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49Self-narrative in schizophreniaIn Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry, Cambridge University Press. pp. 336--357. 2003.
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59How to undress the affective mindJournal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2): 89-119. 2008.An Interview with Jaak Panksepp about consciousness and emotion.
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15Why the body is not in the brainIn Alex Arteaga, Marion Lauschke & Horst Bredekamp (eds.), Bodies in Action and Symbolic Forms: Zwei Seiten der Verkörperungstheorie, Akademie Verlag. pp. 273-288. 2012.
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289Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (review)Topoi 29 (2): 183-185. 2010.Issue Title: Logic, Meaning, and Truth-Making States of Affairs in Philosophical Semantics/Guest Edited by Dale Jacquette
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41An Education in NarrativesEducational Philosophy and Theory 46 (6): 1-10. 2014.I argue for a broad education in narratives as a way to address several problems found in moral psychology and social cognition. First, an education in narratives will address a common problem of narrowness or lack of diversity, shared by virtue ethics and the simulation theory of social cognition. Secondly, it also solves the ?starting problem? involved in the simulation approach. These discussions also relate directly to theories of empathy with special significance given to situational empath…Read more
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10Przerysować mapę i przestawić czas: fenomenologia i nauki kognitywneAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1): 77-122. 2010.We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of i…Read more
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470Fenomenologiczne i eksperymentalne badania ucieleśnionego doświadczeniaIn Fenomenologia I Nauki Kognitywne, Wydawnictwo Rafal Marszalek. 2005.W sytuacjach, gdy powinniśmy mieć do czynienia ze wzajemnym oświecaniem, w rzeczywistości często spotykamy się z obopólnym oporem między kognitywistyką a fenomenologią, gdzie ta druga rozumiana jest jako podejście metodologiczne, po raz pierwszy zarysowane przez Husserla. Filozofowie umysłu, z pierwszych szeregów kognitywistów, niejednokrotnie czynią lekceważące gesty w stosunku do fenomenologii, oparte na myleniu fenomenologii z niewykwalifikoną introspekcją psychologiczną (np. Dennett, 1991). …Read more
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3Three Questions to StueberEmotion Review 4 (1): 64-65. 2012.In response to Stueber’s “Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience, and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate,” I identify three areas for further discussion: the frame problem, diversity, and an altogether different variety of empathy.
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51Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics, and Postmodernism (edited book)State University of New York Press. 1992.Opens up new dimensions in the philosophical thought of Merleau-Ponty and addresses contemporary issues concerning interpretation theory and postmodernity.
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66One step forward, two steps back – not the Tango: comment on Gallotti and FrithTrends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7): 303-304. 2013.
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579Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception (review)Times Literary Supplement. 2005.In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”
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123Empathy, Simulation, and NarrativeScience in Context 25 (3): 355-381. 2012.ArgumentA number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review of these theories shows that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural) simulationist accounts; bu…Read more
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1002The natural philosophy of agencyPhilosophy Compass 2 (2). 2007.A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of the sense of agency…Read more
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651Multiple aspects of agencyNew Ideas in Psychology. 2010.Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers around the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets defined, an…Read more
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53Neurophenomenology: an integrated approach to exploring awe and wonderSouth African Journal of Philosophy 32 (4): 295-309. 2013.Astronauts often report experiences of awe and wonder while traveling in space. This paper addresses the question of whether awe and wonder can be scientifically investigated in a simulated space travel scenario using a neurophenomenological method. To answer this question, we created a mixed-reality simulation similar to the environment of the International Space Station. Portals opened to display simulations of Earth or Deep Space. However, the challenge still remained of how to best capture t…Read more
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143Phenomenological contributions to a theory of social cognitionHusserl Studies 21 (2): 95-110. 2005.Hidden away in the remote corners of one of the largest parts of Husserl's Kˆrper, if we can use that word to translate Corpus, there is ein Leib , an animate body of text that reverberates not only with some of Husserl's other little known texts, but also with some of the most recent discoveries in neuroscience. These texts suggest a theory of intersubjectivity, or what psychologists term social cognition. Let me start with a proviso: whether Husserl ever fully settled on this theory is complet…Read more
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47Dimensions of embodiment: Body image and body schema in medical contextsIn Kay Toombs (ed.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 147--175. 2001.
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Time in ActionIn Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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Introspections without introspeculationsIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
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103Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experienceAtelier Phenomenologie Et Cognition: Theorie de la Cognition Et Necessité d'Une Investigation Phenomenologique. 2000.In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian …Read more
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55Consciousness and free willDanish Yearbook of Philosophy 39 (1): 7-16. 2004.I argue against epiphenomenalist views that consciousness is part of and has an effect on the system in which action is generated. Those who deny free will based on recent results in neuroscience are looking for it at the wrong level of explanation. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists conside…Read more
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33Situational understanding: a Gurwitschian critique of theory of mindIn Lester Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science, Springer. pp. 25--44. 2004.
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184In Defense of Phenomenological Approaches to Social Cognition: Interacting with the CriticsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2): 187-212. 2012.I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory, emphasize the involvement of embodied and enactive processes together with communicative and narrative practices in contexts of intersubjective understanding. I review some of the evidence that supports these approaches. I consider a variety of criticisms leveled against them, and defend the role of phenomenolo…Read more
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96Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critiquePsychopathology 37 (1). 2004.In the past dozen years a number of theoretical models of schizophrenic symptoms have been proposed, often inspired by advances in the cognitive sciences, and especially cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps the most widely cited and influential of these is the neurocognitive model proposed by Christopher Frith (1992). Frith's influence reaches into psychiatry, neuroscience, and even philosophy. The philosopher John Campbell (1999a), for example, has called Frith's model the most parsimonious explanat…Read more
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2Body: Disorders of EmbodimentIn Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion, Oup Usa. 2007.
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93Somaesthetics and the care of the bodyMetaphilosophy 42 (3): 305-313. 2011.Abstract: This article poses a number of questions to Richard Shusterman concerning his concepts of somaesthetics and body consciousness in his book Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics. How do the concepts relate to the kind of forgetfulness of the body that can happen in expert performance? What is the nature of somatic reflection, and how is it different from pre-reflective awareness of the body? The article suggests that our immersed involvement and overt orienta…Read more
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934Metzinger's matrix: Living the virtual life with a real bodyPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11. 2005.Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, the self should be considered something real, and …Read more
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106Getting interaction theory (IT) together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches to social interactionInteraction Studies 13 (3): 436-468. 2012.We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependen…Read more
Memphis, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |