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305Body image and body schema in a deafferented subjectJournal of Mind and Behavior 16 (4): 369-390. 1995.In a majority of situations the normal adult maintains posture or moves without consciously monitoring motor activity. Posture and movement are usually close to automatic; they tend to take care of themselves, outside of attentive regard. One's body, in such cases, effaces itself as one is geared into a particular intentional goal. This effacement is possible because of the normal functioning of a body schema. Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes that pla…Read more
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30From the Transcendental to the EnactivePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2): 119-121. 2012.
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19Teaching Phenomenology to Qualitative Researchers, Cognitive Scientists, and PhenomenologistsIndo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 12 (sup3): 183-192. 2012.The authors examine several issues in teaching phenomenology (1) to advanced researchers who are doing qualitative research using phenomenological interview methods in disciplines such as psychology, nursing, or education, and (2) to advanced researchers in the cognitive neurosciences. In these contexts, the term “teaching” needs to be taken in a general and nondidactic way. In the case of the first group, it involves guiding doctoral students in their conception and design of a qualitative meth…Read more
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20Models of the self: Editors' introductionJournal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6): 5-6. 1997.There is a long history of inquiry about human nature and the nature of the self. It stretches from the ancient tradition of Socratic self-knowledge in the context of ethical life to contemporary discussions of brain function in cognitive science. At the beginning of the modern era, Descartes was led to the conclusion that self-knowledge provided the single Archimedean point for all knowledge. His thesis that self is a single, simple, continuing, and unproblematically accessible mental substance…Read more
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165Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological MethodologyHusserl Studies 26 (2): 83-106. 2010.The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative…Read more
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46Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive SciencesCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1): 93-132. 2003.In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind who mistakenly associate phenomenological method with untrained psychological introspection (e.g., Dennett 1991). For very different reasons, resistance is also found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in th…Read more
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39Shaun Gallagher, Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis, discusses the results of a neurophenomenological study in which a research team used simulation to replicate experiences of astronauts during space travel. Many astronauts described deeply aesthetic, spiritual, or religious experiences of awe and wonder. Gallagher also discusses how using an approach that incorporated neuroscience, hermeneutics, phenomenology, psychology, heart rate, and …Read more
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54The new hybrids: Continuing debates on social perceptionConsciousness and Cognition 36 452-465. 2015.
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72What kind of movement or behavior is involved in neonate imitation? What exactly is the newborn infant doing when it responds to seeing gestures on another person's face? This question is closely related to some other questions, such as whether neonate imitation is possible, and whether it is truly imitation. Piaget, of course, thought that this sort of "invisible imitation" was not possible for infants less than 8-12 months of age.
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306Can social interaction constitute social cognition?Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10): 441-447. 2010.An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in …Read more
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44Representation and deliberate actionHouston Studies in Cognitive Science 1. 2000.Dreyfus enlists the aid of Merleau-Ponty in his critique of representationalist theories of cognition. Such theories posit a representational element at some level of cognitive activity. The nature of the representation and how we think of it will depend upon the level at which one claims to find it. If we consider the case of perception, at one extreme it might be claimed that the representation is a conscious one, that is, that the perceiving subject is conscious of a representation, a _Vorste…Read more
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8The historikerstreit and the critique of nationalismHistory of European Ideas 16 (4-6): 921-926. 1993.
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25Intentionalität und intentionales handelnSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 319-326. 2005.Diejenigen, die behaupten, der freie Wille sei Illusion, sind im Unrecht. Sie begründen ihre Behauptung auf einem wissenschaftlichen Beweis, der die falsche Ebene der Deskription des intentionalen Handelns testet. Der freie Wille bezieht sich nicht auf subpersonale neuronale Prozesse, Muskelaktivierung oder grundlegende Körperbewegungen, sondern auf kontextualisierte Handlungen in einem System, das größer ist als viele zeitgenössische Geistesphilosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler anne…Read more
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37IntroductionInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3). 2008.This Article does not have an abstract
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937Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive scienceTrends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1): 14-21. 2000.Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings.…Read more
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47Dissociation in self-narrativeConsciousness and Cognition 20 (1): 149-155. 2011.We review different analytic approaches to narratives by those with psychopathological conditions, and we suggest that the interpretation of such narratives are complicated by a variety of phenomenological and hermeneutical considerations. We summarize an empirical study of narrative distance in narratives by non-pathological subjects, and discuss how the results can be interpreted in two different ways with regard to the issue of dissociation
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147Suggestions towards a revision of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousnessMan and World 12 (4): 445-464. 1979.In this paper I offer four distinct but related suggestions: (1) That Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness is an adequate account of the concept of the specious present; (2) That the Querschtfftt o5 momentary phase of consdousness is genuinely only a Querschnittanskht; (3) That retention, primal-impression, and protention are functions of consciousness rather than phases or types o.f coasdousness; (4) That further conceptual clarif…Read more
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26Intersubiectivity and psychopathologyIn K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 258. 2013.This chapter provides a review of theory of mind approaches to explaining certain dysfunctions of intersubjectivity in pathologies such as autism and schizophrenia. ToM approaches such as theory theory and simulation theory focus on mindreading but fail to explain important aspects of online intersubjective interaction. A phenomenological approach, focusing on embodied interaction, offers an alternative account of intersubjective processes and specific dysfunctions in pathology. Further research…Read more
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172The neuronal platonistJournal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6): 706-717. 1998.Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common …Read more
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77Phenomenology and experimental design: Toward a phenomenologically enlightened experimental scienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10): 85-99. 2003.I review three answers to the question: How can phenomenology contribute to the experimental cognitive neurosciences? The first approach, neurophenomenology, employs phenomenological method and training, and uses first-person reports not just as more data for analysis, but to generate descriptive categories that are intersubjectively and scientifically validated, and are then used to interpret results that correlate with objective measurements of behaviour and brain activity. A second approach, …Read more
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2Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the MindImprint Academic. 2008.Shaun Gallagher is a philosopher of mind who has made it his business to study and meet with leading neuroscientists, including Michael Gazzaniga, Marc Jeannerod and Chris Frith. The result is this unique introduction to the study of the mind, with topics ranging over consciousness, emotion, language, movement, free will and moral responsibility. The discussion throughout is illustrated by lengthy extracts from the author’s many interviews with his scientist colleagues on the relation between th…Read more
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116Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentificationIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, John Benjamins. pp. 203--239. 2000.
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154Hyletic experience and the lived bodyHusserl Studies 3 (2): 131-166. 1986.The theory of hyletic data has been criticized and dismissed a number of times since Edmund Husserl proposed it early in this century. This rejection of Husserl's theory has been part of a larger, wholesale critique of the traditional notion of sensation in which theories of sensation have been displaced by theories of perception.
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516Understanding Interpersonal Problems in AutismPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (3): 199-217. 2004.A BSTRACT: I argue that theory theory approaches to autism offer a wholly inadequate explanation of autistic symptoms because they offer a wholly inadequate account of the non-autistic understanding of others. As an alternative I outline interaction theory, which incorporates evidence from both developmental and phenomenological studies to show that humans are endowed with important capacities for intersubjective understanding from birth or early infancy. As part of a neurophenomenological analy…Read more
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154Experimenting with introspectionTrends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (9): 374-375. 2002.Psychologists’ relationship with introspection is much like that between men and women: it is on again, off again and psychologists often feel they can neither live with introspection nor without it. In their often compelling article, Jack and Roepstorff argue that the fertility of the field depends on psychologists reuniting with the practice of introspection [1]. They suggest that, although reluctant to admit it, psychologists have been carrying on a surreptitious relationship with introspecti…Read more
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91Advancing the ‘We’ Through NarrativeTopoi 38 (1): 211-219. 2019.Narrative is rarely mentioned in philosophical discussions of collective intentionality and group identity despite the fact that narratives are often thought important for the formation of action intentions and self-identity in individuals. We argue that the concept of the ‘we-narrative’ can solve several problems in regard to defining the status of the we. It provides the typical format for the attribution of joint agency; it contributes to the formation of group identity; and it generates grou…Read more
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16Fenomenologia da intersubjectividade: perspectivas transcendentais e empíricasRevista Filosófica de Coimbra 21 (42): 557-582. 2012.
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631The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction?Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7): 83-108. 2001.Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person's mental states and behaviors. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about secondperson interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another's behavior. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namel…Read more
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300Mental institutionsTopoi 28 (1): 45-51. 2009.We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
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Phenomenology |
Maurice Merleau-Ponty |
Hermeneutics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Psychiatry |