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19Defining consciousnessPragmatics and Cognition 18 (3): 561-569. 2010.I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and mot…Read more
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19Teaching Phenomenology to Qualitative Researchers, Cognitive Scientists, and PhenomenologistsIndo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 12 (sup3): 183-192. 2012.The authors examine several issues in teaching phenomenology (1) to advanced researchers who are doing qualitative research using phenomenological interview methods in disciplines such as psychology, nursing, or education, and (2) to advanced researchers in the cognitive neurosciences. In these contexts, the term “teaching” needs to be taken in a general and nondidactic way. In the case of the first group, it involves guiding doctoral students in their conception and design of a qualitative meth…Read more
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18The Minds, Machines, and Brains of a Passionate Scientist: An interview with Michael ArbibJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (12): 50-67. 2004.Michael Arbib was born in England, grew up in Australia, and studied at MIT where he received his PhD in Mathematics in 1963. He helped to found the Department of Computer and Information Science and the Center for Systems Neuroscience, the Cognitive Science Program, and the Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Today he is Fletcher Jones Professor of Computer Science, a Professor of Neuroscience and the Director of the USC Brain Project at the Univers…Read more
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18Planting Some New Thoughts on the LandscapeJournal of Applied Philosophy 34 (5): 730-736. 2017.In this comment on Jonathan Glover's Alien Landscapes? I'll focus on two issues: social cognition in autism, and delusions; and I'll introduce a new topic – solitary confinement – as a supplement to Glover's far-ranging analyses.
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18The Embodied Phenomenology of phenomenologyJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4): 93-107. 2015.We argue that bodily affects are in part constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. We find resources in Phenomenology, psychology, and neuroscience that point to the importance of bodily affects for shaping not only our perceptions of and judgments about the world, but the phenomenal 'something it is like' to experience such perceptions and judgments.
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18The Multidimensionality and Context Dependency of SelvesAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2): 112-114. 2017.
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17Nailing the lie: An interview with Jonathan ColeJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2): 3-21. 2004.'It nails the old lie that rigorous science and a humane attitude to illness do not go together.' From review of Pride and a Daily Marathon in the TLS Jonathan Cole is, amongst other things, a clinical neurophysiologist practising at Poole Hospital in Bournemouth, England, an author of extraordinarily interesting books, and an experimental neuroscientist who conducts his experiments in some of the major laboratories in Europe and North America, and at least once while floating weightless in mid-…Read more
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16Fenomenologia da intersubjectividade: perspectivas transcendentais e empíricasRevista Filosófica de Coimbra 21 (42): 557-582. 2012.
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16Why the body is not in the brainIn Alex Arteaga, Marion Lauschke & Horst Bredekamp (eds.), Bodies in Action and Symbolic Forms: Zwei Seiten der Verkörperungstheorie, Akademie Verlag. pp. 273-288. 2012.
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16Review of David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Amie L. Thomasson (ed.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (12). 2006.
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15L'intentionnalité et l'activité intentionnelleSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.Ceux qui affirment que le libre arbitre est une illusion n’ont pas raison. Ils fondent leur affirmation sur une preuve scientifique établie à un niveau impropre de description de l’activité intentionnelle. Le libre arbitre ne s’exerce pas sur les processus neuronaux sub-personnels, l’activation musculaire ou les mouvements élémentaires du corps, mais sur des activités contextualisées au sein d’un système qui est nettement plus grand que ne le pensent bon nombre de philosophes de l’esprit, de psy…Read more
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14The Problem with 3-Year-OldsJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2): 160-182. 2015.I review a variety of theories that attempt to explain how young infants are able to pass spontaneous false belief tests, and then ask whether any of these approaches can explain the 3-year-olds' failure on standard, elicited FB tests. I argue that some of these approaches fail to provide adequate explanations, and I defend an embodied enactive approach that I think does a better job. The primary reason 3-year-olds fail at the elicited FB tests is not due to language problems, the complexity of …Read more
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14Neonatal Imitation: Theory, Experimental Design, and Significance for the Field of Social CognitionFrontiers in Psychology 8. 2017.
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14Hegel, History, and Interpretation (edited book)State University of New York Press. 1997.Extends critical discussions of Hegel into contemporary debates about the nature of interpretation and theories of philosophical hermeneutics
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13The Struggle for Recognition and the Return of Primary IntersubjectivityIn Véronique M. Fóti & Pavlos Kontos (eds.), Phenomenology and the Primacy of the Political: Essays in Honor of Jacques Taminiaux, Springer. 2017.I argue that Axel Honneth, reappropriated Colwyn Trevarthen's distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity,into his critical social theory. How the concept of primary intersubjectivity gets re-incorporated, or indeed, re-cognized in Honneth’s conception of recognition, however, is a complex issue that Iexplore in this essay. It is linked to questions not only about child development, but also about whether one should understand recognition in terms of a summons, following Fichte, …Read more
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13Intencionalnost i intencionalno djelovanjeFilozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 339-346. 2006.Oni koji tvrde da je slobodna volja iluzija, u krivu su. Oni temelje svoju tvrdnju na znanstvenom dokazu koji testira pogrešnu razinu deskripcije intencionalnog djelovanja. Kod slobodne volje ne radi se o podosobnim neuronskim procesima, mišićnoj aktivaciji, ili temeljnim tjelesnim pokretima, već o kontekstualiziranim djelovanjima u sistemu koji je veći negoli što to mnogi suvremeni filozofi uma, psiholozi i neuroznanstvenici smatraju. U ovome članku opisujem vrstu intencionalnosti koja ide s vj…Read more
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13Author's Response: Internatural RelationsConstructivist Foundations 13 (1): 110-116. 2017.I offer some clarification on how enactivism is related to naturalism, predictive processing and transcendental phenomenology, and I point to a paradox that requires further clarification with regard to the structure of intrinsic temporality and the nature of self.
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13Author’s Response: Enactivism, Autonomy, Self and OtherConstructivist Foundations 14 (1): 37-41. 2018.: The commentaries on my target article tend to be either supportive and expansive or corrective. I respond to these commentaries by focusing on issues that involve philosophical and scientific frameworks, concepts of autonomy, self, and social cognition broadly conceived.
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11Przerysować mapę i przestawić czas: fenomenologia i nauki kognitywneAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1): 77-122. 2010.We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of i…Read more
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11Husserl and the Phenomenology of TemporalityIn Heather Dyke & Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley. 2013.This chapter summarizes Husserl's phenomenology of time consciousness and situates it in the larger context of late nineteenth‐ and early twentieth‐century considerations about the psychology of temporal experience. Then, in an attempt to place it in a more contemporary context, it suggests an enactive interpretation of this phenomenology, first by extending Husserl's analysis of consciousness to bodily action, and, second, by considering the rethinking of the notion of primal impression suggest…Read more
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11“Towards a phenomenology of self-patterns in psychopathological diagnosis and therapy”Journal of Psychopathology 52 (1). 2019.Categorization-based diagnosis, which endeavors to be consistent with the third-person, objective measures of science, is not always adequate with respect to problems concerning diagnostic accuracy, demarcation problems when there are comorbidities, well-documented problems of symptom amplification, and complications of stigmatization and looping effects. While psychiatric categories have proved useful and convenient for clinicians in identifying a recognizable constellation of symptoms typical …Read more
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9Patterns of researchAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 5 (2). 2014.Interview with professor Shaun Gallagher.
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9The historikerstreit and the critique of nationalismHistory of European Ideas 16 (4-6): 921-926. 1993.
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8Does consciousness cause behavior? (edited book)MIT Press. 2009.Continuing the debate over whether consciousness causes behaviour or plays no functional role in it, leading scholars discuss the question in terms of neuroscience, philosophy, law, and public policy.
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7Phenomenological Approaches to ConsciousnessIn Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.Phenomenology involves a first‐person approach to consciousness. Husserl initiated phenomenology as a transcendental investigation in opposition to naturalism. It includes a methodologically guided analysis of intentionality as the primary characteristic of consciousness. Phenomenology also addresses the issue of the phenomenal character of consciousness tied to the notion of pre‐reflective self‐awareness, to embodiment, and to variations in intentional structures. It also offers a detailed anal…Read more
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6Growth points from the very beginningInteraction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 9 (1): 117-132. 2008.Early humans formed language units consisting of global and discrete dimensions of semiosis in dynamic opposition, or ‘growth points.’ At some point, gestures gained the power to orchestrate actions, manual and vocal, with significances other than those of the actions themselves, giving rise to cognition framed in dual terms. However, our proposal emphasizes natural selection of joint gesture-speech, not ‘gesture-first’ in language origin.
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Memphis, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |