Darrel Moellendorf

The principle of global equality of opportunity is an important part of the commitment to global egalitarianism. In this paper I discuss how a principle of global equality of opportunity follows from a commitment to equal respect for the autonomy of all persons, and defend the principle against some of the criticism that it has received. The particular criticisms that I address contend that a moral view based upon dignity and respect cannot take properties of persons—such as their citizenship—as morally arbitrary, that any justification of what counts as equal opportunity sets must be based upon national cultural understandings, that a positive account of equality of opportunity cannot adequately handle the fact of value pluralism across the globe, and that the principle of equality of opportunity is incompatible with national self-determination. In the course of defending the principle of equality of opportunity from these criticisms, I make revisions to my previously published defense of the principle

After briefly surveying the mission and principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), I argue that international trade may be assessed from the perspective of justice, and that the correct account of justice for these purposes is egalitarian in fundamental principle. I then consider the merits of the WTO's basic commitment to liberalized trade in the light of egalitarian considerations. Finally, I discuss the justice of several WTO policies. While noting the complexity of the empirical issues relating to the effects of trade institutions and policies, I conclude that egalitarians have reasons to object to certain of the principles and policies of the WTO.

Ten years on from the first issue of the Journal of Global Ethics, Darrel Moellendorf and Heather Widdows reflect on the current state of research in global ethics. To do this, they summarise a recent comprehensive road map of the field and provide a map of research by delineating the topics and approaches of leading scholars of global ethics collected together in the recently published Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics which they have co-edited. Topics fall under issues of war, conflict and violence; poverty and development; economic justice; bioethics and health justice; and environmental and climate justice. In all these areas, ethicists are becoming ever more engaged in the details and mechanisms of actually delivering justice in the real world

In this paper I shall argue that due to the constructivist procedure which John Rawls employs in “The Law of Peoples,” he is unable to justify his claim that there is a relationship between limiting the internal and external sovereignty of states. An alternative constructivist procedure is viable, but it extends the ideal theory of international justice to include liberal democratic and egalitarian principles. The procedure and principles have significant implications for non‐ideal theory as well, insofar as they justify a principle of international resource redistribution and weaken general prohibitions against intervention.

“Will which is actually free is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit.” So opens the section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia known as “Free Spirit.” This text as well as both its immediate textual predecessor “Practical Spirit” and the introduction to the Philosophy of right comprise the mature Hegel’s attempt to give an account of freedom of the will, and mark a full departure from the Kantian standpoint on the matter. While Kant sees the evidence of freedom of the will in the moral ought, Hegel contends that the evidence lies in the actions of individuals within certain social arrangements.

Habermas asserts that his discourse ethics rests on two main commitments: (1) Moral judgments have cognitive content analogous to truth value; and (2) moral justification requires real-life discourse. Habermas elaborates on the second claim by making actual consensus a necessary condition of normative validity. I argue that Habermas's two commitments sit uneasily together. The second entails that his cognitivism is revisionist in the sense that it must reject the law of the excluded middle. Moreover, Habermas's argument in defence of the need for real-life discourse is unconvincing and his derivation of the principle which requires consensus is fallacious