Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of
conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and
philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states
are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in
crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an
interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though
extremely limited on Kant's…
Read moreStarting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of
conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and
philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states
are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in
crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an
interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though
extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective.
