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133Agency and Anxiety: Delusions of Control and Loss of Control in Schizophrenia and AgoraphobiaFrontiers in Human Neuroscience 10. 2016.
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130Simulation troubleSocial Neuroscience 2 (3-4). 2007.I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by sim…Read more
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123Empathy, Simulation, and NarrativeScience in Context 25 (3): 355-381. 2012.ArgumentA number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review of these theories shows that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural) simulationist accounts; bu…Read more
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119Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognitionSynthese 195 (6): 2627-2648. 2018.We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of predictive models: predictive coding, predictive processing and predictive engagement. We examine the concept of active inference under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In this context we consider Frith and Friston’s proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.
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119Gesture following deafferentation: a phenomenologically informed experimental studyPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1): 49-67. 2002.Empirical studies of gesture in a subject who has lost proprioception and the sense of touch from the neck down show that specific aspects of gesture remain normal despite abnormal motor processes for instrumental movement. The experiments suggest that gesture, as a linguistic phenomenon, is not reducible to instrumental movement. They also support and extend claims made by Merleau-Ponty concerning the relationship between language and cognition. Gesture, as language, contributes to the accompli…Read more
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118First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through MisidentificationIn Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Ontos Verlag. pp. 245-272. 2012.
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118The Inordinance of TimeNorthwestern University Press. 1998.Shaun Gallagher's The Inordinance of Time develops an account of the experience of time at the intersection of three approaches: phenomenology, cognitive ...
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116Self-narrative, embodied action, and social contextIn A. Wiercinski (ed.), Between Suspicion and Sympathy: Paul Ricoeur's Unstable Equilibrium, The Hermeneutic Press. 2003.In recent philosophy of mind, informed by ongoing research in the cognitive neurosciences, there has been a tendency to offer deflationary or reductive explanations of self and selfidentity. The background to such accounts includes a complex history of the problem of personal identity from Hume to Parfit. Paul Ricoeur has provided an insightful perspective on this history based on his distinction between ipse identity and idem identity.1 My intention is not to rehearse that history, or even to u…Read more
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116Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentificationIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, John Benjamins. pp. 203--239. 2000.
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113Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of ControlReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 865-879. 2015.This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue…Read more
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110Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive ScienceAustralasian Philosophical Review 2 (2): 125-137. 2018.Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological perspective it has been argued that phenomenology cannot be naturalized. In this context it makes sense to…Read more
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106Getting interaction theory (IT) together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches to social interactionInteraction Studies 13 (3): 436-468. 2012.We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependen…Read more
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105Gesture-first, but no gestures?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2): 138-139. 2005.Although Arbib's extension of the mirror-system hypothesis neatly sidesteps one problem with the “gesture-first” theory of language origins, it overlooks the importance of gestures that occur in current-day human linguistic performance, and this lands it with another problem. We argue that, instead of gesture-first, a system of combined vocalization and gestures would have been a more natural evolutionary unit.
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105Models of the pathological mindJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (4): 57-80. 2002.Christopher Frith is a research professor at the Functional Imaging Laboratory of the Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience at University College, London. He explores, experimentally, using the techniques of functional brain imaging, the relationship between human consciousness and the brain. His research focuses on questions pertaining to perception, attention, control of action, free will, and awareness of our own mental states and those of others. As the following discussion makes clear…Read more
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104Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and AdultsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1): 145-169. 2012.We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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103Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experienceAtelier Phenomenologie Et Cognition: Theorie de la Cognition Et Necessité d'Une Investigation Phenomenologique. 2000.In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian …Read more
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103Strong Interaction and Self-AgencyHumana Mente 4 (15): 55-76. 2011.The interaction theory of social cognition contends that intersubjective interaction is characterized by both immersion and irreducibility. This motivates a question about autonomy and self-agency: If I am always caught up in processes of interaction, and interaction always goes beyond me and my ultimate control, is there any room for self-agency? I outline an answer to this question that points to the importance of communicative and narrative practices
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101You and I, robotAI and Society 28 (4): 455-460. 2013.I address a number of issues related to building an autonomous social robot. I review different approaches to social cognition and ask how these different approaches may inform the design of social robots. I argue that regardless of which theoretical approach to social cognition one favors, instantiating that approach in a workable robot will involve designing that robot on enactive principles
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97Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity (edited book)Publications de l'Université de Rouen.. 2004.Introduction In Autrement qu'etre on au-delh de I'essence, Levinas claims that ipseity depends upon alterity. One of the reasons given is that I, according to Levinas, become a subject exactly by being addressed and accused by the Other .
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97Hermeneutics and EducationState University of New York Press. 1992.A study of the interface between philosophical hermeneutics and the philosophical theory of education, yielding a hermeneutical approach to education--an approach that calls into question the current models of educational experience and ...
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96The Oxford Handbook of 4E CognitionOxford University Press. 2018.4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) is a relatively young and thriving field of interdisciplinary research. It assumes that cognition is shaped and structured by dynamic interactions between the brain, body, and both the physical and social environments. With essays from leading scholars and researchers, The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition investigates this recent paradigm. It addresses the central issues of embodied cognition by focusing on recent trends, such as Bayesian …Read more
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96Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critiquePsychopathology 37 (1). 2004.In the past dozen years a number of theoretical models of schizophrenic symptoms have been proposed, often inspired by advances in the cognitive sciences, and especially cognitive neuroscience. Perhaps the most widely cited and influential of these is the neurocognitive model proposed by Christopher Frith (1992). Frith's influence reaches into psychiatry, neuroscience, and even philosophy. The philosopher John Campbell (1999a), for example, has called Frith's model the most parsimonious explanat…Read more
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95Self-agency and mental causalityIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.I want to explore one small corner of the concept of mental causality. It’s the corner where discussions about mind-body interactions and epiphenomenalism take place. My basic contention is that these discussions are framed in the wrong terms because they are infected by a mind-body dualism which defines the question of mental causality in a classic or standard way: How does a mental event cause my body to do what it does? Setting the question in this way has consequences for ongoing interdiscip…Read more
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94Somaesthetics and the care of the bodyMetaphilosophy 42 (3): 305-313. 2011.Abstract: This article poses a number of questions to Richard Shusterman concerning his concepts of somaesthetics and body consciousness in his book Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics. How do the concepts relate to the kind of forgetfulness of the body that can happen in expert performance? What is the nature of somatic reflection, and how is it different from pre-reflective awareness of the body? The article suggests that our immersed involvement and overt orienta…Read more
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94Ways of knowing the self and the otherIn Shaun Gallagher & Stephen Watson (eds.), Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum, Publications De L'université De Rouen.. pp. 1-25. 2004.Introduction to S. Gallagher and S. Watson. (2004). _Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity_ . Rouen: Presses Universitaires. Originally published in 2000 as a special issue of the online journal _Arobase: Journal des lettres et sciences humaines,_ 4 (1-2).
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94Taking stock of phenomenology futuresSouthern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2): 304-318. 2012.In this paper, I review recent contributions of phenomenology to a variety of disciplines, including the cognitive sciences and psychiatry, and explore (1) controversies about phenomenological methods and naturalization; (2) relations between phenomenology and the enactive and extended mind approaches; and (3) the promise of phenomenology for addressing a number of controversial philosophical issues
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92Advancing the ‘We’ Through NarrativeTopoi 38 (1): 211-219. 2019.Narrative is rarely mentioned in philosophical discussions of collective intentionality and group identity despite the fact that narratives are often thought important for the formation of action intentions and self-identity in individuals. We argue that the concept of the ‘we-narrative’ can solve several problems in regard to defining the status of the we. It provides the typical format for the attribution of joint agency; it contributes to the formation of group identity; and it generates grou…Read more
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91On agency and body-ownership: Phenomenological and neurocognitive reflectionsConsciousness and Cognition 16 (3): 645-660. 2007.The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sen…Read more
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86Hegel and the extended mindAI and Society 25 (1): 123-129. 2010.We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the “parity principle” (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58.1:7–19, 1998), in light of Hegel’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use
Memphis, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |