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`Deus sive Natura': Must Natural Lawyers Choose?In Robert P. George (ed.), Natural law, liberalism, and morality: contemporary essays, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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32Virtue Ethics in Social TheoryAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4): 329-340. 2023.Tommie Shelby has offered an influential, carefully stated, and well-argued set of objections to any volitional analysis of racism (VAR) as consisting centrally in certain forms of race-based disregard. Here I hope to defend aspects of VAR by analyzing, evaluating, and sometimes countering several of his major contentions, which have stood unchallenged in the literature over more than two decades. First, I sketch and respond to his Methodological objection to VAR, which criticizes VAR's reliance…Read more
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14Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory (review)Review of Metaphysics 41 (2): 375-376. 1987.Myles Brand's rather audacious goal in his new book is nothing less than "to usher in the next... stage of philosophical action theory," which stage he understands as its "naturalization". Hence the subtitle. Naturalization will consist, he explains, in showing that action theory is "continuous with scientific theory", especially with cognitive science and motivational psychology. One familiar with Stich's view that one moves from "folk psychology" to cognitive science by eliminating such mental…Read more
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20Interpersonal VirtuesProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 31-60. 1997.
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19A Note on Religious Assent and DissentLogos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 4 (2): 160-177. 2001.
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18Death of the (Hand)maiden: Contemporary Philosophy in Faith and ReasonLogos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 2 (3): 11-19. 1999.
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12Are Some People Better Off Dead?Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 2 (1): 68-81. 1999.
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33Humanae Vitae (review)Review of Metaphysics 45 (4): 883-884. 1992.Janet Smith has written an important, imposing, and ambitious book. In what began life as a translation of, and commentary on, Paul VI's controversial 1968 encyclical Humanae Vitae, those two elements now form but two of the book's four appendices.
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12Risk and Protective Factors Associated to Peer School VictimizationFrontiers in Psychology 8. 2017.
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113The intentional and the intendedErkenntnis 33 (2). 1990.The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the intuitive link between intention and inte…Read more
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9Zehrer, Franz, Synoptischer Kommentar (Band II), Klosterneuburger Buchund Kunstverlag (review)Augustinianum 6 (1): 182-183. 1966.
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24SPEECH IN HOMER - Beck Speech Presentation in Homeric Epic. Pp. xii + 256. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012. Cased, US$55. ISBN: 978-0-292-73880-5 (review)The Classical Review 64 (1): 12-14. 2014.
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138Racism, Psychology, and Morality: Dialogue with Faucher and MacheryPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2): 250-268. 2011.I here respond to several points in Faucher and Machery’s vigorous and informative critique of my volitional account of racism (VAR). First, although the authors deem it a form of "implicit racial bias," a mere tendency to associate black people with "negative" concepts falls short of racial "bias" or prejudice in the relevant sense. Second, such an associative disposition need not even be morally objectionable. Third, even for more substantial forms of implicit racial bias such as race-based fe…Read more
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1Reason Informed by Faith (review)American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 507-511. 1991.
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21Reason Informed by Faith (review)American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (4): 507-511. 1991.
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57On the irreducibility of the willSynthese 86 (3). 1991.This paper criticizes the thesis that intending to do something is reducible to some combination of beliefs and desires. Against Audi's recent formulation of such a view I offer as counterexample a case wherein an agent who wants and expects to V has not yet decided whether to V and hence does not yet intend to. I try to show that whereas belief that one will V is not necessary for intending to V, as illustrated in cases of desperate attempts to V, one cannot intend to V without preferring to V …Read more
Areas of Interest
19th Century Philosophy |
20th Century Philosophy |