• Predictive Processing and Some Disillusions about Illusions
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-19. forthcoming.
    A number of perceptual illusions present problems for predictive processing accounts. In this chapter we’ll review explanations of the Müller-Lyer Illusion, the Rubber Hand Illusion and the Alien Hand Illusion based on the idea of Prediction Error Minimization, and show why they fail. In spite of the relatively open communicative processes which, on many accounts, are posited between hierarchical levels of the cognitive system in order to facilitate the minimization of prediction errors, percept…Read more
  • Introduction: The Arts and Sciences of the Situated Body
    Janus Head 9 (2): 293-295. 2007.
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    Embodied Imagination and Metaphor Use in Autism Spectrum Disorder
    with Zuzanna Rucinska and Thomas Fondelli
    Healthcare 9 (9): 200. 2021.
    This paper discusses different frameworks for understanding imagination and metaphor in the context of research on the imaginative skills of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In contrast to a standard linguistic framework, it advances an embodied and enactive account of imagination and metaphor. The paper describes a case study from a systemic therapeutic session with a child with ASD that makes use of metaphors. It concludes by outlining some theoretical insights into the imaginativ…Read more
  • I argue that Axel Honneth, reappropriated Colwyn Trevarthen's distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity,into his critical social theory. How the concept of primary intersubjectivity gets re-incorporated, or indeed, re-cognized in Honneth’s conception of recognition, however, is a complex issue that Iexplore in this essay. It is linked to questions not only about child development, but also about whether one should understand recognition in terms of a summons, following Fichte, …Read more
  •  1
    Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    Following on from Shaun Gallagher's influential 2005 book How the Body Shapes the Mind, this volume brings together leading experts from the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry in a productive dialogue, exploring key questions and debates about the relationship between body schema and body image.
  •  94
    The Phenomenology and Predictive Processing of Time in Depression
    with Zachariah A. Neemeh
    In Dina Mendonça, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), The Philosophy and Science of Predictive Processing, . pp. 187-207. 2020.
    In this chapter we first elucidate the subjective flow of time particularly as developed by Husserl. We next discuss time and timescales in predictive processing. We then consider how the phenomenological analysis of time can be naturalized within a predictive processing framework. In the final section, we develop an analysis of the temporal disturbances characteristic of depression using the resources of both phenomenology and predictive processing.
  • “Towards a phenomenology of self-patterns in psychopathological diagnosis and therapy”
    with Anya Daly
    Journal of Psychopathology 52 (1). 2019.
    Categorization-based diagnosis, which endeavors to be consistent with the third-person, objective measures of science, is not always adequate with respect to problems concerning diagnostic accuracy, demarcation problems when there are comorbidities, well-documented problems of symptom amplification, and complications of stigmatization and looping effects. While psychiatric categories have proved useful and convenient for clinicians in identifying a recognizable constellation of symptoms typical …Read more
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    This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistem…Read more
  •  8
    En el desarrollo de una fenómenología enactivista, el análisis de la conciencia del tiempo necesita ser conducido hacia un enfoque totalmente enactivista. Así, intento impulsar este análisis hacia una fenomenología enactivista más completa de la conciencia del tiempo. Además, sostengo que el análisis de Varela motiva un examen más detallado de los aspectos fenomenológicos de la estructura temporal intrínseca de la experiencia, al entenderla en términos de una fenomenología encarnada y orientada …Read more
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    In this paper we explore the notion of rehearsal as a way to develop an embodied and enactive account of imagining. After reviewing the neuroscience of motor imagery, we argue, in the context of performance studies, that rehearsal includes forms of imagining that involve motor processes. We draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of imagining which also suggests that imagining involves motor processes. This research in neuroscience and phenomenology, supports the idea of an embodied and enactive account …Read more
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    Critical social philosophy, Honneth and the role of primary intersubjectivity
    European Journal of Social Theory 15 (2): 243-260. 2012.
    Gesellschaftskritik, or social philosophy that aims to provide firm criticism of pathological social practices, requires normatively grounded evaluative principles. In this article, we assess different possibilities for such principles with focus on a model that takes specific patterns of intersubjective interaction as its point of reference. We argue that in order to understand the full significance of this ‘intersubjective turn’ for social philosophy, and to strengthen the normative foundation…Read more
  •  1
    Getting interaction theory (IT) together
    with Tom Froese
    Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 13 (3): 436-468. 2012.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the ‘social mind’ is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached ‘social cognition’ is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. We draw on the…Read more
  • Growth points from the very beginning
    with David McNeill, Susan D. Duncan, Jonathan Cole, and Bennett Bertenthal
    Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 9 (1): 117-132. 2008.
    Early humans formed language units consisting of global and discrete dimensions of semiosis in dynamic opposition, or ‘growth points.’ At some point, gestures gained the power to orchestrate actions, manual and vocal, with significances other than those of the actions themselves, giving rise to cognition framed in dual terms. However, our proposal emphasizes natural selection of joint gesture-speech, not ‘gesture-first’ in language origin.
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    Developmental phenomenology: examples from social cognition
    with Stefano Vincini
    Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2): 183-199. 2021.
    We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of constructive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science constitutes a strong impulse to c…Read more
  •  4
    Author’s Response: Enactivism, Autonomy, Self and Other
    Constructivist Foundations 14 (1): 37-41. 2018.
    : The commentaries on my target article tend to be either supportive and expansive or corrective. I respond to these commentaries by focusing on issues that involve philosophical and scientific frameworks, concepts of autonomy, self, and social cognition broadly conceived.
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    Context: Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. Problem: Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment. Meth…Read more
  •  1
    Dynamics and Dialectic
    Constructivist Foundations 14 (1): 114-117. 2018.
    : The articles in this special issue cover a lot of ground, from very specific scientific questions about the nature of movement and development, to very large questions about ontological framing. My comments here are meant to highlight some important issues found in these articles and to offer some clarifications.
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    Joint attention, joint action, and participatory sense making
    Alter: revue de phénoménologie 18 111-123. 2010.
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    In this chapter I focus on the relationship between embodied intersubjective interactions and the kind of spaces that shape and are shaped by such interactions. After clarifying some of the theoretical background involved in questions about social cognition, I review several empirical studies that suggest that social interactions and social relations can change our perceptions of the reachable space around us, as well as the more distant space beyond our immediate reach. These perceptions operat…Read more
  •  7
    Habits and the Diachronic Structure of the Self
    In Andrea Altobrando, Takuya Niikawa & Richard Stone (eds.), The Realizations of the Self, Springer. pp. 47-63. 2018.
    In this chapter, we explore the role of habit in giving shape to conscious experience and importantly to our pre-reflective awareness of ourselves which includes the sense of mineness that accompanies our conscious experience. For the most part, discussions in philosophy of mind and phenomenology concerning pre-reflective self-awareness are focused on determining the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood. For this reason perhaps, the existence of pre-reflective self-awarenes…Read more
  •  3
    Mindful Performance
    In Antonino Pennisi & Alessandra Falzone (eds.), The Extended Theory of Cognitive Creativity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Performativity, Springer Verlag. pp. 43-58. 2020.
    In this chapter I explore several variations of mindfulness in performance, and I focus specifically on variations of self-awareness in these practices. I take an enactivist approach, clarifying first why enactivism is not a form of behaviorism. I argue that phenomenologically inspired enactivist conceptions of perception and action are neither mindless, in a naïve behavioristic way, nor overly cognitivist, but do involve aspects of mindfulness that support embodied performance. I’ll look at exa…Read more
  •  188
    Culture in Mind - An Enactivist Account: Not Cognitive Penetration But Cultural Permeation
    In Laurence J. Kirmayer, Carol M. Worthman, Shinobu Kitayama, Robert Lemelson & Constance Cummings (eds.), Culture, mind, and brain: Emerging concepts, models, applications., . forthcoming.
    Advancing a radically enactive account of cognition, we provide arguments in favour of the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, such that cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather than there being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted confines of cognition. The paper reviews the limitations of two classical cognitivist, modularist accounts of cognition and a revisionary, new order variant o…Read more
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    Don Ihde and Lambros Malafouris have argued that “we are homo faber not just because we make things but also because we are made by them.” The emphasis falls on the idea that the things that we create, use, rely on—that is, those things with which we engage—have a recursive effect on human existence. We make things, but we also make arrangements, many of which are long-standing, material, social, normative, economic, institutional, and/or political, and many of which are supported by various tec…Read more
  •  16
    The Senses of a Bodily Self
    ProtoSociology 36 414-433. 2019.
    I focus on the sense of ownership and ask whether this experience is some­thing over and above one’s bodily experiences, or something intrinsic to them. I consider liberal, deflationary, and phenomenological accounts of the sense of ownership, and I offer an enactive or action-oriented account that takes the sense of ownership to be intrinsic to the phenomenal background and our various bodily senses, including the sense of agency.
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    The Problem with 3-Year-Olds
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2): 160-182. 2015.
    I review a variety of theories that attempt to explain how young infants are able to pass spontaneous false belief tests, and then ask whether any of these approaches can explain the 3-year-olds' failure on standard, elicited FB tests. I argue that some of these approaches fail to provide adequate explanations, and I defend an embodied enactive approach that I think does a better job. The primary reason 3-year-olds fail at the elicited FB tests is not due to language problems, the complexity of …Read more
  •  10
    The Embodied Phenomenology of phenomenology
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4): 93-107. 2015.
    We argue that bodily affects are in part constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. We find resources in Phenomenology, psychology, and neuroscience that point to the importance of bodily affects for shaping not only our perceptions of and judgments about the world, but the phenomenal 'something it is like' to experience such perceptions and judgments.
  •  3
    What is Enlightenment?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2): 94-104. 2016.