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690Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theoryIn Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 63--78. 2006.Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulat…Read more
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50Q. Smith, "The felt meanings of the world: A metaphysics of feeling" (review)Husserl Studies 9 (2): 134. 1992.
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27Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of CognitionIn Matthias Jung & Roman Madzia (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation, De Gruyter. pp. 17-34. 2016.
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104Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and AdultsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 145-169. 2012.We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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214Intersubjectivity in perceptionContinental Philosophy Review 41 (2): 163-178. 2008.The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
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630Philosophical antecedents of situated cognitionIn Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 35--53. 2009.
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80Complexities in the first-person perspective. Review of self-awareness and alterity by Dan ZahaviResearch in Phenomenology 32 (1): 238-248. 2002.
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86The brain as part of an enactive systemBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4): 421-422. 2013.The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Ch…Read more
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545How the Body Shapes the MindOxford University Press UK. 2005.How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of int…Read more
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670Where's the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free willIn Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?, Mit Press. pp. 109-124. 2006.Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward the…Read more
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On the immunity principle: a view from a robot-ReplyTrends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (5): 167-168. 2000.
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306Body image and body schema in a deafferented subjectJournal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4): 369-390. 1995.In a majority of situations the normal adult maintains posture or moves without consciously monitoring motor activity. Posture and movement are usually close to automatic; they tend to take care of themselves, outside of attentive regard. One's body, in such cases, effaces itself as one is geared into a particular intentional goal. This effacement is possible because of the normal functioning of a body schema. Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that pla…Read more
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85We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared AgencyPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2): 95-110. 2017.The basic approach to understanding shared agency has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have so…Read more
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103Strong Interaction and Self-AgencyHumana Mente 4 (15): 55-76. 2011.The interaction theory of social cognition contends that intersubjective interaction is characterized by both immersion and irreducibility. This motivates a question about autonomy and self-agency: If I am always caught up in processes of interaction, and interaction always goes beyond me and my ultimate control, is there any room for self-agency? I outline an answer to this question that points to the importance of communicative and narrative practices
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19Teaching Phenomenology to Qualitative Researchers, Cognitive Scientists, and PhenomenologistsIndo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 12 (sup3): 183-192. 2012.The authors examine several issues in teaching phenomenology (1) to advanced researchers who are doing qualitative research using phenomenological interview methods in disciplines such as psychology, nursing, or education, and (2) to advanced researchers in the cognitive neurosciences. In these contexts, the term “teaching” needs to be taken in a general and nondidactic way. In the case of the first group, it involves guiding doctoral students in their conception and design of a qualitative meth…Read more
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20Models of the self: Editors' introductionJournal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6): 5-6. 1997.There is a long history of inquiry about human nature and the nature of the self. It stretches from the ancient tradition of Socratic self-knowledge in the context of ethical life to contemporary discussions of brain function in cognitive science. At the beginning of the modern era, Descartes was led to the conclusion that self-knowledge provided the single Archimedean point for all knowledge. His thesis that self is a single, simple, continuing, and unproblematically accessible mental substance…Read more
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165Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological MethodologyHusserl Studies 26 (2): 83-106. 2010.The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative…Read more
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47Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie, it highlights that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. The implications of these results for a theor…Read more
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46Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive SciencesCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1): 93-132. 2003.In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind who mistakenly associate phenomenological method with untrained psychological introspection (e.g., Dennett 1991). For very different reasons, resistance is also found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in th…Read more
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30From the Transcendental to the EnactivePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2): 119-121. 2012.
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54The new hybrids: Continuing debates on social perceptionConsciousness and Cognition 36 452-465. 2015.
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72What kind of movement or behavior is involved in neonate imitation? What exactly is the newborn infant doing when it responds to seeing gestures on another person's face? This question is closely related to some other questions, such as whether neonate imitation is possible, and whether it is truly imitation. Piaget, of course, thought that this sort of "invisible imitation" was not possible for infants less than 8-12 months of age.
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307Can social interaction constitute social cognition?Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10): 441-447. 2010.An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in …Read more
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44Representation and deliberate actionHouston Studies in Cognitive Science 1. 2000.Dreyfus enlists the aid of Merleau-Ponty in his critique of representationalist theories of cognition. Such theories posit a representational element at some level of cognitive activity. The nature of the representation and how we think of it will depend upon the level at which one claims to find it. If we consider the case of perception, at one extreme it might be claimed that the representation is a conscious one, that is, that the perceiving subject is conscious of a representation, a _Vorste…Read more
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39Shaun Gallagher, Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis, discusses the results of a neurophenomenological study in which a research team used simulation to replicate experiences of astronauts during space travel. Many astronauts described deeply aesthetic, spiritual, or religious experiences of awe and wonder. Gallagher also discusses how using an approach that incorporated neuroscience, hermeneutics, phenomenology, psychology, heart rate, and …Read more
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25Intentionalität und intentionales handelnSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.Diejenigen, die behaupten, der freie Wille sei Illusion, sind im Unrecht. Sie begründen ihre Behauptung auf einem wissenschaftlichen Beweis, der die falsche Ebene der Deskription des intentionalen Handelns testet. Der freie Wille bezieht sich nicht auf subpersonale neuronale Prozesse, Muskelaktivierung oder grundlegende Körperbewegungen, sondern auf kontextualisierte Handlungen in einem System, das größer ist als viele zeitgenössische Geistesphilosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler anne…Read more
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939Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive scienceTrends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1): 14-21. 2000.Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings.…Read more
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48Dissociation in self-narrativeConsciousness and Cognition 20 (1): 149-155. 2011.We review different analytic approaches to narratives by those with psychopathological conditions, and we suggest that the interpretation of such narratives are complicated by a variety of phenomenological and hermeneutical considerations. We summarize an empirical study of narrative distance in narratives by non-pathological subjects, and discuss how the results can be interpreted in two different ways with regard to the issue of dissociation
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8The historikerstreit and the critique of nationalismHistory of European Ideas 16 (4-6): 921-926. 1993.
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26Intersubiectivity and psychopathologyIn K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 258. 2013.This chapter provides a review of theory of mind approaches to explaining certain dysfunctions of intersubjectivity in pathologies such as autism and schizophrenia. ToM approaches such as theory theory and simulation theory focus on mindreading but fail to explain important aspects of online intersubjective interaction. A phenomenological approach, focusing on embodied interaction, offers an alternative account of intersubjective processes and specific dysfunctions in pathology. Further research…Read more
Memphis, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |