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3818Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups: Some Methodological ConsiderationsIn Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.This paper argues for a methodological point that bears on a relatively long-standing debate concerning collective beliefs in the sense elaborated by Margaret Gilbert: are they cases of belief or rather of acceptance? It is argued that epistemological accounts and distinctions developed in individual epistemology on the basis of considering the individual case are not necessarily applicable to the collective case or, more generally, uncritically to be adopted in collective epistemology.
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2Collective Intentions, Commitment, and Collective Action ProblemsIn Fabienne Peter (ed.), rationality and commitment, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 258. 2007.
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172Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social PhenomenaAnalyse & Kritik 30 (2): 483-514. 2008.Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people s…Read more
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306Agreements, conventions, and languageSynthese 54 (3). 1983.The question whether and in what way languages and language use involve convention is addressed, With special reference to David Lewis's account of convention in general. Data are presented which show that Lewis has not captured the sense of 'convention' involved when we speak of adopting a linguistic convention. He has, In effect, attempted an account of social conventions. An alternative account of social convention and an account of linguistic convention are sketched.
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116Sociality as a philosophically significant categoryJournal of Social Philosophy 25 (3): 5-25. 1994.Different accounts of what it is for something to have a social nature have been given. Sociality does not appear to be a category worthy of philosophical focus, given some of these accounts. If sociality is construed as plural subjecthood, it emerges as a category crucial for our understanding of the human condition. Plural subjects are constituted by a joint commitment of two or more persons to do something as a body. Such commitments generate rights and obligations of a special type, and unde…Read more
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111One for All: The Logic of Group ConflictPhilosophical Review 107 (1): 135. 1998.Russell Hardin writes from a particular perspective, that of rational choice theory. His broad—and ambitious—overall project is to “understand the sway of groups in our time” or, in an alternative formulation, “to understand the motivations of those who act on behalf of groups and to understand how they come to identify with the groups for which they act”.
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138In search of socialityPhilosophical Explorations 1 (3). 1998.This paper reviews some of the growing body of work in the analytic philosophy of social phenomena, with special reference to the question whether adequate accounts of particular social phenomena can be given in terms that are individualistic in a sense that is specified. The discussion focusses on accounts of what have come to be known as shared intention and action. There is also some consideration of accounts of social convention and collective belief. Particular attention is paid to the need…Read more
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