Frank Dietrich

By the example of deafness the article examines the ethical problems that arise when preimplantation genetic diagnosis is used for the intentional heredity of genetic defects. In the first two sections the relevant rules of the German Embryo Protection Law and the motives of deaf couples to desire a handicapped child are explained. Subsequently, it is asked whether the positive selection of genetic defects can harm or otherwise wrong the future child. Moreover, a possible duty of prospective parents to prefer an embryo which will most probably experience a higher quality of life is discussed. Finally, the question is raised whether parents have a right to refuse medical treatment that may alleviate their child's handicap. As a result, it is argued that neither a legal ban on the positive selection of handicapped embryos nor compulsory treatment of deaf children are ethically justified.

This article examines the neoaristotelian theories of Martha Nussbaum and Douglas Rasmussen/douglas Den Uyl. Both sides give a similar account of good human living, which emphasizes the significance of individual autonomy. But they disagree sharply on the political institutions necessary to promote human flourishing; Nussbaum formulates a,social democratic' position; Rasmussen/den Uyl hold a,liberal‘ standpoint. The article explores both lines of reasoning. It is shown that neither Nussbaum nor Rasmussen/den Uyl present conclusive arguments for their political position.

In modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their influence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decision making. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at first a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which does without the assumption of a privileged access to 'moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not influence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect.

In this chapter I will survey the philosophical discussion on the justification of territorial rights which has developed during the last two decades. By a territorial right I will understand a moral entitlement to exert jurisdictional power, i.e. to enact and to enforce laws, within a certain area. The theories of territorial rights which are currently debated in political philosophy can be broadly classified into four groups. In the following I will examine various forms of property theories, justice-based arguments, national accounts and choice theories. Ultimately, I will defend a plebiscitary version of choice theory which considers the will of the residents to be decisive for the assessment of territorial claims.

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, auf welcher Grundlage sich territoriale Ansprüche, die von Staaten erhoben werden, rechtfertigen lassen. Zunächst werden vier Legitimationstheorien, die in der aktuellen Diskussion häufig vertreten werden, untersucht und aus verschiedenen Gründen zurückgewiesen. Als Basis der Rechtfertigung scheiden damit individuelle Eigentumsrechte, der Verlauf der Geschichte, die Gerechtigkeit der staatlichen Herrschaft sowie die Selbstbestimmung nationaler Gemeinschaften aus. Abschließend wird die Auffassung vertreten, die Legitimität der staatlichen Gebietshoheit gründe in dem – gegebenenfalls in einem Referendum zu klärenden – Mehrheitswillen der ortsansässigen Bevölkerung.

Für die Argumentation von Moralphilosophen, die die Legalisierung der aktiven Sterbehilfe befürworten, spielt das Autonomieprinzip eine wichtige Rolle. Ihrer Auffassung nach verlangt der Respekt vor der Autonomie, die Entscheidung eines schwer kranken Menschen gegen die Fortsetzung des Lebens vorbehaltlos anzuerkennen. Dagegen haben verschiedene Theoretiker auf Gefahren hingewiesen, die die rechtliche Zulassung der Tötung auf Verlangen für die individuelle Autonomie mit sich bringt. Sobald der Kranke über die Möglichkeit der aktiven Sterbehilfe verfüge, falle ihm die Verantwortung für die Inanspruchnahme von Pflegeleistungen zu. In der Folge könne u. a. von Seiten der Familie die Forderung an ihn gestellt werden, den vom Gesetzgeber eröffneten Ausweg zu nutzen und sie von der Last seiner Pflege zu befreien. Die Bedenken erscheinen insofern berechtigt, als Formen sozialen Zwangs vorstellbar sind, die eine freie Entscheidung des Patienten verhindern. Allerdings vermag weder das Verbot noch die Zulassung der aktiven Sterbehilfe eine autonome Entscheidung aller Individuen zu gewährleisten. Die Abwägung der Risiken, mit denen beide Optionen behaftet sind, spricht im Ergebnis für die Legalisierung der Tötung auf Verlangen.

Traditionally, state recognition in international law has been based on descriptive criteria stipulated by the Montevideo Convention. However, in the last decades the international community’s response to newly created political units has increasingly been oriented at legitimacy standards. As a consequence, several entities showing the basic characteristics of a state, such as North-Cyprus or Transnistria, failed to gain recognition. In the philosophical debate, most prominently Allen Buchanan has welcomed this development in international law. He argued that the recognition of illegitimate states creates perverse incentives and turns the recognizing parties into accomplices in injustice. However, judging applicants for statehood by normative principles creates, at least, three problems that require detailed examination. First, as long as established states which do not meet the relevant legitimacy standards cannot lose recognition, it seems unfair to withhold recognition from newly created political entities. Second, since the international legal order cannot exclude too many or too powerful states, there may be a need to compromise the principles of justice underlying the recognition account. Third, disagreement among the international community on the interpretation of normative principles may lead to a conflict-laden practice of partial recognition. In view of these objections it seems doubtful whether a “moralization” of state recognition in international law can be recommended on moral grounds.