Jesús Padilla Gálvez

This paper investigates the philosophical significance of Wittgenstein’s repudiation of private language, focusing on its implications for the semantic relation between language and reality. By tracing the development of Wittgenstein’s thought from the representational theory of meaning articulated in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the use-based conception advanced in the Philosophical Investigations, the paper demonstrates that the private language argument signals a decisive break from Cartesian dualism. In rejecting the possibility of a language whose expressions are intrinsically private and grounded solely in inner experience, Wittgenstein undermines the assumption that meaning can be founded on subjective mental states. Instead, he foregrounds the constitutive role of public criteria, communal practices, and rule-governed language games in establishing meaning. The paper contends that Wittgenstein’s argument is not merely a critique of the internal aspect of semantics but a fundamental reconfiguration of the mind–world relation, one that dissolves the inner/outer dichotomy, neutralizes the threat of skepticism, and reconceives linguistic meaning as inherently social and external. This shift, it is argued, lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and challenges foundational assumptions in traditional representationalist accounts of meaning.

This chapter deals with the discussion on the anti-Kantian proposal developed by Bolzano when he introduced the “Satz an sich”. Bolzano’s proposal clearly deviated from the idealistic tradition. As such, a gap was opened between representation on the one hand and the notion of “objective” on the other hand, which belongs to the field of assumptions. The aim was to assume an immanent object that is intentionally given. The Brentano School devoted extensive research to this topic. Aristotelian logic gives way to a new structure whose minor premise is a conditional structure that expresses what C. Stumpf coined as “Sachverhalt”, its English translation being “state of affairs.” This may be expressed in two different ways: as a that-clause or as something that “subsists”. This investigation focuses on the content of judgment when expressed as a state of affairs. Frege considered this content as predicative and Husserl regarded state of affairs is carrier of properties.Wittgenstein proposed a distinction between object and carrier. This investigation aims to clarify the question of states of affairs and its ontology.

La antropología filosófica de L. Wittgenstein está siendo discutida intensamente desde diferentes puntos de vista. El libro reflexiona alrededor de la propuesta de P. M. S. Hacker de su trabajo ‘El enfoque antropológico y etnológico de Wittgenstein’. El autor se interroga si cuando adoptamos una visión antropológica ubicamos nuestra posición externamente, para ver las cosas objetivamente. Para ello, se analiza el problema vinculado a la gramática y su constitución conceptual. Plantea hasta que punto compartimos los conceptos que usamos en nuestro enfoque antropológico. V. Sanfélix entiende que L. Wittgenstein ha ido desarrollando un historicismo sin historia y una etnología sin etnografía e indica que la utilidad de esta “etnología fantástica” ayuda a ganar una visión sinóptica de la gramática de nuestros conceptos. A. Tomasini Bassols reflexiona alrededor la plataforma sobre la que elabora la antropología filosófica y si se puede sostenerse que la obra de Wittgenstein contiene una antropología filosófica. L. Hertzberg examina el modo como Hacker analiza los conceptos. Repasa la distinción “analítico/sintético” y el “historicismo sin historia”. M. Holguín razona acerca de la “historia natural”. Desde su punto de vista, Hacker justifica los calificativos de aproximación “antropológica” o “etnológica” con el fin de describir una nueva perspectiva que le permite abordar los problemas conceptuales. W. Jacorzynski reconsidera el enfoque etnológico de Wittgenstein y se para a considerar el análisis conductual, la regularidad/uniformidad, la historicidad (“sin historia”), la autonomía y la arbitrariedad de la gramática. J. Sádaba profundiza acerca del esquema general desde donde se interpreta nuestra actividad existencial sin que por ello se proponga describir historiográficamente los recorridos de la humanidad. J. Padilla Gálvez ubica el programa antropológico en una fenomenología epistemológica que se caracteriza por el estudio del análisis del lenguaje usado y conjetura que el proyecto fenomenológico quedaría corto si analiza exclusivamente la gramática ya que esta carece de perspicuidad. Por esta razón, el programa requiere de un análisis amplio cuyo proyecto se complemente con la “representación perspicua”.

