Frank Dietrich

While the number of people is increasing rapidly on a global scale, the populations of some countries, e.g. Germany or Japan, are predicted to shrink significantly. The article raises the question whether these demographic developments have any bearing on the justification of territorial rights. More specifically, it is asked whether drastically growing populations may demand declining populations to cede parts of their territories. It is argued that a prima facie claim to the reallocation of territory can be grounded on end state theories as well as on historic accounts of distributive justice. However, several objections to the cession of land, such as the creation of perverse incentives, need to be taken into account. As an alternative to a complete transfer of territorial rights it is proposed to restrict single competences of the right holders concerned. It is maintained that states which control an overproportional share of the world’s territory ought to allow immigration from extremely densely populated countries.

In his recent book One World one of Peter Singer’s main concerns is the preferential treatment of compatriots. Two aspects of Singer’s theoretical reflections on this issue are critically discussed: the use of an impartiality test as basis for the justification of special duties and the resulting condemnation of partial preferences for compatriots. Subsequently, an alternative way to justify special duties is outlined and applied to the case of fellow citizens. It is argued, that partiality to compatriots can be defended, if special duties are regarded as a constitutive part of valuable relationships.

In recent years theorists, such as Yael Tamir and David Miller, have proposed a liberal form of nationalism thereby combining two seemingly incompatible traditions of thought. Perhaps the most controversial element of their theories is the claim that national communities should be accorded with a right to political self-determination. In the article it is explained, firstly, why membership in a nation is seen as important for the individual’s well-being and, secondly, why statehood is deemed necessary for the thriving of the nation. Subsequently, two problems of the liberal nationalists’ argument for political self-determination are discussed. It is argued, firstly, that national communities only need some form of regional autonomy to achieve their most important goals and, secondly, that non-national communities, e.g. religious groups, can base their demand for political sovereignity on the very same argument.

By the example of deafness the article examines the ethical problems that arise when preimplantation genetic diagnosis is used for the intentional heredity of genetic defects. In the first two sections the relevant rules of the German Embryo Protection Law and the motives of deaf couples to desire a handicapped child are explained. Subsequently, it is asked whether the positive selection of genetic defects can harm or otherwise wrong the future child. Moreover, a possible duty of prospective parents to prefer an embryo which will most probably experience a higher quality of life is discussed. Finally, the question is raised whether parents have a right to refuse medical treatment that may alleviate their child's handicap. As a result, it is argued that neither a legal ban on the positive selection of handicapped embryos nor compulsory treatment of deaf children are ethically justified.

This article examines the neoaristotelian theories of Martha Nussbaum and Douglas Rasmussen/douglas Den Uyl. Both sides give a similar account of good human living, which emphasizes the significance of individual autonomy. But they disagree sharply on the political institutions necessary to promote human flourishing; Nussbaum formulates a,social democratic' position; Rasmussen/den Uyl hold a,liberal‘ standpoint. The article explores both lines of reasoning. It is shown that neither Nussbaum nor Rasmussen/den Uyl present conclusive arguments for their political position.

In modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their influence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decision making. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at first a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which does without the assumption of a privileged access to 'moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not influence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect.

In this chapter I will survey the philosophical discussion on the justification of territorial rights which has developed during the last two decades. By a territorial right I will understand a moral entitlement to exert jurisdictional power, i.e. to enact and to enforce laws, within a certain area. The theories of territorial rights which are currently debated in political philosophy can be broadly classified into four groups. In the following I will examine various forms of property theories, justice-based arguments, national accounts and choice theories. Ultimately, I will defend a plebiscitary version of choice theory which considers the will of the residents to be decisive for the assessment of territorial claims.