the urgent need to supply shelter and jobs for their inhabitants? The paper has two aims: to analyse the reasons for environmental ethics'failure to discuss urban preservation so far, and to put forward a rationale for urban preservation. The latter derives from the political wisdom of King Solomon and from the notion of anthropocentric intrinsic value.

When constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics but also by politicians and activists. So why has the major part of environmental ethics failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? Obviously, there is a gap between the questions that environmental philosophers discuss and the issues that motivate environmental activists. Avner de‐Shalit attempts to bridge this gap by combining tools of political philosophy with questions of environmental ethics and environmental politics. He defends a radical position in relation to both environmental protection and social policies, in order to put forward a political theory, which is not only philosophically sound, but also relevant to the practice of environmental activism. The author argues that several directions in environmental ethics can be at odds with the contemporary political debates surrounding environmental politics. He then goes on to examine the environmental scope of liberalism, communitarianism, participatory democracy, and socialism, and concludes that while elements of liberalism and communitarianism may support environmental protection, it is participatory democracy and a modified version of socialism that are crucial for protecting the environment.

Two models of environmentalism are considered. One — hard line environmentalism — is a theory which unites environmental ethics and political theory; the other — soft environmentalism — is a package of the two as two distinctive levels of moral reasoning. It is argued that hard‐line environmentalism is a‐democratic, rests on wrong methodological assumptions, and is friendly to the environment just so long as being so serves a sought‐after ‘psychological revolution’. Soft environmentalism is to be preferred also because its idea of democracy must be national and international rather than local. Since in the ‘new’ Europe people will move very often and will therefore fail to develop a sense of ‘place’ which is local, it may be a waste of time to emphasise ‘localism’ as part of environmentalism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Environmental Justice: Creating Equality, Reclaiming DemocracyAvner De-Shalit (bio)Environmental Justice: Creating Equality, Reclaiming Democracy, by Kristin Shrader-Frechette. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. Pp. 269 including index. ISBN: 0-19-515203-4.At the very last page of her book Kristin Shrader-Frechette writes: "We fail to recognize that unless we are the agents of democracy and social reform, there will be neither democracy nor social reform." This is such a short sentence, and yet it is so important. Shrader-Frechette writes this book in order for us the readers to be moved both philosophically and politically speaking. It is a Socratic way of shocking the student, and causing her to reflect upon the way she has conceived things, the way she has interpreted the world. This is not an easy book to read—it is more like watching a violent film: it tells us about greediness, cruelty, misery, cynicism, and the like. But just like watching a good film, after reading the book one cannot remain indifferent.This book, then, is not a typical neutral piece of philosophy or social science. Shrader-Frechette has an agenda on her mind, and she claims that not only is it wrong not to do something to stop environmental injustice, but in fact people have a duty to be active, politically speaking (see especially [End Page 140] pp. 195-7). Indeed, it is about time environmental philosophers realize that they have a social obligation not to remain unconcerned. Their first weapon is their philosophical tools, which they should employ to reveal and criticize what is going on. In this case, for example, Shrader-Frechette not only describes many cases of environmental injustice, but she also eloquently analyzes the arguments that are used by those opposing policies that are meant to rectify environmental disadvantages. Her position is unequivocal: environmental injustice is wrong because it is immoral, and because it discriminates against people, often the more vulnerable. Environmental injustice is defended by arguments which are philosophically flawed and morally repugnant. However, there are growing cases of environmental injustice because there are strong interests behind them, and because the more powerful can exploit the vulnerability of those marginalized by society. The reader can hear the echo of the French novelist Emile Zola's famous article, apropos of the Dreyfus affair: "J'accuse."What is 'environmental justice'? Often goods (e.g., cheaper electricity or faster cars) are manufactured with an environmental cost (pollution). Obviously, one relevant question is whether we need these goods. Let us assume that society decides we do. Sometimes this production ends up in severe injustice. Sometimes only the rich enjoy the benefits (e.g., faster cars) while the entire population pays the cost (more air pollution, more noise). Sometimes it is the case that society in general enjoys the benefits (e.g., cheaper electricity). Nevertheless, only a small group bears the cost.Why is the cost so unevenly distributed? First, pollution and hazardous waste must be treated by professionals so it is transferred to, and concentrated in several locations to be treated. This exposes the populations that live there to very high levels of pollution. These people, then, face risks to their health and well-being, which other people do not have to face.Furthermore, when this happens house prices in the area usually fall, and these people are trapped there: so sharp is the fall in house pricing in their area that they cannot move to another, cleaner, or safer place, because whatever price they will get for their houses won't allow them to buy a decent house in cleaner areas. Once the process has started, even more pollution is attracted to this place. This is partly due to market forces: buying burial space for hazardous waste becomes very cheap in these locations, and therefore more and more firms use these locations for the burial [End Page 141] of hazardous waste. However, there is a second reason for this: it seems that the authorities and committees that decide where to send the waste to, are formed by middle class people who are less likely to live in those locations. It is an empirical fact...

ABSTRACT Facing heretofore unknown waves of new immigrants, the Israeli Government and the mayor of Jerusalem issued a comprehensive development programme, including rapid and massive construction. Cities with historical and aesthetic uniqueness, particularly Jerusalem, are likely to lose their special features and beauty. A question is raised: how can an argument in favour of conservation of the special beauties of such cities be advanced in light of the urgent need to supply shelter and jobs for their inhabitants? The paper has two aims: to analyse the reasons for environmental ethics'failure to discuss urban preservation so far, and to put forward a rationale for urban preservation. The latter derives from the political wisdom of King Solomon and from the notion of anthropocentric intrinsic value.

It is widely recognised that we hold certain moral obligations to future generations. Robert Elliot argues that we can base these obligations on the rights of future people. I accept his argument that future people are moral agents who possess rights. However, I argue that the main question for political and moral philosophers is whether it is possible to find the balance between the obligations to, and the rights of, contemporaries, and the obligations to, and the rights of, future people. By analysing the notions of 'human rights' and 'welfare rights' of future people, I argue that this question can be tackled only in terms of welfare rights. But the latter make sense only in the context of community of provision. This implies that we must first examine the 'trans-generational' community that includes contemporaries and future generations. Thus a theory of justice between generations cannot be purely 'rights-based'. However, by describing the 'trans-generational community' I argue that it can serve as the moral grounds for our obligations to future generations.

When viewed as a question of distributive justice the evaluation of workfare typically reflects exclusively on the distribution of income: do the physically capable have a justified claim for state support, or is it fair to demand from those who do work to subsidise this support? Rarely is workfare appraised in terms of how it affects other parties such as employers or other workers, and on the structural effects the pattern of incentives it generates brings about, or as an issue of distributive justice related to a more extensive range of objects of distribution such as access to pleasing jobs. We propose to evaluate workfare by looking at its effects more broadly: (1) we discuss and dismiss on empirical grounds the two most common arguments in favour of workfare, namely that workfare develops self-reliance among participants and it is more economical in the use of altruism among taxpayers. (2) We suggest that workfare focuses on work as a burden and as a means to income, ignoring other beneficial aspects that are conducive to the worker’s self expression. These other benefits are distributed unevenly between two main groups: the privileged well off and the disadvantaged. (3) we argue that workfare functions as a mechanism to preserve these privileges to one class of workers at the expense of another. Or, to put it the other way, the payment of unconditional welfare to the long term unemployed might be justified as one method of mitigating unjustified privileges.