El libro que reseñamos estudia la naturaleza humana desde una perspectiva muy amplia al abordar el “potencial moral”. Efectivamente, la expresión inglesa “moral powers” es compleja de trasladar al castellano ya que hace referencia a la fuerza moral, aludiendo pues al rendimiento o la potestad moral; así como, la potencia humana y su capacidad moral. Nos encontramos ante un hito que estudia el valor en la vida y el pensamiento humano, escrito por uno de los pensadores contemporáneos más activos e importantes del momento. Estamos pues ante una investigación filosófica sobre las potencialidades y sensibilidades morales de los seres humanos, del significado de la vida humana y el lugar que ocupa la muerte en la vida. Se nos presentan unas reflexiones sobre antropología filosófica, es decir el estudio del marco conceptual mediante el cual pensamos, hablamos e investigamos acerca del ser humano, entendido en su horizonte social y cultural. El volumen examina la diversidad de valores en la vida humana y el lugar del valor moral dentro de las variedades de estos valores. El asunto crucial gira alrededor de la naturaleza del bien y el mal y la propensión humana a la virtud y al vicio. Examina las concepciones tradicionales sobre el valor ético y repasa críticamente los conceptos erróneos que se han ido introduciendo en la filosofía, la psicología o la neurociencia cognitiva.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression “form(s) of life” which translates into German as “Lebensform(en)” and “Form des Lebens”. The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on other scholars.

The liar analyzes in detail the genealogy of the paradox expressed by Epimenides when he claimed that all Cretans were liars. As he himself was a native of Crete, this expression was paradoxical since he expressed a truth by lying. Epimenides showed that it is possible to construct perfectly correct sentences according to grammatical and semantic rules, but that they in turn express a contradiction insofar as it is true and false indistinctly. Since the beginning of Western thought, the liar's paradox has been resolved from dissimilar points of view. The book will analyze the different proposals developed in order to deactivate their pernicious consequences for any theory of truth. Thus, Aristotle proposed that the liar should be considered a fallacy, so he attempted to dissolve the presumed validity of his argument through insightful distinctions around the secundum quid et simpliciter fallacy. Subsequently, solutions were tested within the framework of discursive, dialectical and hypothetical models. In the book those propositions that change their truth value over time are analyzed, those called in the metapiptonta tradition. In medieval times the liar was assumed to be insolubious. Special attention was given to the discussion around the transcasus. Kant approached the liar from the point of view of the white lies generated by the antinomies of reason. In modern times, special care was taken to translate the liar into new expressive forms in order to pose it from a merely formal point of view. For this reason the study of him focused on showing and describing his circular, self-referential and reflective character. This work emphasizes the study of the liar within the framework of occasional expressions. The self-reference of the liar's paradox is derived from referential expressions that result from the information expressed circumstantially within the framework of a surrounding context. For this reason we propose a systematic study of the occasional in order to dissolve the liar. Our proposal proposes to characterize the surrounding expressions that determine the liar's referential meaning.

The aim of this article is to analyze Wittgenstein's use of the notion of the philosophical superlative by which he describes the problems associated with ostensive definitions and language acquisition. After a brief outline of the research questions posed by Wittgenstein, the philosophical superlative is described and linked to the notion of super-expression. The skeptical argument is then analyzed and the ostensive definition is criticized from a skeptical point of view. In the work, special attention is paid to the analysis of the fallacies that may be associated with the philosophical superlative. Finally, skepticism is criticized for being an insufficient tool to reveal mythological errors in our language.

The book State of Affairs reconstructs the controversy over Sachverhalt in the German and Austria tradition. The author offers an overview of the different proposals made regarding the meaning of “Sachverhalt”. The aim is to present various approaches and show different perspectives and methods in studying its meaning. Each of these proposals provides a new definition of the concept. The main theme of these pages it to reproduce the debate about a concept that, finally, has come to be used efficiently in the legal field. The discussion reveals numerous aspects by which philosophy has contributed to this development.

The book State of Affairs reconstructs the controversy over Sachverhalt in the German and Austria tradition. The author offers an overview of the different proposals made regarding the meaning of “Sachverhalt”. The aim is to present various approaches and show different perspectives and methods in studying its meaning. Each of these proposals provides a new definition of the concept. The main theme of these pages it to reproduce the debate about a concept that, finally, has come to be used efficiently in the legal field. The discussion reveals numerous aspects by which philosophy has contributed to this development.

The aim of this article is to examine the concept of ›custom‹ (Gepflogenheit) in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Any meaningful human action is underpinned by rules. Custom is situated in the transition phase from the actual rule to the following of this rule. However, as the concept of ›rule‹ is a term with blurred edges and does not allow any ›interpretations behind interpretations‹, it can- not guarantee objectivity. Therefore, a platonic perspective must be adopted which involves fixed rules but makes it impossible to distinguish between appearance and reality. From a grammatical point of view, it is impossible for an agent to follow a rule privately and only once. In this context disposition characterizes the process of a game in two ways, both psychologically as well as physiologically. The notion of custom is examined in the context of an understanding of language game. For Wittgenstein, neither ›Intention‹ nor ›Absicht‹ are considered states of consciousness because they are only of temporary but not of permanent nature.

The aim of this article is to examine the concept of ›custom‹ (Gepflogenheit) in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Any meaningful human action is underpinned by rules. Custom is situated in the transition phase from the actual rule to the following of this rule. However, as the concept of ›rule‹ is a term with blurred edges and does not allow any ›interpretations behind interpretations‹, it can- not guarantee objectivity. Therefore, a platonic perspective must be adopted which involves fixed rules but makes it impossible to distinguish between appearance and reality. From a grammatical point of view, it is impossible for an agent to follow a rule privately and only once. In this context disposition characterizes the process of a game in two ways, both psychologically as well as physiologically. The notion of custom is examined in the context of an understanding of language game. For Wittgenstein, neither ›Intention‹ nor ›Absicht‹ are considered states of consciousness because they are only of temporary but not of permanent nature.

Verdad se usa con frecuencia para expresar que una proposición se corresponde con los hechos, la realidad o es fiel a algo original. Muchas actividades humanas se sirven del concepto de “verdad” si bien se presupone su significado intuitivo. El concepto de verdad se debate en este libro principalmente desde tres tradiciones distintas: la teoría clásica, la propuesta semántica y la opción alternativa. Comúnmente, la verdad se ve como la correspondencia del lenguaje o el pensamiento con una realidad independiente. Por el contrario, una teoría semántica de la verdad es una teoría que sostiene que la verdad es una propiedad de las proposiciones. Este punto de vista ha recalcado en presentar una definición satisfactoria que sea materialmente adecuada y formalmente correcta del predicado verdadero. La concepción semántica de verdad se relaciona de diferentes maneras tanto con la correspondencia como con las concepciones deflacionistas. Sin embargo, una convención que satisfaga el predicado de verdad para ciertos enunciados de un lenguaje dado no se puede definir dentro de ese lenguaje. Mediante esta propuesta se intenta resolver la paradoja del mentiroso. Por el contrario, las propuestas alternativas consideran que la definición de semántica es artificiosa empobreciendo así la dimensión veritativa del lenguaje ordinario en el que los hablantes se expresan. Su propuesta pretende devolver al lenguaje natural su significatividad original del predicado “verdad(ero)”. Kripke demuestra que un lenguaje puede contener consistentemente su propio predicado de la verdad, algo que Alfred Tarski consideraba imposible. El enfoque se asienta en definir “verdad” como propiedad parcialmente definida sobre el conjunto de enunciados gramaticalmente bien formados en el lenguaje. El libro aborda los temas afines, presentando las pruebas y refutaciones propuestas en cada alternativa.

Cílem tohoto článku je rekonstruovat Wittgensteinův příspěvek na poli estetiky. Ohnisko zájmu spočívá v teorii smyslového vnímání. Tuto teorii lze charakterizovat jako program "minimálně viděného"; bude analyzována fenomenologickou metodou. V souvislosti se zorným prostorem zkoumám tři problémy: rozostřenost, neurčitost a smyslový dojem. Rozdíl mezi zorným prostorem a euklidovským prostorem může být vymezen srovnáním jejich typických struktur. Budu analyzovat vztah mezi vnímáním lidských bytostí na jedné straně a jejich zorným prostorem na straně druhé. Zorný prostor lze srovnat se dvoudimenzionálním obrazem. Dále je třeba vyjasnit roli barev v programu "minimálně viděného".