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35Further Reflections on the Social WorldProtoSociology 35 257-284. 2018.This discussion responds to a collection of papers that relate in one way or another to the author’s work in the philosophy of social phenomena. It focuses on those passages that deal most directly with that work. After making some general points that respond to remarks in several of the papers, it turns to the individual papers. The subjects discussed include coordination, conversation, collective beliefs and emotions, joint commitment, obligations and rights, patriotism, promises, the pronoun …Read more
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21Coordination problems and the evolution of behaviorBehavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1): 106. 1984.
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471Collective epistemologyEpisteme 1 (2): 95--107. 2004.This paper introduces the author's approach to everyday ascriptions of collective cognitive states as in such statements as we believe he is lying. Collective epistemology deals with these ascriptions attempting to understand them and the phenomena in question.
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273Belief and acceptance as features of groupsProtoSociology 16 35-69. 2002.In everyday discourse groups or collectives are often said to believe this or that. The author has previously developed an account of the phenomenon to which such collective belief statements refer. According to this account, in terms that are explained, a group believes that p if its members are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. Those who fulfill these conditions are referred to here as collectively believing* that p. Some philosophers – here labeled rejectionists – have argued tha…Read more
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773Agreements, coercion, and obligationEthics 103 (4): 679-706. 1993.Typical agreements can be seen as joint decisions, inherently involving obligations of a distinctive kind. These obligations derive from the joint commitment' that underlies a joint decision. One consequence of this understanding of agreements and their obligations is that coerced agreements are possible and impose obligations. It is not that the parties to an agreement should always conform to it, all things considered. Unless one is released from the agreement, however, one has some reason to …Read more
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20Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and HelmreichPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2): 525-538. 2023.
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14Precis of Rights and Demands: A Foundational InquiryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2): 493-498. 2023.
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Part III. Individual and collective epistemology. Social roots of human knowledge / Ernest Sosa ; Belief, acceptance, and what happens in groups : some methodological considerationsIn Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2014.
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186Is an agreement an exchange of promises?Journal of Philosophy 90 (12): 627-649. 1993.This paper challenges the common assumption that an agreement is an exchange of promises. Proposing that the performance obligations of some typical agreements are simultaneous, interdependent, and unconditional, it argues that no promise-exchange has this structure of obligations. In addition to offering general considerations in support of this claim, it examines various types of promise-exchange, showing that none satisfy the criteria noted. Two forms of conditional promise are distinguished …Read more
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28Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and ConstraintsMind 111 (442): 399-403. 2002.
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8Review of Walter L. Wallace: Principles of Scientific Sociology (review)Ethics 98 (1): 180-181. 1987.
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77Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart’s Account, and an Alternative Proposal (review)Law and Philosophy 18 (2): 141-171. 1999.What is a social rule? This paper first notes three important problems for H.L.A. Hart's famous answer in the Concept of Law. An alternative account that avoids the problems is then sketched. It is less individualistic than Hart's and related accounts. This alternative account can explain a phenomenon observed but downplayed by Hart: the parties to a social rule feel that they are in some sense 'bound' to conform to it.
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Dialogue and Joint CommitmentIn Maura Priest & Margaret Gilbert (eds.), Les Defis de Collectif. forthcoming.
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246Social RulesIn Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, Sage Publications. 2013.
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503Conversation and Collective BeliefIn Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, Springer. 2013.
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158Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject TheoryRowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2000.One of the most distinguished living social philosophers, Margaret Gilbert develops and extends her application of plural subject theory of human sociality, first introduced in her earlier works On Social Facts and Living Together. Sociality and Responsibility presents an extended discussion of her proposal that joint commitments inherently involve obligations and rights, proposing, in effect, a new theory of obligations and rights. In addition, it demonstrates the extensive range and fruitfulne…Read more
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1Acting togetherIn Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research, Dr. Haensel-hohenhausen. 2002.
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549On Social FactsRoutledge. 1989.This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
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187Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social WorldOup Usa. 2013.This new essay collection by distinguished philosopher Margaret Gilbert provides a richly textured argument for the importance of joint commitment in our personal and public lives. Topics covered by this diverse range of essays range from marital love to patriotism, from promissory obligation to the unity of the European Union
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104This essay explores the nature of an important collective emotion, namely, collective remorse. Three accounts of collective remorse are presented and evaluated. The first involves an aggregate of group members remorseful over acts of their own associated with their group's act; the second an aggregate of persons remorseful over their group's act. The third account posits, in terms that are explained, a joint commitment of a group's members to constitute as far as is possible a single remorseful …Read more
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95Shared values, social unity, and libertyPublic Affairs Quarterly 19 (1): 25-49. 2005.May social unity - the unity of a society or social group - be a matter of sharing values? Political philosophers disagree on this topic. Kymlicka answers: No. Devlin and Rawls answer: Yes. It is argued that given one common 'summative' account of sharing values a negative answer is correct. A positive answer is correct, however, given the plural subject account of sharing values. Given this account, those who share values are unified in a substantial way by their participation in a joint commit…Read more
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