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104This essay explores the nature of an important collective emotion, namely, collective remorse. Three accounts of collective remorse are presented and evaluated. The first involves an aggregate of group members remorseful over acts of their own associated with their group's act; the second an aggregate of persons remorseful over their group's act. The third account posits, in terms that are explained, a joint commitment of a group's members to constitute as far as is possible a single remorseful …Read more
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95Shared values, social unity, and libertyPublic Affairs Quarterly 19 (1): 25-49. 2005.May social unity - the unity of a society or social group - be a matter of sharing values? Political philosophers disagree on this topic. Kymlicka answers: No. Devlin and Rawls answer: Yes. It is argued that given one common 'summative' account of sharing values a negative answer is correct. A positive answer is correct, however, given the plural subject account of sharing values. Given this account, those who share values are unified in a substantial way by their participation in a joint commit…Read more
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95Can a Wise Society Be a Free One?Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1): 151-167. 2006.This article invokes the idea of a wise society, something that has received little attention from contemporary philosophers. It argues that, given plausible interpretations of the relevant terms, the wiser a society is, the less free it is. Even if one prefers a different account of a wise society, the argument in question is significant, for on this account a wise society possesses features that would seem to be desirable whatever their relationship to wisdom in particular: it makes many true …Read more
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157Remarks on collective beliefIn Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 235-56. 1994.The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain proposition as a bo…Read more
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358Obligation and Joint CommitmentUtilitas 11 (2): 143. 1999.I argue that obligations of an important type inhere in what I call 'joint commitments'. I propose a joint commitment account of everyday agreements. This could explain why some philosophers believe that we know of the obligating nature of agreements a priori. I compare and contrast obligations of joint commitment with obligations in the relatively narrow sense recommended by H. L. A. Hart, a recommendation that has been influential. Some central contexts in which Hart takes there to be obligati…Read more
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113Socializing Metaphysics: The Nature of Social RealityRowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003.Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.
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197Game Theory and “Convention‘Synthese 46 (1). 1981.A feature of David Lewis's account of conventions in his book "Convention" which has received admiring notices from philosophers is his use of the mathematical theory of games. In this paper I point out a number of serious flaws in Lewis's use of game theory. Lewis's basic claim is that conventions cover 'coordination problems'. I show that game-Theoretical analysis tends to establish that coordination problems in Lewis's sense need not underlie conventions.
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270Vices and self-knowledgeJournal of Philosophy 68 (15): 443-453. 1971.Towards an account of character traits in self-Knowledge, With an assessment of the sartrean thesis ("spectatorism") that character trait concepts are fitted for other-Ascription rather than self-Ascription. The logic of ascriptions of evil character and specific vices is dealt with. The relationship of self-Ascription to self-Falsification and "seeing oneself as an object" is examined. Self-Ascription has peculiarities, But at most a very mild form of spectatorism is born out.
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16Critical notice: Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (review)Noûs 33 (2): 295-303. 2002.
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338Social convention revisitedTopoi (1-2): 5-16. 2008.This article will compare and contrast two very different accounts of convention: the game-theoretical account of Lewis in Convention, and the account initially proposed by Margaret Gilbert (the present author) in chapter six of On Social Facts, and further elaborated here. Gilbert’s account is not a variant of Lewis’s. It was arrived at in part as the result of a detailed critique of Lewis’s account in relation to a central everyday concept of a social convention. An account of convention need …Read more
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256What is it to do something with another person? In the author's book On Social Facts and elsewhere, she has conjectured that a special type of commitment - joint commitment - lies at the root of acting together and many other central social phenomena. Here she surveys some data pertinent to this conjecture, including the assumption of those who act together that they have associated rights against and obligations towards each other. She explains what joint commitment is, how it relates to the da…Read more
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49Pro Patria: An Essay on PatriotismThe Journal of Ethics 13 (4): 319-346. 2009.This essay focuses on what patriotism is, as opposed to the value of patriotism. It focuses further on the basic patriotic motive: one acts with this motive if one acts on behalf of one's country as such. I first argue that pre-theoretically the basic patriotic motive is sufficient to make an act patriotic from a motivational point of view. In particular the agent need not ascribe virtues or achievements to his country nor need he feel towards it the emotions characteristic of love. Why should o…Read more
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5Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 13 (4): 168-170. 1993.
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