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Lived Body and Time: A Phenomenologically Based Account of Human NatureDissertation, Bryn Mawr College. 1980.Throughout the history of western philosophy human nature and the nature of time have been thought to exhibit a significant relationship. The nature and origin of time is frequently questioned in reference to its involvement with human corporality or human spirituality. The human body, tempora
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24Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Editorial IntroductionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1): 1-6. 2002.
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20Defining consciousnessPragmatics and Cognition 18 (3): 561-569. 2010.I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and mot…Read more
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232The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau‐Ponty and recent developmental studiesPhilosophical Psychology 9 (2): 211-33. 1996.Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability.
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40Introduction: The Arts and Sciences of the Situated BodyJanus Head 9 (2): 1-. 2006.This special issue of Janus Head explores a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary dimensions of the theme, the situated body. The body, of course, is always situated in so far as it is a living and experiencing body. Being situated in this sense is different from simply being located someplace in the way a non-living, non-experiencing object is located. That the body is always situated involves certain kinds of physical and social interactions, and it means that experience is always both …Read more
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14A cognitive way to the transcendental reductionJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3): 230-232. 1999.[opening paragraph]: Natalie Depraz builds on Iso Kern's distinctions to outline three different motivational pathways to the phenomenological reduction -- the Cartesian way, the psychological way, and the way of the life-world. I would like to suggest a fourth one that may appeal to cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists, theorists who, for the most part, are not ordinarily motivated to pursue phenomenological methodologies
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141Body schema and intentionalityIn José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self, Mit Press. pp. 225--244. 1995.
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130Simulation troubleSocial Neuroscience 2 (3-4). 2007.I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by sim…Read more
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39Intentionality and Intentional ActionSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exer…Read more
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104You and I, robotAI and Society 28 (4): 455-460. 2013.I address a number of issues related to building an autonomous social robot. I review different approaches to social cognition and ask how these different approaches may inform the design of social robots. I argue that regardless of which theoretical approach to social cognition one favors, instantiating that approach in a workable robot will involve designing that robot on enactive principles
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39PhenomenologyPalgrave-Macmillan. 2012.This new introduction by Shaun Gallagher gives students and philosophers not only an excellent concise overview of the state of the field and contemporary debates, but a novel way of addressing the subject by looking at the ways in which phenomenology is useful to the disciplines it applies to. Gallagher retrieves the central insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and others), updates some of these insights in innovative ways, and s…Read more
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95Self-agency and mental causalityIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.I want to explore one small corner of the concept of mental causality. It’s the corner where discussions about mind-body interactions and epiphenomenalism take place. My basic contention is that these discussions are framed in the wrong terms because they are infected by a mind-body dualism which defines the question of mental causality in a classic or standard way: How does a mental event cause my body to do what it does? Setting the question in this way has consequences for ongoing interdiscip…Read more
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861Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciencesJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11): 162-174. 2004.Hermeneutics is usually defined as the theory and practice of interpretation. As a discipline it involves a long and complex history, starting with concerns about the proper interpretation of literary, sacred, and legal texts. In the twentieth century, hermeneutics broadens to include the idea that humans are, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, ‘self-interpreting animals’ (Taylor, 1985). In contrast to the narrowly prescriptive questions of textual interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics, as develop…Read more
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101Taking stock of phenomenology futuresSouthern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2): 304-318. 2012.In this paper, I review recent contributions of phenomenology to a variety of disciplines, including the cognitive sciences and psychiatry, and explore (1) controversies about phenomenological methods and naturalization; (2) relations between phenomenology and the enactive and extended mind approaches; and (3) the promise of phenomenology for addressing a number of controversial philosophical issues
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648Neurophilosophy and neurophenomenologyPhenomenology 2005. 2007.I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
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2Agency, ownership, and alien control in schizophreniaIn Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, John Benjamins. 2004.
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23Review of mark Rowlands, Body Language: Representation in Action (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9). 2007.
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52From action to interactionJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1): 3-26. 2002.Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, n…Read more
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645The overextended mindVersus 113 57-68. 2012.Clark and Chalmers [1998] introduced the concept of the extended mind, in part to move beyond the standard Cartesian idea that cognition is something that happens in a private mental space, "in the head." In this paper I want to pursue a liberal interpretation of this idea, extending the mind to include processes that occur within social and cultural institutions. At the same time I want to address some concerns that have been raised about whether such..
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37IntroductionInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3). 2008.This Article does not have an abstract
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209Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive scienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3): 195-214. 1997.The term phenomenology can be used in a generic sense to cover a variety of areas related to the problem of consciousness. In this sense it is a title that ranges over issues pertaining to first-person or subjective experience, qualia, and what has become known as "the hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). The term is sometimes used even more generally to signify a variety of approaches to studying such issues, including contemplative, meditative, and mystical studies, and transpersonal psychology.(1) …Read more
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1943Joint attention in joint actionPhilosophical Psychology 26 (4): 571-87. 2013.In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex join…Read more
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28Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of CognitionIn Matthias Jung & Roman Madzia (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation, De Gruyter. pp. 17-34. 2016.
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106Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and AdultsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 145-169. 2012.We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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122The Inordinance of TimeNorthwestern University Press. 1998.Shaun Gallagher's The Inordinance of Time develops an account of the experience of time at the intersection of three approaches: phenomenology, cognitive ...
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691Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theoryIn Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. 63-78. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 63--78. 2006.Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulat…Read more
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17Q. Smith, "The felt meanings of the world: A metaphysics of feeling" (review)Husserl Studies 9 (2): 134. 1992.
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80Complexities in the first-person perspective. Review of self-awareness and alterity by Dan ZahaviResearch in Phenomenology 32 (1): 238-248. 2002.
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87The brain as part of an enactive systemBehavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4): 421-422. 2013.The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Ch…Read more
Memphis, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |