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85Hegel and the extended mindAI and Society 25 (1): 123-129. 2010.We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the “parity principle” (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58.1:7–19, 1998), in light of Hegel’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use
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84We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared AgencyPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2): 95-110. 2017.The basic approach to understanding shared agency has been to identify individual intentional states that are somehow “shared” by participants and that contribute to guiding and informing the actions of individual participants. But, as Michael Bratman suggests, there is a problem of stability and depth that any theory of shared agency needs to solve. Given that participants in a joint action might form shared intentions for different reasons, what binds them to one another such that they have so…Read more
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82Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Editorial IntroductionPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1): 1-6. 2002.
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80Complexities in the first-person perspective. Review of self-awareness and alterity by Dan ZahaviResearch in Phenomenology 32 (1): 238-248. 2002.
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80Re-Authoring Narrative TherapyPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (2): 157-167. 2017.How we narrate our lives can affect us, for good or ill. Our narrative practices make an undeniable difference to our psychosocial well-being. All so-called "talking cures" – including traditional psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approaches to therapy and newer techniques – are motivated by this insight about the power of personal narratives. All therapies of the discursive ilk make use of narratives, in one way or another, as a means of enabling individuals to frame, or reframe, and to manage t…Read more
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79Conversations in Postmodern HermeneuticsIn Hugh J. Silverman (ed.), Lyotard: philosophy, politics, and the sublime, Routledge. 2002.Conversation is, first of all, an event, something that happens. But the concept of conversation has also been appropriated by various thinkers as a model or metaphor of hermeneutical experience, of communication, political discourse, the acquisition of knowledge, and so forth. As an event it has been analyzed within the hermeneutical tradition, from Schleiermacher to Gadamer, and in this analysis it has been tied to Romantic conceptions such as the universality of language, "linguistic heritage…Read more
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78Phenomenological approaches to consciousnessIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 686--696. 2007.On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not somet…Read more
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77Dynamical Relations in the Self-PatternFrontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.Abstract: The notion of a self-pattern, as developed in the pattern theory of self, which holds that the self is best explained in terms of the kind of reality that pertains to a dynamical pattern, acknowledges the importance of neural dynamics, but also expands the account of self to extra-neural (embodied and enactive) dynamics. The pattern theory of self, however, has been criticized for failing to explicate the dynamical relations among elements of the self-pattern; as such, it seems to be n…Read more
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77The Place of Phronesis in Postmodern HermeneuticsPhilosophy Today 37 (3): 298-305. 1993.The conception of paralogy, which Jean-Francois Lyotard develops in The Postmodern Condition, motivates a number of questions concerning justice and the moral life. In this paper I suggest that Lyotard's account fails to provide an adequate answer to these questions, and that a more satisfactory account of justice in paralogy can be developed by exploring the concept of phronesis. John Caputo's "ethics of dissemination," in some respects, leads us in this direction. Although both theorists attem…Read more
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77The Interpersonal and Emotional Beginnings of Understanding: A Review of Peter Hobson's The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking (review)Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3): 253-257. 2004.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Interpersonal and Emotional Beginnings of Understanding: A Review of Peter Hobson’sThe Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of ThinkingShaun Gallagher (bio)Hobson's book (2002) is extremely accessible, interestingly interdisciplinary, and knowledgeable in all the right ways. He pulls together work in psychiatry, experimental psychology, and psychoanalysis in a framework that is relevant to issues in the philosophy of mind. We…Read more
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77Phenomenology and experimental design: Toward a phenomenologically enlightened experimental scienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10): 85-99. 2003.I review three answers to the question: How can phenomenology contribute to the experimental cognitive neurosciences? The first approach, neurophenomenology, employs phenomenological method and training, and uses first-person reports not just as more data for analysis, but to generate descriptive categories that are intersubjectively and scientifically validated, and are then used to interpret results that correlate with objective measurements of behaviour and brain activity. A second approach, …Read more
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76Defining consciousness: The importance of non-reflective self-awarenessPragmatics and Cognition 18 (3): 561-569. 2010.I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and mot…Read more
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76Neo-pragmatism and enactive intentionalityIn Jay Schulkin (ed.), Action, perception and the brain: adaptation and cephalic expression, Palgrave-macmillan. 2012.
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73Growth points from the very beginningIn M. Arbib D. Bickerton (ed.), The Emergence of Protolanguage: Holophrasis Vs Compositionality, John Benjamins. pp. 117-132. 2010.Did protolanguage users use discrete words that referred to objects, actions, locations, etc., and then, at some point, combine them; or on the contrary did they have words that globally indexed whole semantic complexes, and then come to divide them? Our answer is: early humans were forming language units consisting of global and discrete dimensions of semiosis in dynamic opposition. These units of thinking-for-speaking, or ‘growth points’ (GPs) were, jointly, analog imagery (visuo-spatio-motori…Read more
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73Pragmatic interventions into enactive and extended conceptions of cognitionPhilosophical Issues 24 (1): 110-126. 2014.Clear statements of both extended and enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in John Dewey and other pragmatists. In this paper I'll argue that we can find resources in the pragmatists to address two ongoing debates: in contrast to recent disagreements between proponents of extended vs enactive cognition, pragmatism supports a more integrative view—an enactive conception of extended cognition, and pragmatist views suggest ways to answer the main objections raised against extended and ena…Read more
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73Making imagination even more embodied: imagination, constraint and epistemic relevanceSynthese 199 (3-4): 8143-8170. 2021.This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistem…Read more
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72Two problems of intersubjectivityJournal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8): 6-8. 2009.I propose a distinction between two closely related problems: the problem of social cognition and the problem of participatory sense-making. One problem focuses on how we understand others; the other problem focuses on how, with others, we make sense out of the world. Both understanding others and making sense out of the world involve social interaction. The importance of participatory sense-making is highlighted by reviewing some recent accounts of perception that are philosophically autistic -…Read more
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72What kind of movement or behavior is involved in neonate imitation? What exactly is the newborn infant doing when it responds to seeing gestures on another person's face? This question is closely related to some other questions, such as whether neonate imitation is possible, and whether it is truly imitation. Piaget, of course, thought that this sort of "invisible imitation" was not possible for infants less than 8-12 months of age.
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71Pathologies in Narrative StructuresRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 203-224. 2007.Per Aage Brandt, commenting on a passage from Merlin Donald, suggests that there is ‘a narrative aesthetics built into our mind.’ In Donald, one can find an evolutionary account of this narrative aesthetics. If there is something like an innate narrative disposition, it is also surely the case that there is a process of development involved in narrative practice. In this paper I will assume something closer to the developmental account provided by Jerome Bruner in various works, and Dan Hutto's …Read more
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70Przerysować mapę i przestawić czas: fenomenologia i nauki kognitywneAvant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1): 77-122. 2010.We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of i…Read more
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70Review: Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step (review)Mind 116 (463): 792-796. 2007.
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70Enactivism, Causality, and TherapyPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (1): 27-28. 2020.In 1937, John Dewey delivered a lecture to the College of Physicians in Saint Louis. His clear message was that in the practice of medicine it does not suffice for physicians to treat just the body, or to look to just the body for the mechanism of disease. Emphasizing the relational nature of organism-environment, he argued that the physician must treat the whole patient and must therefore consider the environment of the patient. It makes no sense, he suggested, to provide medicine to address a …Read more
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69Prospecting performance: rehearsal and the nature of imaginationSynthese 199 (1-2): 4523-4541. 2021.In this paper we explore the notion of rehearsal as a way to develop an embodied and enactive account of imagining. After reviewing the neuroscience of motor imagery, we argue, in the context of performance studies, that rehearsal includes forms of imagining that involve motor processes. We draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of imagining which also suggests that imagining involves motor processes. This research in neuroscience and phenomenology, supports the idea of an embodied and enactive account …Read more
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68Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception, edited by Thomas Baldwin (review)Mind 118 (472): 1105-1111. 2009.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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67Embodiment and Phenomenal Qualities: An Enactive InterpretationPhilosophical Topics 39 (1): 1-14. 2011.I argue that an older debate in phenomenology concerning Husserl’s notion of hyletic data can throw some light on contemporary debates about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. Both debates tend to ignore important considerations about bodily experience and how specific kinds of bodily experience can shape one’s consciousness of the world. A revised and fully embodied conception of hyletic experience enriches the concept of enactive perception.
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67The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and BeyondConstructivist Foundations 13 (1): 91-97. 2017.In developing an enactivist phenomenology the analysis of time-consciousness needs to be pushed toward a fully enactivist account. Problem: Varela proposed a neurophenomenology of time-consciousness. I attempt to push this analysis towards a more complete enactivist phenomenology of time-consciousness. Method: I review Varela’s account of time-consciousness, which brings Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the intrinsic temporal structure of experience into contact with contemporary neuroscie…Read more
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66One step forward, two steps back – not the Tango: comment on Gallotti and FrithTrends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7): 303-304. 2013.
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65Deep Brain Stimulation, Self and Relational AutonomyNeuroethics 14 (1): 31-43. 2018.Questions about the nature of self and self-consciousness are closely aligned with questions about the nature of autonomy. These concepts have deep roots in traditional philosophical discussions that concern metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. They also have direct relevance to practical considerations about informed consent in medical contexts. In this paper, with reference to understanding specific side effects of deep brain stimulation treatment in cases of, for example, Parkinson’s Disease…Read more
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63The (in)visibility of others: a reply to HerschbachPhilosophical Explorations 11 (3): 237-244. 2008.In his article ‘Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception’ (this issue), Mitchell Herschbach raises some critical questions concerning our phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity. We welcome Herschbach's comments in the spirit of constructive criticism, but also think that he has missed some crucial aspects of our argumentation. We take this opportunity to amplify and clarify our views.
Memphis, Tennessee, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |