Jhoan garcia

This chapter argues that the instrumentalist's conception of practical reasoning favoured by consequentialists is inadequate. Despite Amartya Sen's formidable defence of consequentialism, it is argued that consequentialism is incapable of protecting one from the moral horrors of the twentieth century, which almost always arise from its affinity to a kind of sympathy for humanity as a whole. The chapter offers an alternative to the moral life. It is constituted by four planks: (i) moral features derive from one's role-relationships to other people; (ii) it is virtue based, that is, it makes judgments of attitudinal responses deemed either virtuous or vicious; (iii) it is patient focused, that is, the fundamental attitudes of virtues are those directed towards the persons with whom the agent is related in the relevant role; and (iv) it is input-driven, that is, the moral status of an act is determined by its motivational input, not its consequential output.

Code-based cryptography is currently the second most promising post-quantum mathematical tool for quantum-resistant algorithms. Since in 2022 the first post-quantum standard Key Encapsulation Mechanism, Kyber (a latticed-based algorithm), was selected to be established as standard, and after that the National Institute of Standards and Technology post-quantum standardization call focused in code-based cryptosystems. Three of the four candidates that remain in the fourth round are code-based algorithms. In fact, the only non-code-based algorithm (SIKE) is now considered vulnerable. Due to this landscape, it is crucial to update previous results about these algorithms and their functioning. The Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation is a key part of the study of post-quantum algorithms and in this work we focus our analysis on Classic McEliece, BIKE and HQC proposals, and how they apply this transformation to obtain IND-CCA semantic security. Since after security the most important parameter in the evaluation of the algorithms is performance, we have compared the performance of the code-based algorithms of the NIST call considering the same architecture for all of them.

Tommie Shelby has offered an influential, carefully stated, and well-argued set of objections to any volitional analysis of racism (VAR) as consisting centrally in certain forms of race-based disregard. Here I hope to defend aspects of VAR by analyzing, evaluating, and sometimes countering several of his major contentions, which have stood unchallenged in the literature over more than two decades. First, I sketch and respond to his Methodological objection to VAR, which criticizes VAR's reliance on language and linguistic intuitions; then to a Psychological objection, which suggests that VAR implausibly distances an agent's intentions from her beliefs; and, finally, to a Psychopathological objection, which holds that VAR requires treating as unproblematic some psychological states better seen as aberrant. The following section treats three subtle counterexamples Shelby uses to challenge VAR's core contentions about what's necessary and what's sufficient for racism. I close with some gestures toward what I see as a promising approach, very different from his, to studying these topics.

Myles Brand's rather audacious goal in his new book is nothing less than "to usher in the next... stage of philosophical action theory," which stage he understands as its "naturalization". Hence the subtitle. Naturalization will consist, he explains, in showing that action theory is "continuous with scientific theory", especially with cognitive science and motivational psychology. One familiar with Stich's view that one moves from "folk psychology" to cognitive science by eliminating such mentalistic concepts as belief might think one naturalizes action theory by eliminating from it such concepts as belief, desire, motive, and intention. This, however, is not Brand's game. He thinks that "an understanding of human action depends on a scientific reading of intention". While he thinks that the cognitive psychology he discusses in chapters 7 and 8 has advanced our comprehension of what he calls the "cognitive component" in intention, the motivational psychology discussed in chapter 9 is in such "disarray" today that "there is presently no tenable scientific theory into which" what he calls the "conative component" of intention "can be transformed". These last three chapters range widely through the scientific literature on ideo-motor, program, script, drive, and expectancy theories. This discussion is detailed, technical, and sensitive to philosophical problems raised by the psychologists' claims and assumptions. Rare will be the philosopher who is not humbled, impressed, and informed by Brand's evident command and cogent critique of this material. Whether this work is of much philosophical value, I cannot say, but Brand is to be commended for taking "conceptual [philosophical] psychology [to be] the common base of scientific and folk psychology" and for holding that "a scientific psychological model is adequate only if it is compatible with the [philosophically] transformed conceptual claims of folk psychology". After Rorty, it takes courage to call both folk and scientific psychology before the bar of philosophy.

The main objective of this study is to analyse the relationship between peer school victimization and some risk and protection factors and to compare the differences by role in victimization with those of non-involved bystanders. Our participants were 1,264 secondary students (M = 14.41, SD = 1.43) who participated voluntarily, although an informed consent was requested. A logistic regression model (LR) was used in order to identify the victim’s potential risks and protective factors related to non-involved bystanders. A multiple LR and a forward stepwise LR (Wald) were used. The results showed the variables related to the victim profile were: individual features (to be male, to be at the first cycle of compulsory Secondary Education and a few challenging behaviours), school environments (i.e. school adjustment), family environment (parental styles like authoritarianism) and social environment (i.e. friends who occasionally show a positive attitude towards drug consumption and easy access to drugs, access to drugs perceived as easy, rejection by peers or lack of social acceptance and social maladjustment). The results of the study will allow tackling prevention and intervention actions in schools, families and social environment in order to improve coexistence at school and to assist the victimized students in the classroom.

The paper defends the thesis that for S to V intentionally is for S to V as (in the way) S intended to. For the normal agent the relevant sort of intention is an intention that one's intention to V generate an instance of one's V-ing along some (usually dimly-conceived) productive path. Such an account allows us to say some actions are intentional to a greater or lesser extent (a desirable option for certain cases of wayward causal chains), preserves the intuitive link between intention and intentionally, and supports the common sense view that the concept of intending is more basic than those of acting with an intention and of acting intentionally. The remainder of the paper responds to certain apparent counter-examples offered by Audi, Harman, and Bratman. In the course of this, I discuss connections between intending to V and hoping to V, and I argue that one can intend to do what one doesn't expect to do, and that one always intends what one attempts.

I here respond to several points in Faucher and Machery’s vigorous and informative critique of my volitional account of racism (VAR). First, although the authors deem it a form of "implicit racial bias," a mere tendency to associate black people with "negative" concepts falls short of racial "bias" or prejudice in the relevant sense. Second, such an associative disposition need not even be morally objectionable. Third, even for more substantial forms of implicit racial bias such as race-based fear or disgust, Faucher and Machery offer no account or explanation of when we should consider these racist, in whom, in what respect(s), or why. So, findings of implicit racial bias pose no clear objection to VAR. Fourth, because VAR allows not only racial hate, but also callous indifference, disdain, and other forms of racially driven disregard, to be racist,VAR is not "psychologically monist." Fifth, as VAR allows racist attitudes to be immoral in more than one way, offending against both the moral virtues of benevolence and justice, VAR is not "morally monist" either. I also reveal problems with some of Faucher and Machery’s other claims: Faucher and Machery take too narrow a conception of the types of psychology that can contribute to understanding racism; the internal complexity of hatred, which they approvingly mention, is irrelevant to VAR’s truth and undermines part of their criticism of VAR; whether some forms of racial bias are "racial ills" is irrelevant to VAR, which only analyzes racism; over-attention to implicit racial bias may cloak or exacerbate some of our society’s racial ills, or even constitute a new one. I conclude by noting that Faucher and Machery are not just critics of VAR but also allies of VAR in important controversies against those who insist racism lies primarily in social structures and institutions

I sketch and respond to Ryan Byerly’s distinction between a Value-Based Approach to assessing proposed accounts of a virtue-here, humility-and what he calls a Counterexample Based Approach. My first section, on method, argues that, though distinct, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and answer different questions. Engaging his claim that the former approach is superior to the latter, I suggest that we apply Byerly’s own idea that there are different kinds of value to show, contra Byerly, each approach may be better than the other in different ways, and for different purposes. Adapting and applying a point from Aristotle and Aquinas, I suggest that Byerly’s core question--what kind of values a virtue has--may rely on a mistake, that of misunderstanding a virtue’s work of making people and things good as its possessing goodness itself. My latter section, on results, points out difficulties for Byerly's altruistic conception of humility and defends my own view, developed in an earlier “Philosophia” article, that humility is essentially a matter of remaining unimpressed with oneself. I conclude by engaging and rebutting Byerly’s contention that his analysis of humility best captures a certain religious view

This essay rebuts Gary Seay's efforts to show that committing euthanasia need not conflict with a physician's professional duties. First, I try to show how his misunderstanding of the correlativity of rights and duties and his discussion of the foundation of moral rights undermine his case. Second, I show aspects of physicians' professional duties that clash with euthanasia, and that attempts to avoid this clash lead to absurdities. For professional duties are best understood as deriving from professional virtues and the commitments and purposes with which the professional as such ought to act, and there is no plausible way in which her death can be seen as advancing the patient's medical welfare. Third, I argue against Prof. Seay's assumption that apparent conflicts among professional duties must be resolved through "balancing" and argue that, while the physician's duty to extend life is continuous with her duty to protect health, any duty to relieve pain is subordinate to these. Finally, I show that what is morally determinative here, as throughout the moral life, is the agent's intention and that Prof. Seay's implicitly preferred consequentialism threatens not only to distort moral thinking but would altogether undermine the medical (and any other) profession and its internal ethics.

I first sketch an account of humility as a character trait in which we are unimpressed with our good, envied, or admired features, achievements, etc., where these lack significant salience for our image of ourselves, because of the greater prominence of our limitations and flaws. I situate this view among several other recent conceptions of humility (also called modesty), dividing them between the inward-directed and outward-directed, distinguish mine from them, pose problems for each alternative account, and show how my understanding of humility captures truths present but exaggerated in several of them. Responding to some problems for my view, including what I call “Driver’s Paradox”(i.e., the strangeness of someone’s proclaiming ‘I’m humble!’), I suggest that some over-ambitious claims about our moral responsibilities may indicate a lack of proper humility. I discuss the relationship of the character trait of humility both to what humiliates and to what humbles, concluding with consideration of the background assumptions against which, and the circumstances in which, humility may reasonably be classified as a moral virtue.

At the start of her vigorously argued and classic article, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” G. E. M. Anscombe stated three focal theses. First, that philosophers of the time needed to dispense with investigation into talk of what is morally right, wrong; permissible, forbidden, required; and of moral obligation or duty, what we morally ought to do. Second, there was no adequate philosophical psychology then available of the sort needed for doing good moral philosophy. Third, the differences among the modernist moral philosophers ( from, roughly, Hume's time through the mid-20th century) that had been most widely discussed were not as important as what they agreed on. I wish here to make some remarks about the sequel. More specifically, I will briefly discuss some aspects of how things have since played out with the first two theses, in order to say something about the relation between the first and second theses and about the state of things with respect to her third thesis, especially as it impacts today's medical ethics, a field of inquiry that barely existed at the time Anscombe wrote “Modern Moral Philosophy.”

This article responds to logical and social theses proposed by Professor José Medina in discussing the relativity of identity. In exploring the metaphor of family resemblance, the author argues that its causal mechanism is biological, not social; particular features of being a woman, or of belonging to a racial or ethnic group, cannot be reduced to social constructions. The article skeptically discusses the supposed importance of sex, race, and ethnicity to a person’s individual identity, and suggests that moral significance finds its origin and grounding elsewhere. It concludes that no liberation can be ‘complete, or even adequate’ until it liberates the mind from ‘“scripts” rooted in the delusion of “collective identities”’

Drawing chiefly on recent sources, in Part One I sketch an untraditional way of articulating what I claim to be central elements of traditional Catholic morality, treating it as based in virtues, focused on the recipients (“patients”) of our attention and concern, and centered in certain person-to-person role-relationships. I show the limited and derivative places of “natural law,” and therefore of sin, within that framework. I also sketch out some possible implications for medical ethics of this approach to moral theory, and briefly contrast these with the influential alternative offered by the “principlism” of Beauchamp and Childress. In Part Two, I turn to a Catholic understanding of the nature and meaning of human suffering, drawing especially on writings and addresses of the late Pope John Paul II. He reminds us that physical and mental suffering can provide an opportunity to share in Christ's salvific sacrifice, better to see the nature of our earthly vocation, and to reflect on the dependence that inheres in human existence. At various places, and especially in my conclusion, I suggest a few ways in which this can inform bioethical reflection on morally appropriate responses to those afflicted by physical or mental pain, disability, mental impairment, disease, illness, and poor health prospects. My general point is that mercy must be informed by appreciation of the person's dignity and status. Throughout, my approach is philosophical rather than theological.