John J. Drummond

This paper approaches the intentional structure of the emotions by considering three claims about that structure. The paper departs from the Brentanian and Husserlian ‘priority of presentation claim’. The PPC comprises two theses: intentional feelings and emotions are founded on presenting acts and intentional feelings and emotions are directed specifically to the value-attributes of the presented objects. The paper then considers two challenges to this claim: the equiprimordial claim and the priority of feeling claim. The EC asserts that the presentational and affective dimensions of intentional feelings and emotions are equiprimordial. I respond to this challenge to the PPC by revising it, claiming instead that the founding relations exist between the presentational and affective senses in an experience whose presenting and affective aspects are equiprimordial. The PFC grants priority to the affective, a grant which presupposes the independence of the affective from the presentational. I argue that the PFC is mistaken, and that the revision of the PPC can handle the examples on which the PFC is based.

Brough's translation of Husserl's writings on time-consciousness found in volume 10 of the critical edition of Husserl's works is a welcome addition to the growing catalogue of translations of Husserl. The texts collected in Husserliana 10 are of central importance to understanding Husserl's phenomenology. They are indispensable first to understanding the "wonder" of time-consciousness, whose analysis is "an ancient burden", and the "most difficult" and "perhaps the most important" problem in phenomenology. But they are also indispensable to understanding the most fundamental structures of all experience and of the ego. The irreducible and unitary form of time grounds the possibility of experiencing the duration, concreteness, and individuality of all objects, whether immanent or transcendent, whether processional or enduring; indeed, even ideal objects are experienced as timeless only against the backdrop of the temporal. The analysis of time-consciousness therefore discloses intentionalities essential to the experience of every possible object.

Cobb-Stevens recognizes that Husserl's phenomenology and the so-called analytic tradition beginning with Frege are fundamentally similar in their rejection of modern philosophy's identification of the content of our experiences with representations in the mind. He also, however, identifies a cardinal difference between analytic and Husserlian philosophies in their characterizations of the relation between perception and predication. He develops this point by showing first that the project of the analytic tradition fails insofar as it cannot establish a sufficiently strong connection between word and world. He argues that Frege sharply distinguished psychological representations from objective senses so as to free semantics from psychology and epistemology. However, classic epistemological and ontological issues about appearances and reality refused to disappear. Frege attempted to confront these problems in his account of the relation between a sense and its truth-conditions and in his characterization of sense as a mode of presentation referring to objects, but his critique of psychologism barred any appeal to our intuitions of objects and their intelligible forms. Truth and falsity, for Frege, had to be properties of propositions considered in themselves apart from our intuitive grasp of worldly states of affairs.

A POSTMODERN THINKER might very well be dismayed by the suggestions embedded in my title that the breach between modernism and postmodernism can be overcome and that Husserl is at all relevant to a discussion of postmodernism. Has not, after all, the postmodern critique revealed once and for all the poverty of the modern philosophical tradition with its epistemological and foundationalist concerns? And what better example of a philosopher working in the modern tradition than Husserl, who clearly identifies his own philosophy as a form of "transcendental idealism" and who is clearly committed to the discovery of both an indubitable starting point upon which and a clear methodology by which philosophy can establish itself as a sure science of cognition?

Evans challenges a widely held, but far from unanimous, view that Derrida's early studies of Husserl and Saussure are carefully argued, scholarly critiques of those thinkers' positions. Evans is careful to point out that in criticizing Derrida's readings and interpretations he is not importing a standard to which Derrida owes no allegiance. Rather, he is applying Derrida's own standard, namely, that a reading must "recognize and respect" all the "instruments of traditional criticism," including the canons of faithful textual interpretation and logical argumentation, not in order to "protect" a text but to "open" a reading.

This article is a review of the recently published book Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, edited by Stephen Schneck. It considers some issues regarding the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological personalism and his later metaphysics by way of a discussion of the articles contained in this volume. The review explores the various and varied discussions of the relation between Scheler’s phenomenological notions of person and spirit. It suggests that Scheler’s turn from a phenomenological anthropology to metaphysics has its roots not only in this notion of spirit, which is distinguished both from Husserl’s absolute consciousness and from Heidegger’sDasein, but also in the ontology of values that is embedded in Scheler’s phenomenological axiology.

Welton's book concentrates on the development of Husserl's views concerning the relationship between the meanings of linguistic expressions and the fulfillment sense objects have for us in our perceptual experience. Welton understands the issue of this relationship to be a central problem, perhaps even the central problem, motivating the development in Husserl's phenomenology. Consequently, Welton organizes his book in a roughly chronological fashion, tracing Husserl's discussions of two different types of meaning, the fulfillment of meaning-l by meaning-p, and the manner in which the two types of meaning supplement and build upon one another.

This collection is the third of three planned volumes collecting Husserl's shorter essays, reviews, and lectures. Slightly more than one-third of the volume is devoted to five essays on the theme of renewal. All were written in the years from 1922 to 1924; the first three were published in the Japanese journal Kaizo in 1923 and 1924, but the fourth and fifth were not published. These essays arise out of Husserl's own experience of and reflection upon the First World War. Husserl sees a crisis in which our loss of a proper sense of the human has consequences which are not merely theoretical but, much more broadly, ethical and cultural. His response to this crisis is to call for a philosophical renewal of the sort which can underwrite a cultural renewal.

To be more than a meta-ethical stance, moral phenomenology must provide an account of moral norms. This paper unites two sorts of phenomenological considerations. The first considers the teleological character of intentional experiences as ordered toward "truthfulness" in all the spheres of reason and toward a notion of self-responsibility for our beliefs, attitudes, and actions as the flourishing of rational agents. The second considers the phenomenological tradition's identification of empathy as the experience in which we encounter others as conscious agents like me but irreducibly different from me and that grounds the emotions of respect and sympathy. Respect grasps the other conscious agent as an irreducibly different cognizing, rational, reflection-capable being, as making articulated judgments of value, and as making articulated choices about what activities conduce to what ends. Respect for others cannot be separated from a sympathetic care for others, a sympathy that inclines one toward caring for and aiding the other person in developing her own rational capacities. Sympathy, in brief, complements respect. At the same time, respect complements sympathy insofar as sympathy runs the risk of transmuting into paternalism. This is why, just as we need sympathy in relation to respect, we need respect in relation to sympathy. The paper introduces a distinction between first-order goods for an agent and the second-order goods associated with truthfulness. The second-order goods, the paper argues, necessarily override first-order goods when they prevent the attainment of the second-order goods for anyone.

The critical edition of Husserl's works will, upon its completion, include three volumes of Husserl's shorter essays, reviews, and lectures. These works--only some of which were published during Husserl's lifetime--have no natural home as supplementary texts to Husserl's major works and lecture-courses, and are therefore collected in separate volumes. Nijhoff published the first of these volumes in 1979; it collects works focused largely around logical issues from the years 1890-1910. The second volume, presently under review, is a more heterogenous collection than the first, and the third is still in preparation.

This is a difficult book to review, primarily because it is, in a sense, not a book at all. This book not only does not but cannot yield clear and plain results; it is, I think, misconceived. It is simply a collection of some of Brentano's essays written, for the most part, in the years from 1914 to 1916. And while Kraus has been moderately successful in imposing an external unity of themes upon the work by juxtaposing thematically connected essays, he has been less than successful in establishing the desired internal unity of a clearly argued and continuously developed position.